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# FM 34-36

# SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS

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

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FIELD MANUAL
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FM 34-36
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 30 September 1991

# SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS

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# PREFACE

Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) need timely and accurate intelligence and information to–

- Plan missions.
- Protect the command.
- Secure the element of surprise.
- Identify and develop targets.
- Protect friendly command, control, and communications ($C^3$).

This is done across the operational continuum of peacetime competition, conflict, and war.

This manual focuses on the missions and functions of intelligence elements and organizations which provide intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) support to ARSOF organizations. It provides doctrine for special operations forces (SOF) IEW operations, including military intelligence (MI) organizations, missions, functions, and capabilities from support operations team-A (SOT-A) and S2 section levels to SOF and the senior intelligence officer (SIO) at the joint level. It shows how these IEW assets meet ARSOF operational needs within the established IEW system. It also lays out some "how to" techniques and procedures required to conduct IEW operations within the framework of the intelligence cycle.

This manual expands upon the doctrine in FM 34-1 and FM 100-25. This doctrine is written specifically for SOF S2s, military intelligence (MI) commanders, and other assigned MI personnel, and the elements which support them. It also includes SOF commanders and their staffs. The doctrine reflects current Army SOF IEW capabilities.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

The proponent of this publication is US Army Intelligence Center. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, US Army Intelligence Center, ATTN: ATSI-TDL-D, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.

This manual does not implement any International Standardization Agreements (ISAs). It complies with Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) 2033, 2044, and 2084; and with Quadripartite Standardization Agreements (QSTAGs) 170, 523, and 528.

# CHAPTER 1

# ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND THE INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEM

This chapter introduces ARSOF units and the IEW system that supports them. It contains historical examples of IEW support to ARSOF. It places ARSOF IEW requirements in perspective by comparing them with the IEW requirements of conventional combat units. It also discusses the intelligence cycle and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process.

## ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

ARSOF includes Special Forces (SF), rangers, special operations aviation (SOA), psychological operations (PSYOP) units, and civil affairs (CA) units—these are discussed in Chapters 4 through 8. Figure 1-1 shows the ARSOF organizational structure based in the continental United States (CONUS). The seven primary ARSOF missions are—

- Direct action (DA).
- Special reconnaissance (SR).
- Counterterrorism (CT).
- Unconventional warfare (UW).
- Foreign internal defense (FID).
- PSYOP.
- CA.

ARSOF are forces specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations (SO) or to provide direct support (DS) to other SOF. ARSOF—

- Provide a flexible military capability to defend US national interests.
- Play an important part of our total defense posture and are a strategic instrument of national policy.
- Give the National Command Authority (NCA) options from which they can choose to respond to international situations at reasonable cost and risk to US interests.
- Deploy in regions of national geopolitical and military interest to support unified and specified (U&S) commands.

Missions are assigned to ARSOF to directly support the operational requirements of the theater commander-in-chief (CINC). These missions are integrated, vital elements of both theater strategy and national objectives. ARSOF missions and activities span the operational continuum from peacetime competition through conflict to war. Figures 1-2 and 1-3 show the operational continuum.

Commanders need properly executed and timely collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence and combat information across the operational continuum. ARSOF commanders use the IEW system to prevent surprises and to concentrate fighting forces and combat systems where they will be most effective.

At the tactical level, the IEW mission is to support commanders with situation development, target development, electronic warfare (EW), and counterintelligence (CI). At the operational and strategic level, the IEW mission also includes indications and warning (I&W). Figure 1-4 shows the IEW mission.

The IEW system supporting ARSOF includes organizations and assets from the national level down to and including the tactical ARSOF soldier in the field. This system supports all ARSOF activities across the operational continuum.




Figure 1-1. CONUS ARSOF organizational structure.




**Figure 1-2. Operational continuum.**




**Figure 1-3. Example of operational continuum for Desert Shield and Desert Storm.**




**Figure 1-4. The intelligence and electronic warfare mission.**

## OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM

The operational continuum is a dynamic spectrum consisting of three environments: peacetime competition, conflict, and war. Within this continuum, the US can find itself in peacetime competition with one nation and at war with another nation, while in conflict with still another nation—all at the same time. Moreover, as recent peacetime contingency missions (such as URGENT FURY, JUST CAUSE, OPERATION DESERT SHIELD, and OPERATION DESERT STORM) reveal, the operational continuum is not a one-way street but rather a multi-path avenue which permits operations to flow in all directions.

Figure 1-3 shows how OPERATION DESERT SHIELD and OPERATION DESERT STORM flowed along the operational continuum. Initially, the US and Iraq were in an environment of peacetime competition that began at the end of the Iran-Iraq War.

The US was hoping to gain some influence over Baghdad and pull them out of the Soviet sphere. But in July 1990, Iraq massed troops on the Kuwait border and threatened to invade if Kuwait, among other things, did not cut its oil production. The US response was mostly in the diplomatic arena; however, we held some joint air defense exercises with our Persian Gulf allies which placed us on the verge of a conflict environment on the operational continuum.

When Iraq appeared to back off, the situation appeared to remain in a peacetime competition environment. However, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent execution of OPERATION DESERT SHIELD, the US and Iraq entered the environment of conflict.

Had OPERATION DESERT SHIELD succeeded in convincing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, then it would not have been necessary to move into the next environment of the continuum—war. However, when months of diplomatic and military maneuvering failed, the US and its allies initiated OPERATION DESERT STORM. At this point, we crossed over into the war environment.

Initially, the allies limited their actions to aerial bombing, hoping to persuade Iraq to withdraw. However, Iraq's failure to withdraw forced the allied move deeper into the war environment. After the 100-hour ground war, the allies called a halt to offensive operations but maintained forces inside Iraq—thus moving into the conflict phase of the continuum.

Still within the conflict environment of the continuum, the situation with the Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq caused the US to initiate OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT. This was a disaster (manmade) relief effort under the heading of a Peacetime Contingency Operation.

Although the final chapter in the war with Iraq remains uncompleted, the allied goal is to work through the operational continuum while rebuilding Kuwait and Iraq and to reestablish a peacetime competition environment. However, it is up to Iraq whether that happens. The potential exists for the US to shift backwards through conflict and war again before achieving peace.

The ARSOF SIO must be prepared to meet the commander's intelligence requirements for any mission and be able to anticipate what new requirements might arise as the operation flows along the continuum.

## HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Timely and accurate intelligence and unprocessed combat information can be a significant factor in operational success. Historically, the commander who has superior knowledge of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) factors has a critical edge in combat. As the following examples show, the more information and intelligence commanders have, the greater their chances for success.

- In January 1945, timely and accurate intelligence enabled the 6th Ranger Battalion to rescue 511 American and Allied prisoners from a Japanese prisoner of war (PW) compound near Cabanatuan in the Philippines.

- During the Korean War the intelligence community identified enemy vulnerabilities for exploitation by psychological warfare teams. These efforts were

very successful in lowering the morale, reducing combat effectiveness, and encouraging desertion and defection of communist troops. In summary, it is estimated that 65 percent of more than 150,000 communist PWs said US psychological warfare had some influence on their decision to surrender.

- In South Vietnam, the combined intelligence center's imagery interpretation (II) photographic study program provided valuable intelligence that helped SF units set up camp and hamlet security. Often these camps became isolated strongpoints astride communist infiltration routes and were a constant thorn in the side of the North Vietnamese.

- In Panama, timely and accurate intelligence enabled US forces to achieve all mission objectives within a short time. While this intelligence resulted in a quick end to the fighting, gaps in the intelligence support to post-hostilities operations (population resource control, military government) slowed the transition from combat to nation building.

- In Iraq, superb intelligence support resulted in an overwhelming victory over the Iraqi armed forces. Intelligence also played a key role in dealing with the Shiite Muslims in occupied southern Iraq. However, in northern Iraq, the US had to play catch-up to determine the direction the Kurdish rebellion was taking and was reconnoitering for suitable sites for refugee camps. This occurred only days before the camps were to be established.

What history tells us is that the intelligence community does an excellent job of supporting combat operations. However, it is incumbent upon both the IEW system and ARSOF to identify intelligence requirements for operations across the operational continuum to include pre- and post-hostilities phases.

## COMBAT INFORMATION

Combat information is unevaluated data. It is gathered by ARSOF elements during any combat operation or wartime environment. This information is provided directly to the ARSOF commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into intelligence in time to satisfy the user's intelligence requirements.

Information becomes intelligence once it is collected, evaluated, analyzed, integrated, and interpreted. In other words, the distinction between combat and intelligence is in how the information is processed and used. When information must be processed and analyzed, or if it needs to be integrated with other data and then analyzed and interpreted, it is intelligence and not combat information. Information may be both combat information and intelligence, but in sequence. (See FM 34-1, Chapter 2.)

Unevaluated information collected by ARSOF units during target specific operations is considered combat information. It can be combined later with other intelligence or information as part of the all-source intelligence product. Only after the data is validated, analyzed, and processed does it become intelligence. (See FM 6-20-10.) There are two types of intelligence products: single-source and all-source.

### SINGLE-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

If the sources of an intelligence product are from only one intelligence discipline, the final product is called a single-source intelligence product. The following are SOF-related examples of each intelligence discipline:

- Human intelligence (HUMINT) is intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. ARSOF units provide the IEW system with HUMINT through SR and debriefings of units after operations. SR is explained in detail in Chapter 4. MI units support ARSOF with HUMINT through controlled collection and tactical interrogation operations. (See FM 34-60, Chapter 5; and FM 34-52, Chapter 3.)

- Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is intelligence that includes all communications intelligence (COMINT), electronics intelligence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). ARSOF units use SIGINT to prepare for and conduct infiltration and exfiltration; to locate actual or potential threat positions; and to analyze possible courses of action (COAs). ARSOF units can collect limited COMINT with organic assets. (See FM 34-40, Chapter 4.)

- Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is intelligence derived from the exploitation of products from visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors. ARSOF units use IMINT for targeting, infiltration and exfiltration, and general reconnaissance or area orientation. (See FM 34-55, Chapters 1 and 2.)

- Technical intelligence (TECHINT) is intelligence concerning foreign technological developments, and the performance and operational capabilities of foreign materiel, which have or may eventually have a practical application for military use. ARSOF use TECHINT products to exploit foreign weapons. Since ARSOF units operate deep in hostile or denied territory, they are often first to discover, identify, and provide information concerning new or previously unidentified material. (See FM 34-54, Chapters 1, 3, and 4.)

- Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) is a highly sophisticated application of state-of-the-art technology and processing techniques to detect and identify specific foreign weapon systems based on inadvertent signatures. This identification aids in determining capabilities and intentions. ARSOF units use MASINT for developing target data.

### ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

All-source intelligence can be a combination of combat information, intelligence from more than one intelligence discipline, or even data from previously completed all-source intelligence products. To be called all-source intelligence, it must contain information from at least two of the intelligence disciplines.

## THE NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT

Today, ARSOF commanders depend even more on timely, accurate intelligence and combat information than did their historical counterparts. ARSOF commanders must be able to exploit METT-T factors to their advantage and to capture and keep the vital element of surprise throughout the operational continuum.

ARSOF commanders need IEW support because it is crucial in assisting the commander to make informed decisions during the decision-making process. All IEW disciplines are ARSOF operational multipliers. Each discipline provides the accurate, sensitive, and timely intelligence and combat information commanders need to complete their missions successfully. IEW supports ARSOF commanders as they plan and execute effective maneuver, firepower, force protection, and leadership.

SIGINT and EW are operational multipliers because these assets provide ARSOF commanders with passive and active means to protect $C^3$ systems. SIGINT and EW are employed by combining both offensive and defensive operations, as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Assets and products from disciplines like HUMINT and IMINT are also valuable combat multipliers because they provide information or intelligence that cannot be obtained otherwise.

Each intelligence discipline supports the final product by confirming or denying the validity of information collected by the other disciplines. IEW products are gathered and integrated into all-source intelligence products to support the commander's concept of operations.

ARSOF commanders and their staffs must understand how the IEW system works and how to integrate IEW assets and products, along with the principles of integration, synchronization, and interoperability, to support their concept of the mission. The environments and types of operations will, of course, vary. The key to effective ARSOF intelligence support is for ARSOF to fully use the intelligence system. To do this, ARSOF operators must work with supporting intelligence agencies to sensitize the intelligence community to ARSOF requirements.

## THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

The ARSOF SIO is the ARSOF commander's link to the total IEW system. The commander relies on the SIO to provide intelligence and combat information when needed. The ARSOF commander directs the IEW process by establishing the commander's critical information requirements. These requirements consist of the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR)

and information requirements (IR) and the operational requirements for the staff.

The SIO must know the composition of the IEW system, the ARSOF SIO's place in it, and how to use it; otherwise, the SIO cannot answer the commander's PIR and IR. Figure 1-5 shows SOF IEW requirements.

The SIO plans, supervises, and coordinates collection and analysis efforts to make sure the commander and staff elements get timely combat information and intelligence products. Using the intelligence cycle and the IPB process, the SIO develops and maintains an intelligence data base.

## THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

The existing intelligence cycle is tailored to meet ARSOF IEW requirements. The intelligence cycle is used by the SIO to ensure the commander is supplied with pertinent, timely, and continuous intelligence products and combat information.

As its name implies, the intelligence cycle is continuous. It has no true beginning nor end and, although each step is done sequentially, all phases are done concurrently. The intelligence cycle, which is shown in Figure 1-6, consists of four steps: directing, collecting, processing, and disseminating and using. Supervising and planning are inherent in all phases of the cycle. Chapter 2 discusses the intelligence cycle in detail.

## INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

The SIO uses the IPB process to provide answers to the commander's PIR and IR. IPB gives the commander and staff a continuous picture of METT-T and other operational factors. They use this information as a guide to determine where and when to use available resources. The IPB product is continually updated and briefed to the commander, who uses this information when making decisions. Figure 1-7 shows the IPB process. The TTP of IPB to support SOF operations are in Chapter 10. Details of IPB process are in FM 34-130, Chapter 4.

## INTELLIGENCE DATA BASE

All MI officers maintain a general data base for their commander's assigned AO as well as for potential contingency areas. This data base contains information on threat, weather, terrain, sociology, politics, training, economics, psychology, and other factors. The mission and the commander's direction define the parameters of the data base.

ARSOF commanders and their staffs also maintain intelligence data bases, but these bases are three-tiered pyramidical bases; they consist of generic data, durable data, and perishable data, as shown in Figure 1-8.

Generic data, shown at the bottom of the figure, is information common to or characteristic of a whole group or class rather than an individual or specific target; for example, fundamental, critical components of thermal power generation that are found at any thermal power generation plant anywhere in the world.

The middle tier contains site, system, or area specific data that are not time perishable. This includes durable information about existing natural and synthetic terrain features, installations, equipment, and personnel. It also includes imagery blueprints, layout diagrams, flow charts, maps, demographics, biographics, and other data that will not change significantly for as long as such features, installations, equipment, or personnel exist. (Both the lowest and middle tiers of data are assembled before a warning order is issued and address what may be targeted by ARSOF.)

The top tier contains site, system, or area specific real time or near-real-time (NRT) data that are time perishable. This includes transitory information about existing installations, equipment, and personnel. It is assembled after a warning order is issued and focuses on the actual locations and status of people, places, and things that will be targeted by ARSOF. Examples of data in this tier include guard routines, locations of hostages, operational status of special weapons, and transport and delivery systems during the ARSOF targeting window.

The ARSOF commander and staff use this data throughout the mission planning process. Figure 1-9 shows how the commander's guidance and interpretation of the operation plan (OPLAN) set the parameters of the data base and support operational and logistical planning.




**Figure 1-5. SOF IEW requirements system.**




**Figure 1-6. The intelligence cycle.**




**Figure 1-7. IPB process.**


SITE, SYSTEM, AREA SPECIFIC REAL OR NEAR-REAL-TIME PERISHABLE DATA
SITE, SYSTEM, OR AREA SPECIFIC DURABLE DATA
GENERIC DATA

**Figure 1-8. ARSOF data bases.**




**Figure 1-9. SOF mission planning.**

## INTELLIGENCE CYCLE AND MISSION PLANNING PROCESS

The intelligence cycle directly correlates with the command, intelligence, operations, and logistics processes for ARSOF mission planning. Figure 1-10 shows how the SOF commander keys the directing step of the intelligence cycle and defines the parameters of the intelligence data base. The development and maintenance of the SOF intelligence pyramid falls within the collecting and processing steps of the intelligence cycle. The dissemination step of the intelligence cycle ensures that the ARSOF operations and logistics elements receive the intelligence they need to plan, equip, and execute the operation.




**Figure 1-10. Correlating the SOF mission planning process and the MI intelligence cycle.**

# CHAPTER 2

# INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT

The ARSOF commander employs the IEW system throughout the operational continuum. This chapter describes how the total IEW system works with ARSOF to accomplish the mission. ARSOF commanders have limited organic IEW assets and depend highly on connectivity with theater and national level intelligence agencies for operational intelligence support. Figure 2-1 lists these assets by organization and echelon.

## THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

All intelligence operations follow a four-step process known as the intelligence cycle. The mission drives the intelligence cycle. Supervising and planning are inherent in each step of it. Figure 2-2 shows ARSOF unit intelligence cycle functional responsibilities.

The intelligence cycle is continuous. Even though the four steps are conducted in sequence, all are conducted concurrently. While available information is processed, additional information is collected, and the intelligence staff is planning and directing the collection effort to meet new demands.

Previously collected and processed information (intelligence) is disseminated as soon as it is available or needed. Often this process must be compressed to meet mission requirements. For example, ranger battalions must deploy and be target-bound within 18 hours. Products resulting from this process are used to support the ARSOF commander's changing PIR and IR.

Intelligence planning begins concurrently with other staff planning. Until an intelligence estimate is available, detailed operational planning cannot be completed. The SIO must be ready to provide an estimate for the next operation and revise the current estimate to meet changing operational conditions.

As planning progresses and operational details are developed, the commander continues the decision-making process. As a result, intelligence plans are either substantiated or changed. The farther an operation is projected into the future, the more likely it is that changes in the situation will alter intelligence plans. The commander's intent, concept of the mission, and the intelligence estimate are the basis for allocating resources. Intelligence planning and supervising must remain flexible. IPB is an integral part of planning and supervising throughout the intelligence cycle.

Both the intelligence cycle and the IPB process are cyclic in nature. Just like the intelligence cycle, all IPB functions are performed continuously and simultaneously to support the commander's concept and mission. The estimate is developed from conclusions derived from the IPB process and from information drawn from intelligence data bases.

### DIRECTING

The commander, through the SIO, directs the intelligence effort. The ARSOF S2 performs collection management planning before the operation begins and guides the effective employment of collection resources during the operation. The graphic data bases are developed and maintained through research and IPB. IPB, coupled with available data bases, provides a foundation for situation and target development. This provides a means for projecting battlefield events and activities in the operational area and for predicting COAs. By comparing these projections with actual events and activities as they occur, the SIO can provide the commander with timely, complete, and accurate intelligence.

Intelligence agencies from national level down constantly develop and maintain intelligence data bases. The SIO accesses these data bases to prepare initial intelligence estimates and to analyze the area of operations (AO) showing probable foreign COAs. This analysis is based on mission requirements and the commander's PIR. The product resulting from this guidance is an intelligence estimate. (See FM 34-1, Appendix B.) The intelligence estimate is integrated with other staff estimates. It is presented to the commander who decides what actions are needed to accomplish the mission.

| ECHELON | PRODUCERS | ORGANIC RESOURCES | REQUESTS SPT FROM |
|---|---|---|---|
| EAC | J2<br>JIC<br>SOC J2<br>Theater Army G2<br>EACIC | Interrogators<br>TECHINT analysts<br>Controlled collection<br>MDCI spt<br>SIGINT analysts<br>HF jamming<br>IMINT collection and analysis | Theater USAF, USN, USMC, national level agencies, and host nation allies |
| TASOSC | ISE | Analysts | SOC J2<br>EACIC<br>Theater Army G2 |
| USASOC **<br>USASFC *<br>USACAPOC | G2<br>DCSINT<br>G2 | Analysts (all) | SO J2, USSOCOM **<br>TASOSC * |
| SF Group | Group S2 Staff<br>Group MI Det<br>Bn S2 Staff<br>Bn MI Det | SR teams<br>MDCI spt<br>Interrogators<br>SOT-A<br>TCAE<br>Imagery analysts<br>Soldiers | USASFC **<br>SOC, JTF, TASOSC* |
| Ranger Regiment | Regt S2 Staff<br>Bn S2 Staff | MDCI<br>Regt Recon Det<br>Soldiers<br>Patrols<br>Analysts<br>Imagery analysts | USASOC **<br>SOC, JTF, TASOSC* |
| SOA | Regt S2 Staff<br>Bn S2 Staff | Air crews<br>Soldiers<br>Analysts | USASOC **<br>SOC, JTF, TASOSC* |
| CA | Bn S2 Staff | Soldiers<br>Analysts | USASOC **<br>SOC, JTF, TASOSC * |
| POG | R&A Co<br>Group S2 Staff<br>Bn S2 PDC Staff | Interrogators<br>Soldiers<br>PSYOP specialists | USASOC **<br>SOC, JTF, TASOSC* |

**LEGEND:** * Conflict or War ** Peacetime

**Figure 2-1. IEW assets by organizations and echelon.**

| FUNCTION / UNIT | DIRECTION | | COLLECTION | | | | | PROCESSING | | | | | | | | | DISSEMINATION | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | ANALYSIS | | | | | | | | | PROCEDURE(S) | | |
| | DET RQMTS | TASK | GEN RQMTS | PRI RQMTS | VAL RQMTS | COL RQMTS | ASSET MGT | I&W | OB | THRT ASMT | CUR INTL | EST | TGT INTEL | MDCI | REC | EVAL | DOWN GRADE | SAN | FWD TO USER |
| USASOC | X | | X | X | X | X | | X | | | | | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| USASFC | X | | X | X | X | | | | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | | X | X |
| USACA POC | X | | X | X | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TA SOSC | X | | X | X | X | X | | | X | X | X | X | X | | | X | X | | X |
| SF | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| PSYOP | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | | X |
| CA | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | | X |
| SOA | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| RGR | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| 112 SIG BN | X | | X | | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | X |
| 528 SPT BN | X | | X | | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | X |

LEGEND:

DET RQMTS - Determine requirements
GEN RQMTS - Generate requirements
PRI RQMTS - Prioritize requirements
VAL RQMTS - Validate requirements
COL RQMTS - Collate requirements
CUR INTL - Current intelligence

I&W - Indications and warning
OB - Order of battle
THRT ASMT - Threat Assessment
EST - Estimate
TGT INTEL - Target Intelligence
MGT - Management

MDCI - Multidiscipline CI
REC - Received
EVAL - Evaluate
SAN - Sanitize
FWD - Forward

Figure 2-2. Intelligence cycle functional responsibilities.

Based on the commander's intent, PIR, and initial intelligence estimate, the SIO determines the specific IEW assets needed to satisfy the commander's requirements. FM 34-2, Chapter 2; and FM 34-130, Chapter 5, discuss IPB collection management.

The commander's PIR drives the SIO collection and dissemination efforts. Based on thorough knowledge of all operational factors, the SIO develops recommended intelligence requirements to support the commander's concept of the operation. The intelligence staff–

- Accesses data bases.
- Tasks assets.
- Assesses capabilities.
- Directs, processes, and disseminates intelligence and combat information during and after deployment.
- Uses national intelligence capabilities to forecast foreign intent, COAs, and vulnerabilities.
- Coordinates multidiscipline counterintelligence (MDCI) support before, during, and after the operation.

PIR and IR are the basis for intelligence collection and production. ARSOF PIR are as concerned with host nation and local populace as they are with the threat and the other characteristics of the AO. The commander approves PIR and the SIO approves IR. These IR reflect some of the intelligence requirements that are less critical to the commander's decisions, but still include information to support the operations. Once approved, PIR and IR are integrated into the all-source intelligence collection plans that drive situation and target development.

As these mission requirements change or as old requirements are met and new requirements are established, the SIO develops new PIR and IR to answer them. Appendix A contains a sample collection plan and a chart that lists sources and agencies with the units and activities that fit into each category.

## COLLECTING

Collecting entails gathering information from all sources. Collection operations are guided by PIR and IR. The SIO focuses them on named areas of interest (NAIs), which are points or areas where activity confirms or denies a particular COA; or on target areas of interest (TAIs), which are engagement points or areas. These areas usually are along an avenue of approach (AA) or mobility corridor where the interdiction of a threat force by fire, maneuver, or jamming will reduce or deprive that force of a particular capability.

ARSOF TAIs include population groups, installations, and critical facility nodes within a strategic target system. Some examples are key bridges, assembly areas, transportation systems, and air defense artillery (ADA) systems. See Chapter 10 for more information on NAI and TAI.

For ARSOF, the collecting phase of the intelligence cycle begins as soon as mission area requirements are identified. The collection process is conducted using all the means available within the IEW system–both internal and external to the ARSOF organizations. Collected information is reported to the collection management and dissemination (CM&D) section of the MI detachment. As incoming reports are received, they are matched with the collection requirements they satisfy and forwarded to the all-source production section (ASPS) for processing.

## PROCESSING

Processing is the phase of the intelligence cycle where information becomes intelligence. Processing results in finished intelligence products the ARSOF commander and staff use for planning and executing the mission. Processing consists of the three operations discussed below.

### Recording

Recording converts information into writing or other forms of graphic copy and then arranges it into groups of related items. Recording can be done manually or by computer and ranges from the simple logging-in of incoming message traffic to preparing IPB terrain products. Posting on an incident map or overlay would be recording.

### Evaluation

Evaluation determines if the information is pertinent, reliable, and accurate. The analyst can rule out or confirm the validity of the information by applying his knowledge of the terrain or other conditions. However, this process can require the reorientation of collection assets to confirm or deny the validity of a given report. This is critical for ARSOF units preparing to operate against targets deep behind enemy lines or in denied areas.

### Analysis

Analysis determines the significance of the information, based on information and intelligence already known, and then draws conclusions about the probable meaning of the evaluated information. Analysis is a continuous process applied to all available data. However, it becomes critical during the threat integration function of the IPB process. During threat integration, the friendly commander and staff analyze all available information against all possible enemy and friendly COAs. An important task performed through the evaluation and processing operations is indications and warnings (I&W).

## DISSEMINATING AND USING

The final part of the intelligence cycle is disseminating and using. Intelligence and combat information are of little value if they are not delivered when and where they are needed. Failure to do this defeats a thorough and successful collection and processing effort. Since most intelligence and combat information is time sensitive, intelligence products must be disseminated to the ARSOF operations officer and commander when they need it and in a form they can use. Report formats are discussed in FM 34-1, Chapter 3 and Appendix G, and are shown in FM 34-3, Appendix A.

Disseminating is driven by ARSOF operation requirements. The fast-moving nature of ARSOF operations dictates the need for transmitting information quickly. Electrical message, data link, secure voice radio, and courier are the primary means of dissemination during ARSOF operations. Spot reports can be transmitted quickly and contain the bulk of combat information.

Combat information and operational data are the mainstay for ARSOF commanders. ARSOF commanders use this data to accomplish their mission. Any element that obtains combat information must disseminate it by the fastest, most direct means available. In an ARSOF unit, this is done by entering the appropriate net. ARSOF commanders must ensure that intelligence nets are established. If direct communication over these nets is not possible, information should be passed through any available communications net to a relaying headquarters.

Combat information also is reported through intelligence channels for processing and disseminating. Intelligence, combat information, and targeting data are disseminated based on established requirements stated in unit SOPs. Although these requirements may vary, each unit must use a system that establishes priorities to distribute the most critical information first.

# SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES COMMANDER'S INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Because the intelligence cycle is predicated on the commander's intent, the ARSOF commander executing a mission is best suited to define his intelligence needs. When the commander clearly identifies and prioritizes the PIR, MI assets can provide the type and amount of intelligence needed to direct the operation.

To best support their commanders, ARSOF collection managers must identify and prioritize their standing and time-sensitive collection requirements. They must then forward these requests for intelligence information (RIIs) to their higher headquarters to be incorporated into the theater and national requirements list. The Joint Tactical Exploitation of National Systems (J-TENS) Manual and FM 34-2, Appendix C, specify request formats to get support from national systems. Other support requests should use theater-specified formats.

The five IEW mission tasks, which are shown at Figure 1-4, are discussed below.

# SITUATION DEVELOPMENT

Situation development is the process resulting from collecting and integrating intelligence and combat information into all-source products that provide an estimate of the situation and a projection of foreign capabilities and intentions. These products let ARSOF commanders see and understand the operational environment in sufficient time and detail to employ their forces effectively. Thus, a picture is developed based on an analysis of intelligence holdings which are continuously updated by collecting

and processing information. Situation development incorporates all four steps of the intelligence cycle.

During situation development, the SIO uses IPB in the mission planning process to provide systematic and continuous analysis of all the operational factors in specific geographic areas.

The following types of ARSOF analytical products are integrated into the IPB product to support situation development.

- General area study.
- PSYOP estimate.
- Target intelligence package (TIP).
- Area assessment.
- Civil-military operations estimate.

### GENERAL AREA STUDY

General or specific area studies provide broad background knowledge of an area, region, or country. Each ARSOF unit performs a general area study to orient its members on potential operational areas. With ASPS support, the unit's area specialist team (AST) manages the area study program and assists the ARSOF element with its general area studies. Appendix B provides a sample outline for a general area study.

### PSYOP ESTIMATE

A PSYOP estimate is an analysis of the current situation from a psychological viewpoint. It considers all of a commander's feasible COAs, analyzes and compares them, and then recommends key PSYOP factors affecting accomplishing the overall mission. Appendix C provides a sample outline for a PSYOP estimate.

### TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE

TIPs containing operational area intelligence are detailed studies of specific targets within a designated joint special operations area (JSOA). The special forces group (SFG) and battalion ASTs and ranger order of battle (OB) sections maintain libraries of approved special operations mission planning folders (SOMPFs). With ASPS support, they continually review and update TIPs to provide the latest operational area intelligence to deploying SOF units.

Once an ARSOF unit deploys, the supporting AST or OB section continues to search for intelligence of interest to the ARSOF team. The AST monitors RIIs submitted by the deployed ARSOF unit and ensures timely answers to the unit's questions.

Multiple military and national intelligence agencies prepare TIPs to satisfy ARSOF planning needs for specific targets. Each TIP includes data on the target and important installations in the surrounding area, military aspects of terrain, and forces near or at the target that could affect accomplishing the mission.

TIPs are specially designed to support SOF requirements; however, they should also be useful to any services' ground forces, or air targeting forces with a mission against the target. TIPs include but are not limited to–

- Army country profile (ACP), which is used to obtain basic data on a specific AO.

- Imagery, which plays the biggest role in the up-to-date information that goes into each TIP. It is used to confirm or deny existing OB information, as well as to provide the latest images of ongoing construction and levels of activity. Imagery is also used to produce the highly detailed graphics and overlays that accompany each TIP. JCS Publication 3-05.5 specifies the format and control of TIPs.

- Maps and overlays, which are used to portray the latest known locations of units in the field, units in garrison, defense sites, key terrain, and other facilities such as communication sites, ports and harbors, and lines of communication (LOC).

- Automatic data processing (ADP), which is used to produce up-to-date information that is incorporated into each TIP.

- Country studies and other publications, which are used to provide information demographics, culture, religion, hydrology, and other general subjects.

### AREA ASSESSMENT

ARSOF area assessments are internally generated. The area assessment is a continuous process that confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence gained before deploying. The ARSOF unit transmits the results of the area assessment to its operational base only when there is new intelligence that differs significantly from the intelligence they receive before deploying. By conducting an area assessment, a deployed ARSOF unit

continually adds to its knowledge of the JSOA. The ARSOF unit begins its area assessment as soon as it enters its operational area.

There is no rigid format for making an area assessment, but the area study outline at Appendix B provides a guide. The area assessment serves as the basis for the commander's estimate of the situation. Some major aspects of the area assessment include—

- Foreign situation and security measures.
- Situation of the supported indigenous force.
- Attitude of the civilian population.

### CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ESTIMATE

The civil-military operations estimate aids commanders in accomplishing their missions while minimizing civilian interference and reducing collateral damage to the civilian populace and economy. These estimates include information concerning civilian population density, configuration, public health, public safety, and probable routes and numbers of dislocated civilians. Appendix D contains a sample outline for a civil-military operations estimate.

## TARGET DEVELOPMENT

Target development for ARSOF is conducted during peacetime, conflict, and war. ARSOF employs two distinct target development processes which overlap:

- Deliberate targeting process, which is a long-term process that occurs during peacetime.
- Adaptive targeting, which is an accelerated process used during crisis or war.

The MI concept of targeting most closely parallels the SOF adaptive targeting process.

### DELIBERATE TARGETING PROCESS

In the deliberate targeting process, ARSOF missions focus on facilities, installations, and system components which are critical to a nation's warfighting capabilities, infrastructure, or internal stability. This target selection program must examine all potential target systems to determine which are best suited to accomplish the supported CINC's objectives. Since the deliberate targeting program occurs prior to hostilities, critical node selection is based on peacetime data bases and analysis.

### ADAPTIVE TARGETING PROCESS

In the adaptive targeting process, target selection goals are not confined to destroying or damaging a fixed target. The major goals are to alter, affect, impede, or report threat activity. Movers, shooters, emitters, and sitters which are identified and located by ARSOF in the JSOA become a critical set of target categories.

However, while a conventional forces targeteer can task units to actively pursue threat forces—much as a hunter stalks prey—the ARSOF targeteer must approach the deep battle adaptive targeting process from the mindset of a trapper. The ARSOF SIO examines the JSOA and its adjoining areas to predict threat force movement patterns and to assess their speed of movement. These analyses result in identifying NAIs which the ARSOF commander can nominate as future TAI or future JSOAs to his theater special operations commander. These TAIs can then become assigned JSOAs for ARSOF target missions.

It is important for the ARSOF SIO to know that the deliberate and adaptive targeting processes depend on effective and timely use of the intelligence cycle. ARSOF target development is the result of complete and accurate situation development during peacetime contingency planning and battlefield analysis during conflict or wartime. IPB supports target development programs and provides the ARSOF commander with the intelligence needed to select valid target nodes for his operational elements.

## ELECTRONIC WARFARE

EW coordination is a shared responsibility of the ARSOF staff. This staff consists of the S2, S3, signal officer, and MI detachment commander. The commander uses EW to determine, exploit, disrupt, and deceive foreign $C^2$ systems while protecting friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. EW can be defensive or offensive. It contributes significantly to command, control, and communications countermeasures ($C^3CM$). ARSOF commanders consider integrating Air Force and other

non-SOF EW support into special operations. EW support is used—

- During infiltration and exfiltration.
- During critical times in mission execution (particularly in DA and CT missions).
- As an anti-pursuit expedient.

### DEFENSIVE EW

Defensive EW, or electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), protects friendly $C^2$ systems. ECCM include such passive procedures as emission control and terrain masking. They also include immediately identifying and reporting meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference (MIJI) of a friendly $C^3$ facility. The signal officer has staff responsibility for ECCM. However, ECCM is the responsibility of every soldier who uses or supervises the use of communications and noncommunications emitters.

### OFFENSIVE EW

Offensive EW exploits, disrupts, or deceives threat command, control, communications, and intelligence ($C^3I$) systems. There are two types of offensive EW: electronic countermeasures (ECM) and electronic support measures (ESM).

#### Electronic Countermeasures

ECM systematically disrupt hostile $C^3I$ systems by jamming and deception. Selective jamming and imitative deception can disrupt and delay foreign reaction to the presence of SOF on the ground at the objective. The S3 has staff responsibility for ECM. The SF group has a very limited organic tactical jamming capability so it relies primarily on theater systems to provide ECM support for its operations. The S3 EW officer (normally an additional duty) plans and coordinates this support with the help of the S2. One of the major duties is to protect friendly frequencies.

The Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) is a time and geographically oriented listing of taboo, protected, and guarded functions, nets, and frequencies. It is compiled and managed by the signal officer, coordinated with the intelligence officer, and approved by the operations officer. The JRFL is limited to the minimum number of frequencies necessary for friendly forces to accomplish assigned missions. It facilitates friendly EW actions by placing the minimum number of restrictions on ECM systems.

#### Electronic Support Measures

ESM intercept, identify, and locate threat emitters. ESM provide information required for ECM, ECCM, targeting and situation development, and operations. ESM resources provide information to support EW activities like avoidance, targeting, and homing. Such resources may also be a source of information for local electronic order of battle (EOB) development, target surveillance, and EW mission control. In the process of performing the functions listed above, ESM also provides intercept, location, and identification of hostile signals by using equipment and techniques similar to those used to produce SIGINT. ESM may also draw on data bases produced by other SIGINT activities and intelligence sources.

## COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

CI provides analysis of foreign intelligence threats to include espionage, sabotage, subversion, assassination, terrorism, and other threats. This is accomplished through the four major CI functions: investigation, collection, operations, and analysis and production. (See FM 34-60, and FM 34-60A, for more information on CI.) CI operations—

- Must include specific actions which support the protection of the force.
- Counter the foreign multidisciplined intelligence threat.
- Counter foreign sabotage, subversion, assassination, and terrorism.

CI does not include—

- Personnel or information security.
- Physical security.
- Operations security (OPSEC).

MDCI analysis provides ARSOF commanders with detailed assessments of foreign all-source intelligence and security threats near their operational bases and in their operational areas. These foreign threat assessments

are critical to the unit's OPSEC and base defense programs.

MDCI analysts also support ARSOF deception operations by determining foreign intelligence collection assets. MDCI analysts provide the S3 with recommendations of friendly activities to support the deception; if these activities are employed, they will help evaluate their effectiveness. See FM 90-2 and FM 90-2A for details on battlefield deception and electronic deception principles and TTPs.

## INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS

I&W is a critical subfunction of the processing step of the intelligence cycle. This is where the intelligence community monitors threat activity to ensure that their political, military, economic, or diplomatic actions are not a prelude to hostilities or other acts contrary to US interests. Analysis of I&W reports can alert the system to possible threat activity and can be used to refocus and adjust intelligence requirements and collection efforts.

At the national level, the Department of Defense (DOD) performs I&W by using the Worldwide Warning and Indication Monitoring System (WWIMS). Under the auspices of WWIMS, the national intelligence agencies, service branches (Army, Air Force, Navy), and unified and specified CINCs maintain 24-hour I&W watch centers.

At the theater level, I&W analysis allows commanders to better anticipate and understand NCA actions which may lead to the decision for military involvement. In order to impede a threat attempt at strategic surprise, theater-based all-source intelligence analysis is vital to the theater commander and to the NCA.

High-intensity conflict in a theater of war would be preceded by a failure on the part of the countries involved to adhere to long-standing rules of behavior.

Once a theater intelligence staff has discerned the threat's political designs, the information gleaned during the performance of the second and third functions of operational level of war IPB yields a broad picture of how a threat could be expected to fight and to what objectives.

ARSOF is both a consumer and producer of I&W reporting. It uses I&W reporting on world military-political developments to focus and refine its intelligence collection priorities and update and guide its operational and contingency planning. This becomes increasingly critical once an ARSOF element enters the final mission preparation and execution stages.

Once deployed, ARSOF elements can provide unique, first-time I&W reporting from denied areas, and can confirm or deny I&W reporting from other sources.

Although WWIMS supports all of DOD, the SOF-specific I&W centers are located at the Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC, and at US Special Operations Command at McDill AFB, FL. For ARSOF, the USASOC EOC monitors the I&W system from its headquarters at Fort Bragg.

## ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE TEAM

The IEW team that provides dedicated support to ARSOF operations is led by the ARSOF commander. Under the $C^2$ and guidance of the ARSOF commander, the S2, S3, and the supporting MI unit commander work together to provide the information and intelligence the ARSOF commander needs to support the concept of the operation.

The MI commander executes the SOF commander's I&W directives. The ARSOF commander leads the IEW team. The commander provides team leadership, motivation, focused perspective, and direction. He provides the SIO with initial guidance on his intent and concept of the operation and identifies his PIR. The SIO evaluates the commander's PIR and recommends adjustments if needed. The commander then approves the final PIR and the intelligence cycle begins.

The SIO manages and supervises SOF intelligence operations and security programs. Based on

intelligence requirements, the SIO develops intelligence collection requirements and tasks subordinate elements, including organic and supporting MI units.

The S3 plans and directs EW and OPSEC based on mission requirements. The S3—

- Tasks subordinate elements to carry out these missions.
- Determines friendly vulnerabilities by comparing the friendly force profile with the MDCI estimates provided by the CI section.
- Recommends OPSEC measures and evaluates their effectiveness. The MI detachment commander manages organic MI assets to accomplish assigned IEW missions and exercises $C^2$ over all organic and attached MI elements and operational control (OPCON) over supporting MI assets.

# CHAPTER 3

# ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

This chapter describes the ARSOF IEW organization and $C^2$, ADP links and support, and the collection management process.

## ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

SOF organizations are based on generic group or regimental and battalion structures. These structures are modified to meet specific environmental and operational considerations which may be unique to specific theaters where they are employed.

There are five theater SOF commands:

- Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR).
- Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC).
- Special Operations Command, Atlantic (SOCLANT).
- Special Operations Command, Central (SOCCENT).
- Special Operations Command, Southern (SOCSOUTH).

These SOF commands are subunified commands whose missions are to conduct special operations when authorized by each unit's combatant command. Theater Army Special Operations Support Commands (TASOSCs) and the active and Army reserve PSYOP groups and CA elements are also task organized in the same way. The ranger regiment can be committed to a specific theater CINC or held under national control, depending on the situation. Figure 3-1 shows the combatant command (COCOM) structure.

### USSOCOM

The US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the unified COCOM for special operations. All CONUS-based SOF are assigned by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to the CINC, USSOCOM. Figure 3-2 shows the command relationships. The CINC exercises COCOM of assigned forces through a combination of service and joint component commanders.

USSOCOM and most of the theaters it supports have command arrangement agreements (CAA) which authorize direct liaison authority (DIRLAUTH) between US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) operational elements and the supported theater's Special Operations Command (SOC). These direct channels support ARSOF intelligence tasking and reporting requirements. That is why these DIRLAUTH arrangements are extended to the major subordinate units (MSUs) and the organizations that will exercise OPCON over them in contingencies and wartime. This ensures these elements get timely and accurate intelligence throughout the mission or operation.

The J2 USSOCOM establishes the policy, guidance, and overall direction of SOF intelligence operations. The policy, guidance, and overall direction of ARSOF intelligence operations in peacetime is executed by the USASOC DCSINT.

### THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (J2)

The SOC (J2), as the theater SOF intelligence mission tasker –

- Develops in-theater IEW policy, planning, and coordination.
- Ensures there is enough intelligence support requested for each mission tasked by the special operations commander.
- Coordinates with theater service IEW organizations to collect, produce, and disseminate intelligence to meet SOF requirements.
- Tasks collection and production assets to satisfy SOF intelligence requirements.
- Coordinates joint special operations intelligence collection operations and the production and dissemination of TIPs to support SO targeting. (See FM 31-20, Chapter 1; and FM 100-25, Chapter 6.)




Figure 3-1. Combatant command structure.




**Figure 3-2. Command relationships.**

- Coordinates with the SOC Communications-Electronics Directorate (J6) to ensure the availability of secure sensitive compartmented information (SCI) voice and data communications between SOC headquarters, SOC component commands, and the TASOSC.
- Maintains direct liaison with operational and strategic level intelligence agencies.
- Maintains direct liaison with combined and allied SOF intelligence staffs.
- Develops IEW policies, plans, and programs for SOF.
- Maintains maps and terrain and imagery products for immediate contingency use by the SOC headquarters.

## US ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

USASOC is the major Army command (MACOM) for special operations. Its major subordinate commands (MSCs) are–

- US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (USAJFKSWC).
- US Army Special Forces Command (USASFC).
- US Army Civil Affairs and PSYOP Command (USACAPOC).
- 75th Ranger Regiment.
- 160th Special Operation Aviation Regiment.

The DCSINT, USASOC–

- Directs the intelligence, CI, and security support to all CONUS-based Active Component (AC) and Reserve Components (RC) ARSOF.
- Advises the commander on all intelligence training matters. This includes current policy, doctrine, and concepts.
- Develops and implements policy and guidance used to evaluate and monitor the readiness status of the AC and RC intelligence units.
- Coordinates directly with USSOCOM and the Theater Army to ensure continuity and compatibility of theater SOF intelligence requirements.
- Manages readiness training (REDTRAIN) and live environment training opportunities and programs for ARSOF personnel.
- Is the SIGINT mission activities manager for all AC and RC SOF.
- Serves as the functional interface between ARSOF and MI to resolve doctrinal, training, equipment, and personnel issues.

## ODCSINT ORGANIZATION

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT), as shown in Figure 3-3, is discussed below.

### Plans, Policy, and Programs Division

The Plans, Policy, and Programs Division–

- Prepares long-range intelligence plans like medium- and long-range threat assessments and crisis impact analyses.
- Identifies trends and issues in the intelligence field which may affect the SOF community.
- Reviews, analyzes, recommends, and manages the ODCSINT segment of the USASOC goals and objectives.
- Identifies intelligence production requirements (IPRs) in support of SOF.
- Provides policy and guidance, higher and lower, for the production of intelligence studies in support of SOF.
- Develops interoperability guidance for MACOM and MSC intelligence entities.
- Establishes intelligence requirements for the commanding general and staff and develops the format, content, focus, and timing of periodic output by the MSC to meet these requirements.
- Provides policy oversight of all intelligence programs.




**Figure 3-3. USASOC ODCSINT organization.**

- Develops ODCSINT operating policies and SOP in accordance with guidance from the ODCSINT.
- Manages the ODCSINT budget.
- Compiles and maintains ODCSINT history; establishes suspense dates and registers requirements with the Requirements Management Division for tasking and tracking.
- Maintains continuing liaison with policy makers at USSOCOM and Department of the Army.
- Administers the Strategic Industrial Targeting Analysis Program.
- Produces quarterly progress reports on ODCSINT goals and objectives.

**IEW Support Division**

The IEW Support Division—

- Is the focal point for all incoming intelligence architecture taskings and actions.
- Develops IEW equipment requirements.
- Interfaces with the USAJFKSWC, USASOC, and US Army Intelligence Center on doctrinal, training, and other combat development matters as required.
- Coordinates to acquire nondevelopmental items (off-the-shelf equipment) in conjunction with USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS).
- Is the intelligence focal point for USSPACECOM actions.
- Is the command focal point for the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) program.

- Coordinates and controls the DCSINT automation program.
- Is the staff proponent for all intelligence training matters.
- Represents USASOC to INSCOM, HQDA, and other agencies and commands to identify intelligence training requirements and training opportunities that support USASOC goals and its IEW personnel.
- Directs the command's tactical intelligence REDTRAIN program.
- Establishes an ARSOF Military Intelligence Specialty Training Element (MISTE) program and becomes the focal point for MISTE after the program is initiated.
- Is the focal point for all USASOC M&CG activities.
- Represents the DCSINT on intelligence matters related to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the National Training Center (NTC).
- Reviews doctrinal publications.
- Manages the command's intelligence readiness reporting programs.

**Requirements Management Division**

The Requirements Management Division –

- Serves as the ODCSINT focal point for all requirements levied by internal or external sources.
- Publishes and develops intelligence requirements management guidance and policy.
- Validates and processes statements of intelligence interests (SIIs) and requirements for recurring publications of subordinate units submitted through the MSCs.
- Identifies CONUS-based ARSOF intelligence requirements and forwards them to USSOCOM or the appropriate national agency for incorporation into the national intelligence requirements collection apparatus.
- Establishes an all-source intelligence ADP facility to support MACOM, MSC, and MSU automated intelligence information requirements in support of missions.
- Validates and processes MSC and MSU requests for intelligence information.
- Serves as the DCSINT focal point for all imagery-related matters and activities.
- Performs SIGINT operational management in accordance with existing regulations.
- Publishes, develops, and periodically updates the command's SIGINT architecture concept of operations.
- Conducts SIGINT directives management in accordance with existing policies and guidelines.
- Registers, validates, prioritizes, and processes all HUMINT requirements for integration into the all-source production effort of ODCSINT, USASOC.
- Coordinates and participates in National Security Agency (NSA) field assistance visits to all MSUs through MSCs.
- Coordinates with the theater J2 and applicable national level organizations and agencies for theater and national level SIGINT support.
- Performs SIGINT operational coordination for requesting, validating, processing, maintaining, and prioritizing command SIGINT requirements for exercise, contingency, and real-world military operations.
- Validates, maintains, and performs SIGINT authority tasks.
- Provides technical support to the Fort Bragg imagery readiness facility.
- Develops and maintains SIGINT training material and COMINT technical support packages for all SOF-supported contingency plans (CONPLANs) and OPLANs.

- Plans and supervises all EW activities for the command and establishes priority targets for all EW operations.
- Serves as the DCSINT focal point for the management and operation of the USASOC secondary imagery dissemination system.
- Coordinates multispectral imagery requirements for USASOC.
- Monitors and maintains the USASOC imagery reconnaissance objectives list (IROL).
- Directs the overt collection programs. (See TC 34-5, Chapter 3.)

**Security Division**

The Security Division –

- Directs the information security program. To do this, it –
  - Advises and represents commanders on information security matters.
  - Takes action on reports of possible compromise and security violations within the command.
  - Develops policy and procedures to protect classified information within USASOC.
- Directs CI activities. To do this, it –
  - Develops policy, implements directives, and oversees the CI effort within ARSOF.
  - Provides support to counter-HUMINT operations, oversight of intelligence activities, CI and security support of DCSOPS special category (SPECAT).
  - Recommends deception measures to support DCSOPS plans and operations.
  - Provides CI and security support to the DCSOPS OPSEC program and to MACOM participation.
  - Administers badge and access systems at the MACOM to physically secure restricted areas.
- Directs –
  - Foreign disclosure activities.
  - The command's special access programs (SAPs).
  - MDCI threat and combatting terrorism analysis.
  - Personnel security program.
  - Foreign visitor accreditation.
  - Automation security program.
  - Compromising emanations (TEMPEST) control program.
  - CI and information security for the COMSEC program.
  - Security education program.
- Administers the intelligence property book account.
- Administers the intelligence contingency fund account.
- Manages the TOP SECRET billet control system.

**Special Security Office**

The Special Security Office –

- Manages the established SSO support for USASOC.
- Manages the SCI billet program for subordinate reserve and national guard units.
- Ensures SCI is properly controlled, transmitted, destroyed, packaged, and protected.
- Ensures hard copy SCI products are sent via defense courier service.
- Administers the SCI billet program.
- Disseminates SCI to persons who are authorized access.
- Conducts –
  - TEMPEST ADP security actions.

  - All physical security actions for the sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF).
  - SCI security awareness programs for all SCI indoctrinated personnel.
  - Required interface with SCI telecommunication center and ADP facilities to ensure SCI security and proper dissemination.
- Provides privacy communications system (PCOMS) support for the command group.
- Investigates SCI security infractions.
- Maintains listings of available SCI hard copy products and ensures prompt dissemination to all authorized personnel.
- Processes SCI incoming and outgoing visitor clearance certifications.
- Tailors SSO support to the changing needs of the command.
- Establishes temporary SCIFs as necessary.
- Performs after-duty-hour inspections of the SCIF.

## THEATER ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT COMMAND

The theater army DCSINT and the supporting EACIC are the theater's primary sources of intelligence products for ground OB. The DCSINT controls most theater army IEW collectors. He may request topographic support from the theater engineer command which controls theater topographic assets. The DCSINT also controls theater army intelligence training assets.

The EACIC directly links with all other theater and strategic level intelligence production agencies. Since most ARSOF operations are ground-based, the EACIC is the single most important intelligence production management center available to the TASOSC.

The TASOSC is a subordinate functional command of the theater army. The TASOSC mission is to plan and coordinate support and sustain theater ARSOF conducting SO. The TASOSC SIO ISE assists the theater SOF by providing all-source IEW support. The TASOSC commander collocates an ISE near either the unified command's joint intelligence center (JIC) or the theater army EACIC. The TASOSC ISE plans and coordinate ARSOF intelligence and security support requirements with the theater SOC J2, theater army DCSINT, and supporting theater and theater army organizations.

Under the staff supervision and control of the TASOSC Director of Intelligence (DOI) and based on SOC J2 guidance, the TASOSC ISE chief validates, consolidates, and prioritizes ARSOF standing and routine intelligence requirements and other RIIs. The ISE satisfies the RIIs or forwards them to either the EACIC or SOC J2, depending on theater requirements. Then the TASOSC ISE monitors RII status until the appropriate tactical, operational, or strategic level collection asset responds. It also supports the targeting process by producing TIPs. Figure 3-4 shows the doctrinal flow of ARSOF RII when in the theater.

The TASOSC ISE maintains an automated NRT intelligence data base to support ARSOF requirements. It relies on existing theater SCI communications channels to pass information to the supported in-theater SOF unit.

The TASOSC ISE has up to three intelligence support teams (ISTs). These ISTs collocate with supported major operational headquarters. Examples of major operational headquarters are subunified commands, joint task forces (JTFs), and NATO MSCs. Operating from the supported headquarters' SCIF, the IST helps expedite the flow of intelligence data to and from the supported headquarters.

The TASOSC ISE chief task-organizes his element to provide theater ARSOF with –

- Intelligence CM&D support. The TASOSC ISE CM&D team processes and tracks ARSOF RIIs. The team disseminates ARSOF intelligence reports to the EACIC. Then it forwards required intelligence products to the supported ARSOF and reviews EACIC intelligence products to see if they can be used by ARSOF.
- SO target development support. The ISE target development team develops and produces all-source TIPs and other target intelligence data. This data is used to support the SO targeting process. (See




**Figure 3-4. The doctrinal flow of ARSOF RII and the DIRLAUTH relationship.**

Chapter 9 for information about the SOF targeting process.)

- Technical control and analysis element (TCAE) interface. The TASOSC ISE TCAE provides connectivity between the theater TCAE and ARSOF units that have EW and SIGINT capabilities.

- Intelligence liaison. The TASOSC ISE places ISTs at the all-source intelligence centers (ASICs) supporting major operational headquarters; for example, subunified commands, JTFs, and NATO MSCs. This speeds the flow of combat information and intelligence between conventional forces and SOF. The TASOSC ISE and IST use established theater SCI channels to communicate with one another.

SFGs and battalions have organic intelligence staffs and MI detachments which provide DS to SF units. The PSYOP groups and battalions have small organic intelligence staffs. Other intelligence assets within PSYOP units include interrogation specialists on the interrogation and debriefing teams in the battalion's support company, and the test and evaluation teams in the battalion's headquarters company.

There is also a small tactical intelligence and interrogation section in the product development center (PDC) of each PSYOP tactical company. CA units have an organic intelligence staff but have no other organic intelligence resources. The SOA regiment and the rangers have regimental and battalion S2 staffs but have no other organic MI support.

The ARSOF unit SIO –

- Identifies and prioritizes unit intelligence requirements.

- Tasks unit collection and analysis assets.

Deployed ARSOF SIOs identify requirements that cannot be satisfied at unit level and forward them to the TASOSC ISE. While in CONUS, ARSOF SIOs forward these same requirements to USASOC.

### ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2, USACAPOC

The G2, US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) organization, as shown in Figure 3-5, is discussed below.

#### CI/Security Division

The CI/Security Division –

- Performs foreign visitor accreditation and disclosure functions.
- Develops CI threat to support terrorism counteractions.
- Performs as information systems security manager for the command.
- Performs all SSO functions for the command.
- Maintains the personnel security program for the command.
- Maintains the information security program for the command.

#### IEW Division

The IEW Division –

- Maintains the REDTRAIN program for the command.
- Identifies intelligence training requirements and training opportunities for the command.
- Programs and reviews the intelligence readiness posture for the command.
- Assists in developing the IEW force structure for the command.
- Develops training in conjunction with the G3.
- Performs mapping, charting, and geodesy requirements for the command.
- Serves as the focal point for the EW training program.

### ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2, US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (AIRBORNE)

The ACofS, G2 organization, as shown in Figure 3-6, is discussed below.

#### Special Security Office

This is a one-soldier section. It provides doctrinal SSO support for the headquarters and coordinates closely with USASOC SSO.




**Figure 3-5. G2 USACAPOC organization.**




**Figure 3-6. G2, USASFC (airborne).**

**IEW Training Division**

The IEW Training Division—

- Serves as the focal point for intelligence architecture issues.
- Manages the command REDTRAIN program.
- Serves as the focal point for intelligence training for MSUs.
- Plans and conducts the Intelligence Certification Program.
- Reviews all intelligence doctrinal publications.

**Security Countermeasures Division**

The Security Countermeasures Division—

- Directs the information, personnel, and automation security programs for USASFC.
- Serves as the focal point for all CI issues for the command.
- Provides oversight for SAP management.
- Administers intelligence contingency funds.
- Administers the badge and access program for the command.
- Recommends programs and operations to support the command OPSEC program.

**All-Source Intelligence Center**

The ASIC—

- Serves as the focal point for all intelligence requests for USASFC and MSUs.
- Prepares mid- and short-term intelligence estimates on critical regional developments in support of current or planned USASFC or MSU operations.
- Monitors, analyzes, and maintains data base files on current, all-source message traffic, multiple source and national level intelligence documents, and contingency support packages.
- Prepares a weekly, all-source commander's intelligence briefing folder (Black Book) and collateral intelligence update for the headquarters staff.
- Coordinates with MSUs to ensure current collection plans and PIR are on hand.
- Manages the SF intelligence collection management system for the command and MSUs.
- Coordinates with the MACOM to integrate higher priority RII into the USASFC collection and production plan.

- Conducts analyst-to-analyst coordination when it is necessary to ensure adequate coverage of areas identified as areas of command interest.
- Serves as a focal point for all IMINT and SIGINT activities for USASFC and MSUs.

**Operations Division**

The Operations Division—

- Serves as the focal point for integrating new intelligence systems into SF.
- Plans for and provides intelligence support to MSU exercises.
- Develops interoperability guidance for the intelligence activities of the command and its MSUs.
- Provides intelligence oversight for the command.

## AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING

The Defense Communications System (DCS) and theater communications systems link EAC intelligence agencies with their supporting, supported, and adjacent commands. Many of these links are through ADP systems. For example, USASOC interfaces with USSOCOM and national or DOD production centers via these ADP systems. These ADP systems support all I&W tasks.

Depending upon system configuration, national and theater level ADP systems can provide—

- NRT intelligence to users as requested.
- Data supporting the deliberate planning process, contingency planning, and training requirements.
- Global access to secondary imagery.
- Analyst-to-analyst communications.
- Graphics or fused intelligence plotting.
- Remote data base access.
- Automated mission planning or rehearsal.
- Automated intelligence message handling.
- Electronic mail.
- Automated collection and requirements management.

The timeliness, quality, and quantity of intelligence and combat information supporting SOF missions vary in proportion to—

- The collection assets available.
- The assigned collection priorities.
- The analytical resources dedicated to the support of SOF requirements.
- The availability and interoperability of supporting communications.

## COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

Collection requirements are always met by the lowest possible echelon so the requestor receives the information or intelligence as soon as possible.

The theater SOC J2 functions as the SOF collection management authority within the theater. He communicates directly with supported theater elements and with the national level agencies of other nations, as well as with our own national level agencies and organizations. Intelligence sections of MSUs in the theater act as requirements managers. They forward combat information and intelligence to the theater SOC J2 and to the requesting unit. This data is used to satisfy the supported commander's collection requirements (see Figure 3-4).

Liaison elements from the national level intelligence agencies (CIA, NSA, DIA, and other agencies) can be deployed into a theater area of responsibility. These are known as liaison national elements (LNE). They deploy with dedicated communications and provide real-time interface between these agencies and their parent agencies.

LNE provide limited in-theater analysis of national platforms and systems down-links in support of theater

requirements. Normally, these LNEs are available only during contingency operations or for major exercises. When they deploy, they are collocated with the supported theater headquarters. In wartime, requirements to national and theater assets are requested or levied at the Unified Command level.

The J2 passes time-sensitive requirements for national level assets to the theater J2. The J2 also gives an information copy of the requirement to the EACIC in-theater. This way, if the EACIC already has the information or intelligence, it can cancel the original request and fulfill the requirement itself.

The theater J2 attempts to satisfy the RII with the data base by passing production requests to other service theater collection assets. If the request still cannot be satisfied at the theater level, it is passed to the appropriate national intelligence agency where a collection requirement is levied on assets available at that level.

All ARSOF SIOs are responsible for meeting their commander's intelligence and combat information requirements. Often, they cannot do this using organic resources; they need access to national and theater level resources. SIOs validate all subordinate unit SIIs requirements for collateral and compartmented recurring documents, one-time document requests, RIIs, and intelligence production requirements (IPRs).

During peacetime, if the S2 determines that organic resources cannot satisfy a request, intelligence support relating to OPLANs or CONPLANs are validated and prioritized by the SOF component S2. The S2 passes these requirements to the appropriate SOC J2 with an information copy to the appropriate MSC (for example, USASFC and TASOSC). The SOC J2 confirms and validates the request and forwards it to the JIC if the request cannot be satisfied by the SOC J2 data base.

Non-OPLAN related requirements are sent by the ARSOF S2 to the appropriate MSC (for example, USASFC) with an information copy of the request to USASOC DCSINT. Requests that the MSC cannot satisfy are validated and sent to USASOC DCSINT with an information copy to USSOCOM. USASOC attempts to fulfill the request; however, if it cannot, it is validated to USSOCOM with an information copy provided to DIA.

# CHAPTER 4

# INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

This chapter discusses IEW support to SF operations. It describes the organization and missions of SF and the intelligence units that support SF. It describes the role of the MI Group S2, the MI Battalion S2, and the MI Detachment S2. Finally, it describes the organic and nonorganic IEW support the Army provides to SF. (See FM 100-25, Chapter 13.)

## MISSIONS

The Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFG(A)) is a unique combat arms organization. It is capable of planning, conducting, and supporting SO in all operational environments and across the operational continuum. SF is an unconventional combat arm. It combines at the lowest tactical level the functions performed by several conventional branches of the Army. In effect, it is a combined arms branch. SF commanders must integrate and synchronize their organic capabilities with those of other SOF and theater assets.

As a component of ARSOF, SF plans, conducts, and supports the full range of SF activities in all operational environments in peace, conflict, and war. Each SFG is assigned an AO, depending on OPLAN requirements. SFGs also conduct DA, SR, CT, UW, and FID missions and collateral activities, as required and within their capabilities.

All military forces stand ready to perform missions for which they are not specifically organized, trained, or equipped. (See FM 31-20, Chapter 3, for more information about the SOF missions and collateral activities.) These collateral or secondary missions include –

- Humanitarian assistance.
- Security assistance.
- Search and rescue.
- Counter-drugs.
- Antiterrorism.
- Other security and special activities.

These wide-ranging missions, which are discussed below, require accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence that can be obtained only by a multidisciplined collection and analysis intelligence organization.

### DIRECT ACTION MISSIONS

SF conducts DA missions to achieve various goals. The goals include –

- Degrading the enemy's $C^2$ and destroying his critical assets.
- Developing desired psychological effects.
- Preempting enemy operations.

DA missions require, at a minimum, detailed knowledge of the target site, infiltration and exfiltration routes, and OB of any threat counter-responsive forces. Facts about the target must be more detailed than required for conventional targeting.

DA missions are often launched against targets deep within enemy-controlled territory, far beyond the sensing capabilities of tactical collection systems. Each target requires construction of its own mission planning folder containing detailed target specific data and in-depth area studies of the AI.

A complete picture of the situation is developed after a multidisciplined analysis of all categories of intelligence is completed and provided to the SF in response to their PIR.

Each mission is an individual effort requiring –

- Development and maintenance of a data base.
- Continuous monitoring of pertinent crisis situations and other specific geographical AIs.
- Accessibility to and coordination with national, strategic, and operational level collection systems.

- Multidisciplined analysis of all information in support of the mission.

### SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

SR missions require capabilities that exceed the operational capabilities of tactical collection systems in order to obtain information not available through other means. These operations generally have the same requirements for detailed intelligence information as DA missions. However, these missions are designed to satisfy intelligence gaps or to confirm information in the intelligence base.

Operations on the ground could detect indicators that help to develop the needed intelligence. Forces conducting these missions must understand the intelligence needs that the missions are designed to fill. Planning for these missions must be accomplished jointly by the SF unit and the intelligence agency requesting the mission.

### COUNTERTERRORISM MISSIONS

CT missions involve offensive measures against terrorists. They include preemptive, concurrent, and punitive actions. This category of SF mission is not generic to all SF units. SF participation in CT is limited to those specially organized, trained, and equipped SF units designated in theater CONPLANs.

Because terrorist organizations maintain a very low profile, it is extremely difficult to identify targets for these missions. The IEW system supports these missions by providing accurate, detailed, and responsive intelligence.

Intelligence must identify terrorist personalities and locations, organizational composition, and logistical support systems; and describe their weapons, equipment, training, and tactics as well as pertinent information about any hostages. Close coordination between mission planners and various national and military intelligence agencies is required to collate, analyze, and immediately provide the SF unit performing the CT mission with the information it requires.

### UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE MISSIONS

UW is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations against an established government or occupying power. They are normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source.

UW includes guerrilla warfare (GW) and other direct offensive, low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, and evasion and escape (E&E). UW normally involves inserting SF elements into areas controlled by hostile forces. These elements need outside support.

Intelligence gathering during UW comes from various sources including those developed within the AO. SF elements make effective contact with partisans and guide them in operations that support US national objectives. They conduct extensive preemployment preparation. They need detailed intelligence about their geographical AO. (Refer to Appendix C for details of the information requirements.) This intelligence includes, among other things–

- Knowing and being able to recognize the languages spoken in the area.
- Economics.
- Politics.
- Climate.
- Geography.
- Sociology.
- Ethnic groups.
- Religious groups.
- Key personalities.

SF elements need detailed information and all-source intelligence on targets and target systems in the area; the situation within and between partisan groups; and virtually all other pertinent information that can be gathered. They also require the aid of indigenous support personnel prior to insertion to help them survive and make contact with the partisan movement.

SF teams conduct LLSO to provide security and meet intelligence requirements within the UW operational area.

The local intelligence nets must be organized and resourced to provide the best possible security for UW forces and to meet the intelligence requirements of the supported commander.

SF operational elements must receive multidisciplined intelligence tailored to their specific mission. This intelligence must be all-source, processed, and be presented

in a usable format for planning and operational employment of assets. SOF uses national and theater intelligence means to identify potential in-country sources. This allows SF elements to successfully accomplish their missions.

Because UW operations are diverse, they need a wide range of support. This includes everything from basic support to a very sophisticated system using ADP and intelligence specialties. All-source intelligence is essential regardless of the mission.

### FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE MISSIONS

In FID missions, SF and other ARSOF support the host-nation government. These missions include civic, psychological, and military operations.

US personnel must know the host nation's population, psychology, religions, customs, and moral attitudes to perform FID missions. They should also know sources of friction and irritation within the host country that could impact on the acceptability and success of the government.

Successful FID missions require using the IPB process to develop the following intelligence products:

- The supported host country's defense and security establishment's OB.
- Details on foreign intelligence organizations active within the host country.
- OB on insurgent groups with the potential to overthrow the host-nation government.
- Country studies about the host nation, its people, and its infrastructure.
- Key personalities.

## ORGANIC INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO SPECIAL FORCES

Organic IEW support is essential to successful infiltration, exfiltration, survival, and mission execution of operational units in various hostile environments. The SF commander requires organic IEW support with commensurate analysis, collection management, security, weather, and communications capabilities tailored to supported regional command requirements across the operational continuum.

Intelligence assets organic to SF are organized according to operational and analytical needs. IEW assets are located at the group, battalion, company, and operational detachment-A (ODA) levels. Each intelligence asset has its own missions, functions, and limitations.

The SF detachment intelligence staffs and MI detachments are the key components of the organic IEW team. The SF staff plans, organizes, directs, coordinates, and controls while the MI detachment commander executes the directives. The SF MI detachment is led by the detachment commander who gives the team leadership, motivation, focused perspective, and direction.

### GROUP S2

The group S2 is the principal staff officer for all intelligence and security matters. Based on the commander's requirements, he develops intelligence collection missions and tasks subordinate elements, including organic and supporting MI units.

A group S2 section generally consists of an S2, assistant S2, SSO, SF technician, senior NCO, and additional NCOs for operations, intelligence, C-SIGINT, imagery analysis, and intelligence analysis.

The group S2–

- Directs the group collection effort, tasking appropriate organic and attached assets and forwarding RIIs to higher headquarters.
- Supervises the group information, ADP, and personnel security programs.
- Advises the commander in the employment of SF unit intelligence assets.
- Provides intelligence support to OPSEC, EW operations, and deception planning.
- Exercises staff supervision over the unit's MI detachment.

- Coordinates CI activities in support of operational requirements.
- Coordinates and manages the group intelligence training program.
- Exercises staff supervision over the special staff functions of the USAF SO weather team when a weather team is attached.
- Identifies, validates, and coordinates priorities for unit geographic area requirements for MC&G products to support OPLANs and CONPLANs, and monitors and validates map requisitions.
- Requests topographic support through command channels for specific AIs. This support may include tailored terrain products, terrain studies, and overprinted MC&G products and services.
- Provides integrated all-source intelligence collection management, analysis, production, and dissemination in support of group level situation and target development. This includes DS to the ODAs.
- Establishes and operates a tactical or field SCIF in the SFOB OPCEN.
- Provides SCI communications between the SFOB and the deployed forward operations bases (FOBs).

### GROUP MI DETACHMENT

The group MI detachment provides integrated all-source intelligence collection management, analysis, production, and dissemination in support of group level situation and target development. These functions correspond to, but are much broader than, those performed by the tactical operations center (TOC) support element of a conventional MI unit.

The detachment establishes and operates a tactical SCIF in the SFOB OPCEN and provides SCI communications between the SFOB and the deployed FOBs. It provides interrogation and CI support.

The detachment commander may work for the deputy group commander under the staff supervision of the group S2. When the detachment is formally detached from the support company, the detachment commander exercises normal company level command, but the detachment remains dependent on the support company for administrative and logistical support. Figure 4-1 shows this structure.

### BATTALION S2

The battalion S2 is the battalion's principal staff officer for all matters pertaining to intelligence and CI. The duties are similar to those of the group S2. He provides special security representative (SSR) support to the battalion. The SSR functions are under the technical control of the supporting SSO. The supporting SSO will be the group SSO only when the two headquarters are collocated.

The SF battalion S2 section generally consists of the S2, a senior intelligence NCO, an intelligence analyst sergeant, and a junior intelligence NCO.

### BATTALION MI DETACHMENT

The battalion MI detachment mission and organization are similar to the group MI detachment. Figure 4-2 shows this structure. Six exceptions are listed below. The MI battalion detachment –

- Is limited in its organic capability to perform –
  - Intelligence collection management.
  - All-source intelligence analysis.
  - Production for the SF battalion and its attached elements.
- Depends on the group intelligence data base and other technical assistance from the group MI detachment.
- Has three organic support operations teams-A (SOT-A). They deploy with SF teams to provide SIGINT and EW support.
- When authorized and directed, participates in active CI operations through the CI section.
- Does not have any organic interrogation teams. This support is obtained from the SF group MI detachment or from other external agencies, as required.
- Works for the battalion commander under the staff supervision of the battalion S2.


SFG
MI DET
DET HQ
CM&D SEC *
ASPS *
INTG TM
CI SEC
TCAE * *
SSO COMM TM
LEGEND: * ASPS and CM&D sections are consolidated on TOE.
* * All SIGINT MOSs are consolidated under the ASPS per the 31803L000 TOE.

**Figure 4-1. Organization, Military Intelligence Detachment, Support Company, Special Forces Group.**




**Figure 4-2. Organization, Military Intelligence Detachment, Support Company, Special Forces Battalion.**

# ORGANIC INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE ASSET DEPLOYMENT IN THE OPERATIONS BASE

The SF group commander exercises $C^2$ through a network of operational bases. These operational bases combine the functions of the CP and unit trains into a single entity. They are normally located at secure and logistically supportable sites in the communications zone (COMMZ). The SFOB is a command, control and support base established and operated by an SF group from organic and attached resources. FOBs are also command, control, and support bases but they are established by the SF battalion.

Each SF group and battalion commander normally organizes the SFOB or FOB into an OPCEN, a support center (SPTCEN), and a signal center (SIGCEN). All three centers have their own organization and functions but their activities are interdependent. Figure 4-3 shows this structure. (FM 31-20, Chapter 6, discusses the OPCEN, SPTCEN, and SIGCEN in detail.)

Organic IEW assets are normally located at the OPCEN. The OPCEN is the functional activity that directs and controls SF operations in a designated operational area. It performs the functions of a conventional unit's TOC.

The OPCEN, as shown in Figure 4-4, has staff supervision over a separate isolation facility (ISOFAC) with an area specialist team (AST); headquarters commandant; MI detachment; liaison section; consolidated plans section; and S2, S3, and S5 sections.

Based on approved plans and guidance from the base commander, the OPCEN director supervises all operational aspects of mission planning and execution. The OPCEN director synchronizes S2, S3, and S5 activities within the OPCEN.

The S2 section and the MI detachment are discussed below. FM 31-20, Chapter 6, discusses in detail the other sections located within the OPCEN.

## S2 SECTION

Under the staff supervision of the unit S2, the OPCEN S2 section is the focal point for all-source intelligence production and collection management. This section consists of the S2 staff, elements of the group or battalion MI detachment, and the USAF weather team.

These personnel are then task organized into four elements which are organic to the S2 section: S2 operations branch, SSO, S2 security branch, and USAF weather team. In addition, elements from the MI detachment are OPCON to the S2 section. These personnel staff the ASPS, CM&D section, SSO communication section, TCAE, IA, and the terrain team.

### S2 Operations Branch

The S2 operations branch directs and coordinates the daily operations of the S2 staff. It exercises staff supervision of the tactical SSO; the attached USAF weather team; and the MI detachment's ASPS, CM&D, TCAE, imagery analysts, and terrain team.

### S2 Plans Section

The consolidated plans section maintains OPLANs for the entire OPCEN. The S2 representative to the consolidated section coordinates and plans intelligence support for future and contingency SF operations. It physically locates with the S3 plans branch or the consolidated plans section.

### S2 Security Branch

The S2 security branch develops unit personnel, information, ADP, and physical security programs and supervises their implementation. Under its staff supervision, the MI detachment CI section provides CI support to the S3 OPSEC program and to deception planning.

### USAF Weather Team

The USAF staff weather officer (SWO) serves as a special staff officer to the group commander on all weather matters. The team provides–

- Current and forecast weather data.
- Climatic analysis studies in support of all group missions.
- Forward area limited observing program (FALOP) training and mission support information to ODAs in isolation.

When approved by the group commander, the SWO may attach weather team members to ODAs, operational detachments-B (ODBs), or SOT-A's to gather critical




Figure 4-3. A type of SF operational base.




**Figure 4-4. A type SF operations center.**

weather observations from denied territory and data sparse regions.

### MI DETACHMENT

The MI detachment forms the ASPS in the OPCEN and provides collection management, all-source production, and S2 support to OPSEC and EW planning and mission management.

The MI detachment commander, as the principal intelligence producer and executor—

- Provides, through the group S2, intelligence support to the commander.

- Establishes and operates a tactical SCIF in the OPCEN. Within the SCIF, the unit SIO provides the SSO.
- Responds to formal taskings from the operational base SIO.
- Directs and controls the TCAE, the SSO communications team, and the interrogation and CI sections with guidance from the S2.

Proper IEW support depends on direct daily contact and informal tasking and coordination between the SIO staff elements and the various sections of the MI detachment.

**All-Source Production Section**

The ASPS performs IPB and consolidates information from all sources to meet the SF commander's needs. The ASPS–

- Processes, correlates, and integrates all-source intelligence in response to taskings from the CM&D section.
- Is the focal point for all situation and target development.
- Develops and maintains the unit's intelligence data base, to include the intelligence journal, OB information, IPB products, targeting data, and the situation map.
- Monitors the CM&D collection plan and recommends revisions to close identified gaps.
- Receives and processes intelligence products and combat information from higher, lower, and adjacent commands.
- Prepares intelligence estimates, reports, summaries, and briefs as required.

**CM&D Section**

The CM&D section formulates detailed collection requirements and tasks collectors for required information. The CM&D section–

- Performs intelligence collection management for the SIO operations branch.
- Obtains the commander's approved requirements from the unit SIO, prioritizes them based on SIO guidance, and translates them into collection missions.
- Prepares the unit collection plan and forwards the unit's PIR to the TASOSC ISE and the SOC J2.
- Tasks organic and attached MI collection assets.
- Through the S3, requests intelligence collection mission tasking of SF teams or other subordinate non-MI assets.
- Disseminates combat information and intelligence within the command and to higher, adjacent, and lower headquarters.

**SSO Communications Section**

The SSO communications section is located within the SCIF. It provides–

- Secure communication to the SF commander.
- Secure SCI communications between the SFOB and its deployed FOBs.

Higher headquarters provides SCI communications to the SOC J2 and TASOSC ISE.

**Technical Control and Analysis Element**

The group TCAE carries out the SIGINT and EW management functions. It–

- Produces the SIGINT collection plan.
- Is collocated with the ASIC in the SCIF.
- Provides centralized technical control and collection tasking authority over deployed SOT-A's through the battalion TCAE (SOT-B).
- Analyzes and correlates intercepted SIGINT traffic from the SOT-A's with data from other sources including TENCAP; and then passes these products to the ASPS and the TASOSC's ISE.
- Develops and maintains the SIGINT technical data base and the EOB data base.

- Interfaces with theater and national intelligence systems to complete the integration of technical data generated by tactical units with the technical data produced by the National Security Agency (NSA).

- Provides technical support (such as SIGINT technical data) to the battalion TCAEs as required.

- Performs all functions of the SIGINT Collection Management Authority (CMA). The OIC performs these functions, which are detailed in a separate CMA directive. He also provides technical support to the battalion TCAE as required. (The battalion TCAE does essentially the same functions as the group TCAE.)

CONUS-based TCAEs interface directly with the Army TCAE during peacetime for all technical support requirements and USSID-required readiness reporting.

**Imagery Analysts Section**

Imagery analysts extract information and develop intelligence mainly from imagery collected from aerial TENCAP sensors. Within SF units, imagery analysts are assigned to the group and battalion MI detachments. A thorough knowledge of threat tactics and ground OB enables them to recognize, identify, locate, describe, and report information concerning objects, activities, and terrain on a variety of imagery products.

Imagery analysts make associations between visible objects and configurations and analyze the results to determine strength, disposition, and enemy capabilities. They—

- Analyze imagery and report specific information on threat operations, activities, dispositions, logistics, communications, installations, and civilian activities and their possible effect on SF operations.

- Prepare and maintain imagery prints to supplement and update maps for SF operational planning.

- Brief and debrief air crews.

- Extract information from imagery in DS of unit mission area analysis, target feasibility analysis, and ODA mission planning and target analysis.

- Prepare battle damage assessments (BDAs).

- Prepare mosaics and terrain models to support operational planning.

- Accomplish imagery exploitation, reporting, and production in DS of SFOB and FOB requirements from a joint or theater army imagery exploitation activity.

- Prepare and maintain a decompartmented TENCAP imagery data base for the unit's mission area.

- Provide technical assistance to the unit CM&D section, as required.

**Battalion SOT-A**

Both the battalion and group MI detachments provide support to the SOT-A. In turn, the SOT-A provides organic SIGINT and EW capabilities to the SF group. The SF group commander exercises technical control of SIGINT and EW operations through the group TCAE.

The group TCAE translates each SOT-A mission tasking into a technical tasking and forwards the tasking and IPB products and technical data to support mission area analysis to the appropriate battalion TCAE. Then the battalion TCAE tasks the SOT-A to execute the mission. If no deployed SOT-A is capable of collecting the information, the battalion S3 commits and deploys another team to meet mission requirements.

SOT-A's are normally deployed with an SF team to provide ESM to the SF team commander and the battalion TCAE during the operation. This may require SOT-A's to—

- Deploy independently and then infiltrate to join a deployed SF team.

- Deploy with the SF team.

- Deploy independently from the SF team.

When a SOT-A is deployed with an SF team, they combine security tasks and CSS requirements. A SOT-A has the capability to support an SF team with limited interrogation, translation, interpretation, and communications support.

The SOT-A team leader executes the technical aspects of the mission. In addition to providing EW to support

the SF team commander, the SOT-A transmits collected information to the battalion TCAE for decryption, processing, analysis, and dissemination. The TCAE forwards this information to the group TCAE where it is further processed within the group TCAE and then disseminated to the appropriate users.

The SOT-A's are capable of operating in all environments and across the operational continuum in support of special operation elements. Their small size and ability to task organize in a variety of combat configurations supports SF commanders' intelligence requirements.

### CI Section

The primary function of the CI section is to perform MDCI analysis to support the ASPS and the unit's OPSEC and deception programs. It performs source administration functions in support of all group LLSOs. It also supports the unit's personnel security and information security functions. Its CI teams conduct liaison with other US and host-nation security organizations located in the vicinity of the base.

The CI section manages CI support to OPSEC and deception. It is located within the OPCEN and maintains direct contact with S2 security personnel and the ASPS.

Counter-SIGINT teams are able to provide communications monitoring and analysis of commercial and military landlines and radio telephones at the SFOB. When authorized, organic SOT-A teams can provide limited communications monitoring support. When necessary, the CI section coordinates this and other nonorganic support with the supporting theater Army CI element.

The CI section—

- Conducts MDCI analysis to support ASPS situation and target development.
- Develops detailed assessments of foreign intelligence and security threats near SF operational bases and in SF operational areas.
- Recommends appropriate OPSEC measures to reduce friendly vulnerabilities.
- Evaluates, if possible, the effectiveness of OPSEC measures implemented to correct identified friendly vulnerabilities.
- Briefs deploying SF teams on the latest threat data.
- Provides SF teams with technical advice and assistance to prepare them to establish and operate LLSOs during long-term UW and FID missions.
- Supports SF deception operations by determining foreign vulnerabilities to deception.
- Provides the S3 with recommendations for deception measures and evaluates their effectiveness through MDCI analysis.
- Requests external support, when necessary, to evaluate foreign reactions to friendly deception operations.

When directed, the SF battalion's CI teams participate in LLSOs. Also, when directed, they conduct CI investigations of suspected sabotage, subversion, and espionage activity directed against the SF group.

### Terrain Team

The supporting terrain team, while not part of the group MI detachment, collocates with and functions as an essential element of the OPCEN. The S2 tasks the team and controls its activities. The terrain team collects, compiles, and produces graphic and textual terrain data to support the group's needs. It also assists the ASPS in its IPB function by producing general and detailed terrain analysis, terrain studies, overlays, and overprinted maps.

### Interrogation Teams

The group's MI detachment has two interrogation teams. They normally deploy three two-person teams, as required, to support group operations. One of the teams may be attached to the joint interrogation facility (JIF). SF interrogation activities include—

- Interrogating EPWs and debriefing detainees, returned US personnel, and other persons of intelligence interest to the supported commander.
- Exploiting documents that appear to directly satisfy the supported commander's SOR.

- Participating in overt elicitation activities. These activities include liaison, escort, observer, and treaty verification missions.

### OTHER ORGANIC SUPPORT

In addition to the support provided by the OPCEN, the SF company, ODA, and S3 also provide organic support.

#### SF Company

The SF company technician has staff responsibility for the organization, training, intelligence and CI activities, and combat operations of the company and its operational detachments.

#### ODA

At the ODA level, the assistant operations and intelligence NCO supervises intelligence training, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination activities. The NCO–

- Assists the operations sergeant in preparing area studies, briefbacks, OPLANs, and OPORDs.
- Processes and questions EPW.
- Briefs and debriefs patrols.
- Conducts LLSO, as directed by higher headquarters; this is done with the assistance of the detachment members.

#### S3

The S3 has primary coordinating staff responsibility for operations, organization, and training. These include orchestrating, developing, and tasking for EW, OPSEC, and deception operations.

#### Medical Section

The group and battalion medical sections are excellent sources of information about the health threat and the medical personnel and facilities of deployment locations.

## NONORGANIC INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO SPECIAL FORCES

IEW support for SF consists of HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, TECHINT, MASINT, EW, and CI. Although organic IEW assets provide dedicated support to their respective operational bases, nonorganic support still is required. In CONUS, this nonorganic support is normally requested through USASFC G2, USASOC ODCSINT, and USSOCOM. Outside continental United States (OCONUS) nonorganic support is requested through the SOC J2 and the TASOSC S2.

### IEW SUPPORT FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

Intelligence requirements for SF operations are unique, highly sensitive, and compartmentalized. The Requirements Management Division of USASOC coordinates with USSOCOM and theater intelligence organizations to provide the intelligence that cannot be provided by MSCs.

The SOC J2 primarily is concerned with in-theater IEW policy formulation, planning, and coordination. The SOC J2–

- Ensures sufficient intelligence support is available for each mission tasked by the SOC.
- Relies on the theater service IEW organizations to collect, produce, and disseminate intelligence to meet service component SOF requirements.
- Coordinates joint SO intelligence collection operations and the production and dissemination of TIPs to support SO targeting. (See Chapter 9.)
- Tasks subordinate ARSOF units to collect and report information that supports SF intelligence requirements.

The SOC Director of Communications-Electronics (J6) coordinates to obtain secure SCI voice and data communications among the headquarters of the SOC, its component commands, and the TASOSC.

The TASOSC DOI provides all-source IEW support to all in-theater ARSOF. Complying with guidance from the SOC J2, the DOI validates, consolidates, and prioritizes standing and routine IR and RIIs. He then forwards them to the TASOSC ISE collocated at the theater army MI brigade's EACIC.

Under the staff supervision of the TASOSC S2, the ISE–

- Responds to RIIs by integrating them into the EACIC requirements list.
- Monitors RII status until the appropriate collection assets respond.
- Maintains an intelligence data base to support ARSOF requirements.
- Supports the targeting process by producing TIPs.

### HUMINT Support

HUMINT is collected using a variety of methods. HUMINT collectors–

- Interrogate EPWs and debrief or interview civilian internees, detainees, and refugees.
- Debrief returned captured US personnel, escapees, and evaders.
- Exploit CEE and CEM.
- Perform controlled collection operations.
- Conduct LLSOs.
- Conduct LRSO, patrols, and observation posts (OPs).
- Conduct liaison with local military or paramilitary forces and the local populace.
- Obtain reports from friendly troops.

The supported command's MI brigade or tactical exploitation battalion provides additional interrogation support for SF missions if required and authorized.

### SIGINT Support

SIGINT is the product of information gathered when electromagnetic emissions are intercepted, collected, evaluated, analyzed, or integrated with other intelligence and combat information, and then interpreted. SIGINT subdivisions include communications intelligence (COMINT), foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT), and electronic intelligence (ELINT). By integrating SIGINT with intelligence from other resources, accurate targeting and threat data can be obtained.

Although SOT-A's of the battalion MI detachment provide an organic SIGINT/ESM capability to the SF group, additional SIGINT support may be required. The type of support needed depends on the target and threat capabilities. SIGINT support for SF missions is available from the supported command's MI brigade.

### IMINT Support

IMINT comes from radar, photographic, infrared, and electro-optic imagery. Imagery analysts use imagery to identify and locate threat activity, installations, and equipment for SF actions. Imagery and IA are significant sources of information and intelligence for SF elements.

IMINT, which covers various seasons, conditions, and angles of a target, provides details on terrain. To a lesser extent, personnel movement and EOB patterns also can be analyzed from IMINT.

IMINT tasking is done through either fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) or intelligence annexes to the OPORD, SOP, or the RII. Formats to request support from national systems are in the J-TENS Manual, Sections 3, 4, and 5; and in FM 34-2, Appendix C. IMINT systems controlled by a higher headquarters, other services, or national agencies respond to approved RIIs through appropriate channels.

The channels used depend on the agency and the requirement, the agency receiving the request, and command procedures. Corps and division assets can provide IMINT when the target area falls within the range of their organic systems. Other services and national assets also can provide IMINT in support of SF operations.

### TECHINT Support

TECHINT consists of S&TI and battlefield TECHINT. TECHINT provides SF personnel with intelligence about foreign technological developments and the performance and operational capabilities of foreign materiel. Battlefield TECHINT, a subdivision of TECHINT, provides the tactical commander with countermeasures to neutralize and defeat enemy systems and materiel.

TECHINT products are produced by the Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC) or by a battlefield TECHINT team. TECHINT teams provide a variety of support to SF personnel preparing to deploy. This sup-

port includes training and information on foreign weapons, equipment, and vehicles. Requests for TECHINT team support must go through the SOC J2 (when in theater) or through intelligence channels to USASOC ODCSINT. For more information on TECHINT, see FM 34-54.

### EW Support

Superior and aggressive EW is a vital capability of ARSOF. The application of EW in ARSOF is not unlike that of conventional warfare operations, with the exception of the proximity of ECM and the vulnerability of ARSOF.

EW will require ESM or the collection, analysis, and location of threat emitters and the decision of which targets will be subject to ECM. ECM will consist of both jamming and deception.

- Jamming will be used to deny the intended receipt of communications from the transmitting station to deny threat $C^2$.
- Deception will be used to spoof the intended receiver for a period of time in which to achieve an immediate objective.

ECCM is also an essential element of EW in SOF operations based on the vulnerability of SOF and the proximity to the threat. Detailed communications operating procedures must be established and practiced to ensure SOF operations are not vulnerable to threat EW.

### CI Support

CI detects, evaluates, counteracts, or prevents foreign intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, and terrorism. The organic group and battalion CI sections primarily perform MDCI analysis. In addition, SF commanders normally receive additional CI investigative and technical support from the supporting CI unit of the theater army MI brigade. (See FM 34-60 and FM 34-60A for details on CI.)

## OTHER NONORGANIC SUPPORT

A working relationship between the supporting CA unit and the SF S2 aids the commander's mission planning, preparation, and execution. A good relationship ensures information passes quickly between the two elements and eliminates duplicated effort.

### CA Support

In daily operations, CA personnel deal with people, equipment, and documentary material that may provide valuable intelligence. This is important since many SF missions depend upon the support of the civilian population. UW and FID missions can fail without popular support. That is why SF commanders must consider the impact of all of their activities on the civilian population.

In support of SF mission planning, preparation, and execution, CA elements–

- Train and advise members of the supported SF unit in civil military operations (CMO) and the political, economic, social, and cultural factors that influence SF operations.
- Identify and acquire foreign resources.
- Coordinate with other agencies to minimize civilian interference.
- Assist in meeting legal and moral obligations to the local population, families of supported indigenous forces, and persons displaced by SF operations.
- Supplement the intelligence effort by collecting information during CMO.
- Act as staff focal point for cultural aspects that affect SF operations.
- Coordinate and integrate CA activities with PSYOP activities.
- Provide technical advice and assistance on civil assistance, military civic action, and humanitarian assistance programs.
- Provide input during pre-mission planning and preparation. This minimizes civilian interference and reduces collateral damage to the civilian populace and economy.

### PSYOP Support

PSYOP are particularly important to SF. PSYOP units can provide SF intelligence personnel with key information concerning influential population segments, vulnerabilities of hostile groups, and other information that adds to the overall intelligence effort in the operational

area. The earlier a close working relationship is established between the SF unit and the supporting PSYOP unit, the greater the chances of mission success.

SF PSYOP elements –

- Provide advice and assist SF units as they work to obtain and sustain the support of neutral and uncommitted segments of a foreign power.
- Exploit hostile vulnerabilities in the operational area.
- Design PSYOP for deployed SF teams to execute.
- Recommend and plan actions like civil disobedience, rallies, and demonstrations that degrade or neutralize hostile influences on the target audiences.
- Review SF plans to identify potentially adverse effects on target audiences that could affect mission accomplishment.
- Train SF soldiers in the customs they must honor in the operational area.
- Provide basic and special PSYOP assessments that add to the overall intelligence effort in the operational area.
- Advise SF commanders and their staffs on the psychological impact of military operations on target audiences within the operational area.

### SF Support to IEW

By using SR in denied areas, SF can provide the IEW system with human eyes on the objective.

SR operations encompass a broad range of intelligence collection activities to include reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. The SR collection effort emphasizes US unilateral (or alliance) intelligence requirements, not the requirements of an indigenous resistance organization. SR complements national and theater collection systems (such as high altitude imagery or SIGINT) that are more vulnerable to weather, terrain, masking, and hostile countermeasures.

SR operations can be broken into two categories:

- Battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance, which involves the use of standard patrolling tactics and techniques. Such missions are often for extended durations beyond or in the absence of conventional fire support and sustainment means.
- Clandestine collection, which is complex and sensitive, involves the SIGINT and HUMINT techniques normally reserved to the US intelligence community. SF teams may conduct unilateral clandestine collection missions in crisis situations, in support of national and theater CT forces, or in other conditions short of war. In wartime or as a special activity, SF teams may conduct unilateral clandestine collection missions in hostile areas where the threat precludes the use of other HUMINT means. Clandestine collection may require oversight, interagency coordination, and control of SF teams by the US intelligence community.

Typical SR missions include –

- Initial contact with an indigenous resistance organization and assessment of resistance potential.
- Collection of strategic, political, economic, psychological, or military information.
- Collection of critical military OB information (for example, NBC capabilities and intentions, commitment of second-echelon forces, and location of high-level headquarters).
- Collection of technical military information.
- Target acquisition and surveillance of hostile $C^2$ systems, troop concentrations, deep strike weapons, LOC, and other military targets of strategic or operational significance.
- Location and surveillance of hostage, PW, or political prisoner detention facilities.
- Poststrike reconnaissance.
- Meteorologic, geographic, or hydrographic reconnaissance to support specific aerospace, land, or maritime operations.

### MC&G and Other Intelligence Products

Each SF group and battalion has an up-to-date DIA account which ensures automatic dissemination of intelligence products, studies, and reports based on the unit's SII recurring document list and SIGINT end product requirements. The SII provides the vehicle for unit registration of requirements for intelligence information reports (IIRs), all-source nonrecurring finished intelligence (NRFI), and first issuance of all-source recurring intelligence.

AC units with proper Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) accounts obtain MC&G products from the DMA Combat Support Center, which is the OCONUS Army map depot. RC units in CONUS obtain MC&G products from their continental United States Army (CONUSA) map depots.

USASOC and its MSCs assist units to obtain special MC&G products and services. When maps of a required area are outdated or nonexistent, units request multispectral imagery (MSI) or grid imagery through regular intelligence channels.

# CHAPTER 5

# INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO RANGER OPERATIONS

This chapter discusses IEW support to the ranger regiment. It describes ranger missions. The chapter explains the IEW elements organic and external to ranger units and concludes with a detailed discussion on how the available IEW systems are employed to support ranger missions.

## MISSIONS

Ranger missions are diverse and are carried out on any terrain and under any condition. That is why accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence is critical when planning ranger missions. Rangers need specific information that can be obtained only through active interface with the supporting IEW system. This is because organic intelligence assets are limited.

Consequently, almost all information on a potential enemy or AO for planning or operational purposes must come from external intelligence agencies. Rangers have always relied upon timely and accurate intelligence support for mission success, whether in the forests of North America during the French and Indian War; climbing a cliff in Normandy during World War II; or exiting an aircraft at 500 feet over a Grenadian airfield.

The ranger regiment is a unique light infantry unit. It provides the NCA with the capability to rapidly deploy a lethal force to any region of the world for limited periods. Although it is a SOF, once in combat, the ranger regiment may fight and maneuver like other light infantry units.

The ranger regiment has the mission to plan and conduct special and light infantry operations in any operational environment in peace, conflict, and war. These operations can be in support of conventional or other SOF. (See FM 7-85, Chapters 6, 7, and 8; and FM 100-25, Chapters 8 and 9; for a complete discussion on ranger unit operations.)

The primary SO mission of rangers is to plan and conduct DA missions. Ranger operations include DA missions and special light infantry operations. DA missions are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions to seize, destroy, or inflict damage on a specific target. They also are actions to capture or recover designated personnel or materiel.

Ranger operations include raids, interdictions, and recovery operations. Special light infantry operations include many of the light infantry missions assigned to airborne, air assault, or light infantry brigades and battalions.

## ORGANIC INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO RANGER REGIMENTS

Intelligence assets organic to ranger regiments are organized according to operational and analytical needs. The ranger regiment has organic assets that can be used to perform intelligence functions and missions.

### REGIMENTAL INTELLIGENCE STAFF

As the primary intelligence advisor to the commander, the regimental S2–

- Operates the regimental intelligence S2 section.
- Reports and forwards priority intelligence and combat information to higher, adjacent, and lower echelons.
- Directs the regimental collection effort, tasking appropriate organic assets and forwarding RIIs to higher headquarters.
- Coordinates EW efforts with the staff operations officer.

- Coordinates with other elements of the IEW system.
- Coordinates CI efforts in support of operational requirements.
- Coordinates closely with the regimental fire support officer (FSO) to exchange battlefield information, nominate targets, and coordinate fire support coordination (FSCOORD) measures.

The S2 needs significant support from other headquarters and intelligence elements and agencies to provide comprehensive and timely intelligence support to the regiment.

## REGIMENTAL S2 SECTION

The regimental S2 section can be task organized to support subordinate battalions by detaching personnel down to the battalions. A flexible arrangement is necessary due to the types of missions the regiment is assigned to perform. This section—

- Conducts limited all-source intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination to support situation and target development, CI, and support to OPSEC activities.
- Deploys with the regimental TOC during operations.
- Identifies, validates, and coordinates unit geographic area requirements for MC&G products to support OPLANs and CONPLANs and to validate map requisitions.

Figure 5-1 shows the organization for the 75th Infantry Ranger Regiment. The regimental S2 section consists of the S2 and assistant S2, tactical intelligence team, OB team, IMINT team, CI team, and reconnaissance detachment. There are also three battalion S2 sections. Although nonorganic to the regimental S2 section, they provide coordination and information flow.

### Tactical Intelligence Team

The tactical intelligence team performs collection management functions for the regiment. This team—




**Figure 5-1. Intelligence Organization, 75th Infantry Ranger Regiment.**

- Deploys with the regimental TOC, but can be detached to support battalion operations.
- Performs all-source intelligence processing and analysis.
- Develops and is the primary architect of intelligence products constructed from regimental and outside sources.
- Maintains a worldwide intelligence data base.
- Identifies existing intelligence gaps in the collection effort and information flow.
- Produces intelligence reports and summaries.
- Produces intelligence estimates and annexes in support of OPLANs.
- Coordinates with the supported commander to obtain detailed IPB of the target area.
- Uses IPB to perform detailed terrain analysis.
- Responds to RIIs from regimental elements.
- Briefs and debriefs the regimental reconnaissance detachment teams in conjunction with the OB team.
- Provides intelligence briefings, as required.

### OB Team

The OB team and the tactical intelligence team are collocated and work together. The OB team is responsible for maintaining and updating enemy OB files. It studies and processes information on specific geographical target areas. The team also produces TIPs and estimates on enemy military actions. OB intelligence, in this context, includes intelligence and information regarding the enemy's organization, strength, and dispositions plus intelligence derived from weather forecasting and terrain analysis.

### IMINT Team

The IMINT team is subordinate to the regimental S2 section. It is responsible for interpreting IMINT products. The team has imagery analysts with the technical expertise to accomplish the mission and to deploy with the necessary equipment. Because IMINT is important to ranger operations, this section can be in DS to a ranger battalion and be augmented by other IMINT specialists.

The team maintains an IMINT library for the regiment and the battalions. Commanders use this material for planning and meeting operational requirements.

### CI Team

Elements of the CI team can be deployed with any of the ranger battalions. This team provides CI support to the unit's OPSEC and deception plans. It conducts CI liaison with US and foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies, as required.

### Reconnaissance Detachment

The information and intelligence gained from debriefing make ranger reconnaissance squads and scout patrols an effective HUMINT resource. The reconnaissance detachment—

- Fulfills tactical surveillance missions in an area before other ranger elements are committed to the fight.
- Has no organic language or interrogation assets.
- Can carry out certain tasks, such as operational security, sanitization measures, and deception operations.
- Has military freefall, combat diving, and scout swimmer capabilities.
- Is OPCON to the regimental S2 section. The detachment is divided into three teams. These teams give the regiment the capability to meet immediate on-the-ground intelligence requirements.
- Conducts target surveillance.
- Is specially trained to provide information on enemy OB, target sites, route reconnaissance, and base camps.
- Can be used as pathfinders to reconnoiter, choose, clear, and prepare landing zones (LZs) and drop zones (DZs).
- Can operate for up to five days on its own.

### Battalion S2 Section

The ranger battalion S2 section consists of two officers—the S2 and assistant S2—and three enlisted soldiers. The section has a limited capability to collect and analyze information. Its mission is to support the battalion commander with basic intelligence data base collection, analysis, and tactical intelligence support for

battalion operations. The battalion S2 section can be augmented by regimental S2 elements or external assets, as required.

The ranger battalion S2—

- Develops and maintains an intelligence data base.
- Identifies existing intelligence gaps.
- Produces intelligence reports and summaries.
- Performs terrain analysis and IPB functions directly supporting battalion operations.
- Processes RIIs from battalion elements.
- Participates in the decision-making process.
- Tasks, through the S3, battalion elements to perform tactical intelligence missions supporting battalion operations.
- Conducts intelligence training for battalion elements.
- Coordinates CI efforts supporting battalion operational requirements.
- Directs the battalion collection management process.
- Briefs and debriefs reconnaissance teams.
- Coordinates closely with the battalion FSO to exchange combat information, nominate targets, and coordinate fire support measures.

### OTHER ORGANIC SUPPORT

In addition to the support provided by the ranger regiment, other organic support is provided by USAF liaison, medical support, fire support, and USAF weather team.

#### USAF Liaison

The regimental headquarters and each battalion has a USAF liaison team. This team sometimes is used as an intelligence communications link.

#### Medical Support

The regimental and battalion surgeons are a source of medical and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) intelligence on possible deployment locations. They also provide valuable information on disease and pest conditions in the AO.

#### Fire Support

The organic fire support structure, including the fire support teams (FISTs) and battalion and regimental FSCOORD, provides valuable combat information to the S2.

#### Weather Team

The USAF SWO serves as a special staff officer to the regimental commander on all weather matters. The team provides current and forecast weather data and climatic analysis studies in support of all regimental missions. The team provides FALOP training to the reconnaissance detachment, and provides mission-unique information during operations. Weather support for ranger operations is limited to the regimental level only.

## NONORGANIC INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO RANGER REGIMENTS

Intelligence assets organic to the ranger regiment are limited. However, the IEW system supporting the ranger regiment is vast. Through the I&W system, the ranger regiment's organic intelligence assets interface with the nonorganic IEW systems to secure all necessary support.

This nonorganic intelligence support for rangers includes all the intelligence disciplines and functional areas: HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, TECHINT, EW, and CI operations. External product support is available by coordinating between the ranger unit S2 and the supported command.

### IEW SUPPORT FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

When deployed, the theater or JTF commander is responsible for providing intelligence support to the ranger regiment. USASOC provides information and intelligence to the ranger force commander while the force is in CONUS. The USASOC intelligence staff

coordinates with theater intelligence agencies to provide what the regiment needs.

In theater, the main source of processed intelligence is the EACIC. The EACIC provides intelligence, MDCI, and EW product support to the ranger force. Figure 5-2 shows the intelligence support available from the EAC brigade. The ranger regiment normally places an intelligence liaison officer (LNO) at the EACIC or the appropriate ASPS to facilitate the necessary coordination to ensure—

- The intelligence needs of the ranger force are relayed to the intelligence processing center.
- The resulting analysis is based on the specific needs of the ranger force commander.

This LNO also coordinates with the corps or EAC targeting center. Close coordination between the regiment, the EACIC, and the targeting center is essential to effectively employ ranger forces.

### HUMINT Support

HUMINT support to ranger forces includes intelligence derived from—

- Interrogating EPWs and debriefing civilian internees, detainees, and refugees.
- Debriefing returned captured US personnel, escapees, and evaders.
- Exploiting CED and CEM.
- Performing controlled collection operations.
- Conducting RSO, patrols, and OPs.
- Conducting liaison with local military or paramilitary forces and the local populace.
- Obtaining reports from friendly troops.

The interrogator is one of the primary HUMINT collectors not organic to the ranger battalion. The interrogator is specially trained to exploit personnel and documents written in the source's native language. Interrogators are most effective when they are employed forward in support of commanders in direct contact with the enemy.

Interrogator support is available from the supported command's MI brigade or tactical exploitation battalion. At brigade and above interrogators are collocated at EPW holding areas and camps. Interrogators collect against SIR that answer the commander's PIR and IR. Then this interrogation information or intelligence is incorporated into the all-source intelligence product.

When rangers need combat information or intelligence for mission planning that only interrogators can provide, they either request this support through USASOC or the appropriate TASOSC, or through other commands which have interrogators organic to their units.

### SIGINT Support

SIGINT is the product of information gathered when electromagnetic emissions are intercepted, collected, evaluated, analyzed, and integrated with other intelligence and combat information and then interpreted. SIGINT subdivisions include COMINT, FISINT, and ELINT. By integrating SIGINT with other intelligence, accurate targeting data can be obtained.

SIGINT support to the planning process for ranger missions, including locating enemy $C^3$, is available from the supported command's MI brigade. The type of support needed depends upon the nature of the target and enemy capabilities.

### IMINT Support

IMINT comes from radar, photographic, infrared, and electro-optic imagery. Imagery analysts use imagery to identify and locate enemy activity, installations, and equipment for ranger actions. Imagery and IA are significant sources of information and intelligence for ranger elements.

IMINT, which covers various seasons, conditions, and angles of a target, provides details on terrain. To a lesser extent, enemy OB and personnel movement patterns also can be analyzed from IMINT.

IMINT tasking is done through either FRAGO or intelligence annexes to the OPORD, or the RII. Formats to request support from national systems are in the J-TENS Manual, Sections 3, 4, and 5; and FM 34-2, Appendix C. IMINT systems controlled by a higher headquarters, other services, or national agencies respond to approved RIIs through appropriate channels.




**Figure 5-2. Intelligence support available from the EAC MI brigade.**

The channels used depend on the agency and the requirement, the agency receiving the request, and command procedures. Corps and division assets provide IMINT when the target area falls within the range of their organic systems. Other services and national assets also can provide IMINT in DS of ranger operations.

### TECHINT Support

TECHINT consists of S&TI and battlefield TECHINT. TECHINT provides rangers with intelligence about threat technological developments and the performance and operational capabilities of threat materiel. Battlefield TECHINT provides the tactical commander with countermeasures to neutralize and defeat enemy systems and materiel.

TECHINT products, including countermeasures, are produced by the CMEC or a battlefield TECHINT team. TECHINT is incorporated into the all-source intelligence product. Specific requests for TECHINT team support are coordinated through headquarters, echelons corps and above.

### EW Support

EW is vital to successful ranger operations and requires the same support that conventional warfare operations need. However, in ranger operations, ECM must be closer and focused on the objective to effectively support the fighting force.

EW will require ESM or the collection, analysis, and location of threat emitters and the decision which targets will be subject to ECM. ECM will consist of both jamming and deception.

- Jamming will be used to deny the intended receipt of communications from the transmitting station to deny threat $C^2$.
- Deception will be used to spoof the intended receiver for a period of time in which to achieve an immediate objective.

ECCM is also an essential element of EW in ranger operations based on the vulnerability of ranger forces and the proximity to the threat. Detailed communications operating procedures must be established and practiced to ensure ranger operations are not vulnerable to threat EW.

### CI Support

CI detects, evaluates, counteracts, or prevents foreign intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, and terrorism. It determines security vulnerabilities and recommends countermeasures. CI operations support OPSEC, deception, and rear operations.

CI support to the ranger regiment is normally provided by a CI team from the MI group at theater army level. The CI team conducts liaison support between the regiment and other intelligence and law enforcement agencies operating within the theater. CI support is also provided through USASOC channels. (See FM 34-60 and FM 34-60A for details on CI.)

## OTHER NONORGANIC SUPPORT

Intelligence requirements for ranger operations are specialized and sensitive. The USASOC ODCSINT Requirements Management Division coordinates with theater and national level intelligence agencies to provide the information and intelligence the force needs. The TASOSC ISE produces TIPs and other supporting intelligence products for ranger operations within the theater. See Figure 3-4 for more information on RIIs.

### CA Support

A working relationship between the supporting CA unit and the ranger unit aids the commander's mission planning, preparation, and execution. A good relationship ensures information passes quickly between the two elements and eliminates duplicated effort.

In daily operations CA personnel deal with people, equipment, and documentary material that may provide valuable intelligence. This is important because ranger commanders must consider the impact of all of their activities on the civilian population.

In support of ranger mission planning, preparation, and executions, CA elements –

- Identify and acquire foreign resources.
- Coordinate with other agencies to minimize civilian interference.
- Assist in meeting legal and moral obligations to the local population, families of supported indigenous forces, and persons displaced by ranger operations.

- Supplement the intelligence effort by collecting information during CMO.
- Act as staff focal point for cultural aspects that affect ranger operations.
- Provide input during pre-mission planning and preparation. This minimizes civilian interference and reduces collateral damage to the civilian populace and economy.

### PSYOP Support

PSYOP supports ranger operations by reducing the effectiveness of the enemy force and enhancing and eliciting the support of the local population. Ranger PSYOP elements–

- Exploit hostile vulnerabilities in the operational area.
- Design PSYOP for deployed ranger units to execute.
- Review ranger plans to identify potentially adverse effects on target audiences that could affect mission accomplishment.
- Provide basic and special PSYOP assessments that add to the overall intelligence effort in the operational area.
- Advise ranger commanders and their staffs on the psychological impact of military operations on target audiences within the operational area.

### Ranger Support to the IEW System

Like any other unit, ranger elements can be excellent sources of combat information. Rangers are often the first to encounter the enemy and can confirm or deny friendly assessments of threat organization, equipment, capabilities, and morale. They can bring back captured threat equipment for evaluation and report on the effectiveness of friendly weapons on threat systems. Rangers can also provide real time assessments of the target area civilian population's psychological and physical disposition for use in fine tuning PSYOP and CA plans for follow-on forces. Ranger SIOs must be proactive in debriefing rangers to ensure this valuable information enters the IEW system.

### MC&G and Other Intelligence Products

The ranger regiment and its subordinate battalions have an account with the DIA and the Army Intelligence Agency (AIA). All pertinent reports and studies are sent to the ranger regiment and battalions, as requested. Maps, IMINT, and other special products are also routinely supplied. These and other national assets supply information and intelligence for quick response missions under certain conditions. DIA or AIA may even dedicate assets like foreign ASTs to support specific ranger missions.

Ranger units with a proper DMA account obtain MC&G products direct from the DMA Combat Support Center, which is the OCONUS Army map depot. USASOC assists units to obtain special MC&G products and services.

# CHAPTER 6

# INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION

SOA plans and conducts special air operations across the operational continuum. Specialized SOA assets routinely penetrate hostile and sensitive airspace undetected to conduct and support SO and theater level operational plans. These assets operate with precise execution over extended ranges, under adverse weather conditions, and during times of limited visibility.

The effectiveness of SOA depends largely on the ability of the S2 to gather and disseminate detailed operational intelligence to mission planners in a timely manner. The SOC J2, in coordination with the TASOSC ISE, provides NRT intelligence throughout mission planning and execution.

In the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), each supported CINC is given SOA assets tailored to meet the specific mission requirements of the theater CINC. A typical SOA force consists of assets drawn from the SOA regiment.

The regiment consists of a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), SOA regiment (airborne); a special operations helicopter battalion with a light attack company; an assault helicopter battalion; and a medium helicopter battalion (lift). (See FM 100-25, Chapter 9, for details of these elements.)

## MISSIONS

The most frequent SOA mission is infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of SOF by air. SOA units can provide general aviation support to SOF where use of other Army aviation assets are not appropriate, feasible, or available. These types of missions, however, detract from the primary mission of clandestine penetration into denied areas.

## ORGANIC INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION REGIMENTS

The only MI support in SOA regiments and their subordinate battalions are their respective S2 staffs. SOA units have no other organic IEW assets. Figure 6-1 shows the intelligence organization for the 160th SOA Regiment.

The SOA regiment S2 section has three teams: OB, imagery interpretation, and CINC intelligence planning. The SOA regimental S2 staff organization is currently under development.

Accurate IEW support is vital to mission success and survivability of SOA assets. Successful penetration and exfiltration dictate that SOA assets must avoid detection. Pilots avoid detection by—

- Using advanced terrain flight techniques.
- Operating under conditions of limited visibility.
- Relying heavily on a comprehensive aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) system.

In SOA operations, knowledge and suppression of the foreign air threat is paramount. The staffs of the SOA task force S2 and the area air defense command must closely coordinate to avoid detection and minimize losses. The S2 must push to acquire every asset possible to exactly pinpoint the weapons systems, quantity, and location to assist aircraft in the successful penetration of denied air space.

### S2 RESPONSIBILITIES

The SOA S2 is the staff representative for intelligence and CI measures. The S2—

- Recommends PIR to the commander and establishes IR.




**Figure 6-1. Intelligence organization, 160th SOA Regiment.**

- Provides accurate air defense information to supported SOF units.
- Coordinates intelligence requirements.
- Acquires sufficient imagery for SOA operations.
- Provides an assessment of the foreign intelligence collection threat.
- Prepares and implements intelligence training programs.
- Exercises staff supervision of CI personnel.
- Helps the operations element prepare essential elements of friendly information (EEFI), vulnerability studies, and countermeasures to be employed by the units in support of the OPSEC plan.
- Assists the S3 in planning operations. The S2 and S3 should maintain a single situation map with overlays.
- Coordinates weather information and analysis with the appropriate Army or Air Force weather element.
- Identifies, confirms, and coordinates priorities for unit geographic area requirement MC&G products to support OPLANs and CONPLANs; monitors and validates map requisitions.

### OB Team

This team is responsible for foreign OB files. This team studies and processes information on specific geographical target areas. It also produces intelligence assessments on foreign military actions. SOA OB intelligence goes beyond enemy air defense threats. It includes foreign air support facilities and navigation aids that SOA elements exploit or avoid while deep in hostile territory.

### Imagery Interpretation Team

This team develops and maintains imagery data files on specific geographical target areas. The team's focus goes beyond normal OB and ongoing target coverage. It includes foreign or hostile air support facilities that SOA elements can use while in denied territory.

### CINC Intelligence Planning Team

This team is responsible for coordinating with the theater CINCs to ensure that the regiment has each theater's intelligence estimates and OPLANs on hand.

# NONORGANIC INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION REGIMENTS

Intelligence support to SOA is specialized and sensitive. It is often different from conventional aviation. The Requirements Management Division, USASOC, and the SOA CINC intelligence planning team coordinate with theater and national level intelligence sources to provide needed information.

## IEW SUPPORT FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

The SOC J2 primarily is concerned with in-theater IEW policy formulation, planning, and coordination. The SOC J2–

- Ensures that sufficient intelligence support is available for each mission tasked by the SOC.
- Relies on the theater service IEW organizations to collect, produce, and disseminate intelligence to meet SOA requirements.
- Tasks subordinate SOF units to collect and report information in support of SOA intelligence requirements.

The SOC J6 coordinates to obtain secure SCI voice and data communications between the headquarters of the SOC, its component commands, and the TASOSC.

The TASOSC S2 provides all-source IEW support to all in-theater ARSOF. Complying with guidance from the SOC J2, the DIO validates, consolidates, and prioritizes standing and routine IR and RIIs. He then forwards them to the TASOSC ISE collocated at the theater Army MI brigade's EACIC.

Under the staff supervision of the TASOSC S2, the ISE–

- Responds to RII by integrating them into the EACIC requirements list.
- Monitors RII status until the appropriate collection assets respond.
- Maintains an intelligence data base to support ARSOF requirements.

### HUMINT Support

HUMINT is collected using a variety of methods. HUMINT collectors–

- Interrogate EPWs and debrief or interview civilian internees, detainees, and refugees.
- Debrief returned captured US personnel, escapees, and evaders.
- Exploit CED and CEM.
- Perform controlled collection.
- Conduct LRSO, patrols, and OPs.
- Conduct liaison with local military or paramilitary forces and the local populace; and obtain reports from friendly troops.

Interrogation support for SOA is available from the supported command's MI brigade or tactical exploitation battalion. Otherwise, interrogators are collocated at EPW collection points and holding facilities at echelons, division, and above. Interrogation information then is incorporated into the all-source product. When SOA needs information for mission planning that only interrogators might provide, they must coordinate their requirements with the command that has interrogators.

### SIGINT Support

SIGINT is developed from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of information derived from intercepted electromagnetic emissions. SIGINT subdivisions include COMINT, ELINT, and FISINT. By integrating SIGINT with intelligence from other resources, accurate targeting and threat data can be obtained.

SIGINT support for planning SOA missions is available from the supported command's MI brigade. The type of support needed depends on the operational factors in the operational area.

### IMINT Support

IMINT comes from radar, photographic, infrared, and electro-optic imagery. SOA uses detailed imagery to develop sophisticated target folders.

IMINT covers the target during various seasons, conditions, and angles of a target, provides details on terrain. The SIO must be able to determine the measurements of buildings, spacings between buildings, and the size of any obstacles on roads or intersections. Within SOA's precision assault environment, inches can mean lives and the difference between success or failure. IMINT is a significant source of critical operational data for SOA elements.

IMINT tasking is done through either FRAGO or intelligence annexes to the OPORD, SOP, or RII. Formats to request support from national systems are in the J-TENS Manual, Sections 3, 4, and 5; and FM 34-2, Appendix C. IMINT systems controlled by a higher headquarters, other services, or national agencies respond to approved RIIs through appropriate channels.

The channels used depend on the requesting unit and the requirement, the agency receiving the request, and command procedures. Corps and division assets can provide IMINT when the target area falls within the range of their organic systems. Other services and national assets also can be tasked to provide dedicated IMINT support to SOF operations.

### TECHINT Support

TECHINT consists of S&TI and battlefield TECHINT. TECHINT provides SOA personnel with intelligence about foreign technological developments and the performance and operational capabilities of foreign materiel. Battlefield TECHINT provides the tactical commander with countermeasures to neutralize and defeat enemy systems and materiel.

TECHINT products are produced by the CMEC or a battlefield TECHINT team at corps. TECHINT is incorporated into the all-source intelligence product. Specific requests for TECHINT support are coordinated through the SOC J2 to corps headquarters or above.

### EW Support

Depending on the nature of the operation and threat capabilities, SOA may need support from EW units. EW operations disrupt or destroy the threat's $C^2$ of his forces and weapons systems, and retain friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. EW also is used to support deception operations. EW misleads the threat by manipulating, distorting, or falsifying indicators; thus persuading the enemy to react in a manner against his own interests.

Active jamming prevents enemy early warning radar from detecting airborne forces or, if detected, from determining their route. Also, false transmissions support SOA deception plans or feints. SOA uses selective jamming and imitative deception to disrupt foreign $C^2$ nets, which reduces the enemy's ability to react to SOA presence.

In CONUS, planning and coordinating elements from USASOC contribute to the EW program for SOA. When deployed, the JTF or theater commander is responsible for planning the EW program to support an SOA mission. The EW program must be closely coordinated so it does not disrupt friendly air-to-ground or ground-to-ground communications, or reveal friendly force intentions.

### CI Support

CI detects, evaluates, counteracts, or prevents foreign intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, and terrorism. It determines security vulnerabilities and recommends countermeasures. CI operations support OPSEC, deception, and force protection.

Currently, the SOA regiment has no organic CI support but CI is vital to SOA mission planning, preparation, and execution. In CONUS, the security division, USASOC, conducts liaison with US and foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies as appropriate. This liaison is an important element of CI support to the SOA regiment.

CI supports OPSEC by providing MDCI information and products, such as the MDCI appendix, to the SOA regiment OPLANs and OPORDs. Additional CI support is obtained from the CONUS CI group as required. Upon deployment, CI support is obtained from the appropriate theater MI brigade. For additional information on CI and HUMINT, see FM 34-60 and FM 34-60A.

## OTHER NONORGANIC SUPPORT

By their nature, SOA missions require only limited CA support. However, should SOA units be required to stay in one place longer than anticipated, they may require support from adjacent units to include CA.

### CA Support

CA elements, in support of SOA, can –

- Train and advise members of the supported SOA unit in CMO and the political, economic, social, and cultural factors that influence operations.
- Identify and acquire foreign resources.
- Coordinate with other agencies to minimize civilian interference.
- Assist in meeting legal and moral obligations to the local population, families of supported indigenous forces, and persons displaced by operations.
- Supplement the intelligence effort by collecting information during CMO.
- Act as staff focal point for cultural aspects that affect SOA operations.

### PSYOP Support

SOA missions are characterized by rapid and surreptitious entry and exit from denied air space. Therefore, SOA units do not require extensive PSYOP mission support. PSYOP can support SOA operations by reducing the effectiveness of the enemy force. PSYOP elements –

- Exploit hostile vulnerabilities in the operational area.
- Design PSYOP for deployed SOA units to execute.
- Review SOA plans to identify potentially adverse effects on target audiences that could affect mission accomplishment.
- Identify sectors of population that would aid SOA crews in E&E.
- Provide basic and special PSYOP assessments that add to the overall intelligence effort in the operational area.
- Advise commanders and their staffs on the psychological impact of military operations on target audiences within the operational area.

In the event that SOA elements are based in an area for extended periods of times, they will require increasing support from adjacent units, to include PSYOP.

In addition to the support provided by SOA, other support is provided by the SO weather team and MC&G nonstandard intelligence products.

### Weather

SOA is highly susceptible to the effects of weather, making weather a critical aspect of mission planning. Weather support to SOA is provided by detachments of the SO weather team. Direct weather support must include, but not be limited to –

- Forecasts of general weather conditions and specific meteorological data elements as described in the 24-hour forecast.
- Solar geophysical information and climatic studies and analyses.
- Weather advisories, warnings, and specialized weather briefings, to include flight weather briefings.

### SOA Support to the IEW System

Like any other unit, SOA elements can be excellent sources of combat information. SOA are often the first to encounter the enemy and can confirm or deny friendly assessments of threat air and ground-based air defense capabilities. They can report on the effectiveness of friendly weapons and counter-air defense measures on threat systems. If possible without compromising their mission, SOA can also provide real time updates on the movements and concentrations of threat units deep in the enemy's rear area. SOA SIOs must be proactive in debriefing SOA elements to ensure this valuable information enters the IEW system.

### MC&G and Other Intelligence Products

The SOA regiment has a standing account with DIA and AIA. All pertinent reports and studies are sent to the SOA regiment when requested. Maps, IMINT, and other special products are also routinely supplied. National assets can supply information for quick response missions and may even dedicate certain assets to support SOA.

SOA units with a proper DMA map account may obtain MC&G products direct from the DMA Combat Support Center, the appropriate installation map depot, or the supporting OCONUS Army map depot. USASOC assists units to obtain special MC&G products and services.

# CHAPTER 7

# INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

This chapter discusses the organization and mission of PSYOP units. It addresses the IEW support MI provides to PSYOP and the support PSYOP give the IEW system.

## MISSIONS

PSYOP missions are planned products and psychological actions in peace or war that are directed toward foreign enemy, friendly, and neutral audiences. The purpose is to influence attitudes and behaviors to achieve national political and military objectives.

PSYOP support varied military, political, and diplomatic actions across the operational continuum. These missions can be strategic, operational, or tactical missions.

- Strategic PSYOP missions are conducted at the national or theater level to advance broad, long-term psychological objectives in support of national psychological objectives.
- Operational PSYOP missions are conducted to achieve mid-term objectives in support of theater campaigns and major operations.
- Tactical PSYOP missions are conducted to achieve immediate or short-term objectives in support of tactical military operations.

Any of the above categories of PSYOP may support more than one level of the operational continuum. That is why distinctions between the categories of PSYOP are often blurred.

SOF, whether operating unilaterally or in cooperation with conventional forces across the entire operational continuum, must always consider nonmilitary factors and objectives. PSYOP missions –

- Play a critical and integral role in achieving or addressing these nonmilitary objectives.
- Aid in accomplishing tactical, operational, and strategic military objectives.
- May be the only military force employed.
- Must be integrated with all operations to prevent contradictory or conflicting messages. See FM 33-1 for details on PSYOP.

## ORGANIZATION

Army PSYOP missions are conducted by specifically organized and trained units. The majority of PSYOP forces are in the US Army Reserve. Figure 7-1 shows a type of RC PSYOP group (POG).

The 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) (POG(A)) is the only Army AC POG. It –

- Is responsible for planning and conducting Army PSYOP activities authorized and implemented worldwide.
- Supports contingencies and open hostilities short of declared war; it also develops, coordinates, and controls peacetime PSYOP activities.
- Is tasked to prepare and undertake the detailed planning and execution of strategic and operational missions for all U&S CINCs when war is declared.

The 4th POG(A) provisional task organization, as shown in Figure 7-2, consists of a group HHC, three regionally oriented battalions, one tactical support battalion, and one PSYOP dissemination battalion.

The 4th POG(A) is normally assigned to the AC of the unified command, but may be assigned as the joint PSYOP task force on the unified command. It may be designated as the senior PSYOP headquarters over US RC POGs or allied elements at EAC.




**Figure 7-1. A type of RC POG.**




**Figure 7-2. 4th POG (A) organization.**

# ORGANIC INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

PSYOP units use and produce all-source intelligence. PSYOP units need timely intelligence to achieve its objectives. This means the PSYOP SIO must maintain continuous coordination with the supporting S2, G2, or J2.

## GROUP/BATTALION S2

The S2 staff elements of the PSYOP battalion or POG are small. Each PSYOP unit's actual production and collection assets are located elsewhere in the unit. In PSYOP battalions, companies, and detachments that operate independently or in support of other forces, the SIO is usually the S2 or the chief of that unit's PDC. In these situations, the PDC S2 establishes the same type relations with the supporting IEW S2 as those normally established between PSYOP and the supported or supporting S2s.

The PSYOP SIO–

- Accesses the IEW system to answer the commander's PIR and IR.
- Ensures PSYOP intelligence elements can access the intelligence assets and products they need to support the commander.
- As an intelligence producer, ensures that the specialized products his intelligence elements produce go into the IEW system to be included in intelligence data bases. PSYOP and MI assets produce products of direct value to each other.
- Directs the intelligence effort to meet the commander's needs.
- Tasks organic and attached intelligence assets and forwards RIIs to higher headquarters.
- Integrates PSYOP intelligence efforts with other units and agencies.
- Assesses threat PSYOP capabilities, potential COAs, and potential effects.
- Produces and disseminates PSYOP intelligence products.
- Identifies, confirms, and coordinates priorities for unit geographic area requirements for MC&G products to support OPLANs and CONPLANs.
- Monitors and validates map requisitions.

## OTHER ORGANIC SUPPORT

PSYOP units have many specialized organic intelligence production and collection capabilities. For example, loudspeaker teams have linguists who can interview HUMINT sources. These assets are located in the PDC, audiovisual (AV) platoons, and foreign broadcast monitoring elements of the PSYOP unit.

### Product Development Center

Each battalion PDC contains threat analysis and counter-propaganda teams. The threat team–

- Examines the situation in its area of responsibility and identifies trends, developments, and events that have PSYOP relevance.
- Conducts research on target countries, regions, groups, or specific issues to develop detailed PSYOP data bases and target analyses. This research is normally in depth; it examines historical, political, diplomatic, social, and economic events and trends for PSYOP significance.

### Threat and Counter-Propaganda Teams

The counter-propaganda team conducts analysis of threat and neutral products in order to assess their impact and aid in developing counter-products.

The threat and counter-propaganda teams use attached and organic interrogators to collect information on political, social, and other PSYOP requirements. This information is often key to campaign assessment and product development. These teams also coordinate PSYOP collection requirements with MI interrogation elements collocated at EPW collection points and holding facilities throughout the theater of operations.

### AV Platoon and Radio Monitoring Elements

Other collection assets consist of the AV platoons and radio monitoring elements. The AV platoons are primarily tactical product development and dissemina-

tion elements. However, due to their proximity to the local populace and threat forces, they have a secondary mission to collect information on the local situation when disseminating activities. Information gathered by these teams is generally local and tactical in nature. It is used and transmitted in the same way information gathered by the interrogators or ground surveillance radar (GSR) teams is used and transmitted.

Some PSYOP units have radio monitoring elements. These elements—

- Overtly monitor threat and neutral commercial radio broadcasts.
- Are not capable of the direction finding, traffic analysis, and cryptologic operations that IEW SIGINT collection and jamming assets are; however, they can be significant to the IEW collection effort.
- Record selected broadcasts and forward them to a PDC for translation, transcription, and content analysis. These recordings can reveal a lot about the intended target audience of broadcasts as well as the PSYOP intentions of the broadcaster.

#### Threat, Counter-Propaganda Analysis, and AV Teams

Elements of these teams conduct surveys, interviews, and panels to collect PSYOP intelligence. These activities are different from tactical intelligence collection because they use techniques developed for market analysis and sociological research as well as HUMINT techniques. The goal is to obtain information on attitudes, beliefs, behaviors, and social organizations.

Since the PSYOP producer must anticipate that its products will be subjected to analysis, intelligence on the opposing PSYOP threat will also be needed. This intelligence will come from a combination of OB, MDCI analysis, and PSYOP data bases.

PSYOP can also provide intelligence of use to MDCI analysis and deception planning elements. This intelligence would usually concern sociological prejudices or predilections of a targeted force that could be manipulated or capitalized upon by the deception effort.

## NONORGANIC INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

PSYOP units collect most of the unclassified and some of the classified information they need themselves. PSYOP units get the rest of the intelligence and information they need through IEW channels.

The type of intelligence needed by PSYOP units depends on the echelon, area of responsibility, and mission of the supported command.

### IEW SUPPORT FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

The SOC J2 primarily is concerned with in-theater IEW policy formulation, planning, and coordination. The SOC J2—

- Ensures that sufficient intelligence support is available for each mission tasked by the SOC.
- Relies on the theater service IEW organizations to collect, produce, and disseminate intelligence to meet PSYOP requirements.
- Tasks subordinate SOF units to collect and report information in support of PSYOP intelligence requirements.

The SOC J6 coordinates to obtain secure SCI voice and data communications between the headquarters of the SOC, its component commands, and the TASOSC.

The TASOSC DOI provides all-source IEW support to all in-theater ARSOF. Complying with guidance from the SOC J2, the DOI validates, consolidates, and prioritizes standing and routine IR and RIIs. He then forwards them to the TASOSC ISE collocated at the theater army MI brigade's EACIC.

Under the staff supervision of the TASOSC DOI, the ISE—

- Responds to RIIs by integrating them into the EACIC requirements list.

- Monitors RII status until the appropriate collection assets respond.
- Maintains an intelligence data base to support ARSOF requirements.

OPORDs, OPLANs, campaign plans, and supporting PSYOP and intelligence annexes contain specific PSYOP intelligence requirements. Most of these requirements are validated and incorporated into PSYOP and IEW collection plans. (See FM 34-1, Appendix H; and FM 34-2, Appendix A.)

In order to meet some of these requirements, SIOs may need to reinforce or refocus available IEW assets. Often, the PSYOP or IEW SIO needs to enter the IEW system to access information or intelligence from other CS units; intelligence agencies; or sources at lower, adjacent, and higher echelons or national level. Figure 7-3 shows examples of sources that support PSYOP.

These units and agencies have extensive contact with, or knowledge of, the target audience. They also may have a complete data base onhand and a collection framework in place with intelligence requirements already developed and tasked. Proper coordination for use or access to these IEW assets saves time and assets, as well as potentially producing significant intelligence to support PSYOP.

## INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES SUPPORTING PSYOP

There are primarily five intelligence disciplines which significantly support PSYOP.

### HUMINT Support

The objective of PSYOP is to influence humans. The attitudes and beliefs of the target audience are, therefore, important. The most effective source for this information is HUMINT.

| UNITS | AGENCIES |
|---|---|
| HN Military | HN Federal and Local Government |
| HN Paramilitary or Militia | HN Police |
| SF | HN Government Agencies (Economic and Commerce) |
| CA | State Department |
| MP | CIA |
| | USIA |
| | AID |

OTHER SOURCES THAT MAY BENEFIT PSYOP INTELLIGENCE

| | |
|---|---|
| EPWs | Documents |
| Defectors | Letters |
| Refugees | Published Material |
| Civilians (friendly and enemy) | Poems |

**Figure 7-3. Examples of organizations and sources that can assist PSYOP efforts.**

HUMINT is collected using a variety of methods. HUMINT collectors—

- Interrogate EPWs and debrief or interview civilian internees, detainees, and refugees.
- Debrief returned captured US personnel, escapees, and evaders.
- Exploit CED and CEM.
- Perform controlled collection.
- Conduct LRSO, patrols, and OPs.
- Conduct liaison with local military or paramilitary forces and the local populace; and obtain reports from friendly troops.

PSYOP units use HUMINT developed from controlled collection, CI operations, interrogations, debriefings, and from other defensive or offensive HUMINT operations. To support PSYOP, HUMINT must be timely and accurate.

IEW intelligence and information gathered from EPWs, defectors, line crossers, and captured diaries often provide PSYOP intelligence elements with significant insights into the psychological situation in a specific area or within a target group. With consent and proper authority, these defectors, crews, and line crossers may also be used to develop PSYOP products. These same sources are also valuable when testing or pre-testing PSYOP products.

Interrogation support for PSYOP units is available from the supported command's MI brigade or tactical exploitation battalion. Otherwise, interrogators are collocated at EPW collection points and holding facilities at echelons, divisions, and above. Interrogation information then is incorporated into the all-source product. When PSYOP units need information for mission planning that only interrogators might provide, they must coordi-nate their requirements with the command that has interrogators.

### SIGINT Support

SIGINT is developed from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of information derived from intercepted electromagnetic emissions. SIGINT subdivisions include COMINT, ELINT, and FISINT. By integrating SIGINT with intelligence from other resources, accurate targeting and threat data can be obtained.

SIGINT assets support PSYOP by providing SIGINT and EW products extracted from locating, monitoring, and transcribing threat communications and by intercepting noncommunications emitters. EW assets support PSYOP by locating and jamming threat PSYOP transmitters. These assets provide information and intelligence that help reveal enemy activities or plans so that PSYOP can develop effective countermeasures.

SIGINT support for planning PSYOP missions is available from the supported command's MI brigade. The type of support needed depends on the operational factors in the operational area.

### IMINT Support

IMINT comes from radar, photographic, infrared, and electro-optic imagery.

PSYOP analysts use IMINT in varied ways. IMINT helps locate and determine the capabilities and operational status of transmitters or printing plants. PSYOP analysts also use IMINT to locate mobile target groups.

By analyzing imagery of the spatial location and architecture of key structures, PSYOP analysts can determine the ethnic or religious make-up of a town or village. Other uses for IMINT products include identifying and evaluating operational capabilities of transportation networks, factories, and other public structures or systems.

PSYOP analysts use IMINT to confirm or deny acts of rioting, acts of sabotage, demonstrations, and work slowdowns that are either the original PSYOP objective or an impact indicator of a PSYOP campaign or specific product.

IMINT tasking is done through either FRAGO or intelligence annexes to the OPORD, SOP, or RII. Formats to request support from national systems are in the J-TENS Manual, Sections 3, 4, and 5; and FM 34-2, Appendix C. IMINT systems controlled by a higher headquarters, other services, or national agencies respond to approved RIIs through appropriate channels.

The channels used depend on the requesting unit and the requirements, the agency receiving the request, and command procedures. Corps and division assets can

provide IMINT when the target area falls within the range of their organic systems. Other services and national assets also can be tasked to provide dedicated IMINT support to SOF operations.

### TECHINT Support

TECHINT consists of S&TI and battlefield TECHINT. TECHINT provides PSYOP personnel with intelligence about foreign technological developments and the performance and operational capabilities of foreign materiel. Battlefield TECHINT provides the tactical commander with countermeasures to neutralize and defeat enemy systems and materiel.

PSYOP units can use TECHINT to focus their efforts on critical, highly technical threat units and installations.

TECHINT products are produced by the CMEC or a battlefield TECHINT team at corps. TECHINT is incorporated into the all-source intelligence product. Specific requests for TECHINT support are coordinated through the SOC J2 to corps headquarters or above.

### CI Support

CI detects, evaluates, counteracts, or prevents foreign intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, and terrorism. It determines security vulnerabilities and recommends countermeasures. CI operations support OPSEC, deception, and force protection.

In CONUS, the security division, USASOC, conducts liaison with US and foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies as appropriate. This liaison is an important element of CI support to PSYOP. CI supports OPSEC by providing MDCI information and products, such as the MDCI appendix, to PSYOP OPLANs and OPORDs. Additional CI support is obtained from the CONUS CI group as required. Upon deployment, CI support is obtained from the appropriate theater MI brigade. For additional information on CI and HUMINT, see FM 34-60 and FM 34-60A.

## OTHER NONORGANIC SUPPORT

Many PSYOP missions are affected by weather. This makes weather a critical aspect of mission planning.

### Weather

PSYOP media may be degraded by severe weather. Severe weather may enhance PSYOP campaigns if it affects threat morale. PSYOP units therefore need advanced notice of approaching weather systems. Weather support required includes—

- Forecasts of general weather conditions and specific meteorological data elements as described in the 24-hour forecast.
- Solar geophysical information and climatic studies and analysis.
- Weather advisories, warnings, and specialized weather briefings.

### MC&G and Other Intelligence Products

PSYOP units with a proper DMA map account may obtain MC&G products direct from the DMA Combat Support Center, the appropriate installation map depot, or the supporting OCONUS Army map depot. USASOC assists units to obtain special MC&G products and services.

# PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE

PSYOP units also produce specialized intelligence products to support a variety of other combat and IEW missions and operations. PSYOP units develop these intelligence products by monitoring and assessing situations and evaluating their impact on specified target groups and national objectives. Finally, this information is combined with additional research on specific target groups.

The primary focus of this production effort is on socio-economic, political, and diplomatic factors. It also focuses on the military aspects of a region, situation, or group. These products include, but are not limited to—

- Strategic level documents such as basic PSYOP studies (BPS).

- Operational or tactical level target analyses on specific target groups.
- PSYOP reports and estimates.

While these products are used primarily by PSYOP units to conduct their operations, they also contain information and intelligence that is useful to the ARSOF IEW community and other SOF. These products contain diverse information on social customs, enemy morale, and important locations.

# CHAPTER 8

# INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

This chapter discusses the organization and mission of CA units. It addresses the IEW support MI provides to CA units, and the support CA operations provide to the IEW system.

## MISSIONS

CA units support strategic, operational, and tactical missions across the operational continuum.

In strategic missions, CA units support the NCA when conducting missions for the theater CINCs in areas such as support to US nation-building efforts. CA units can also support US military intelligence efforts by means of HUMINT.

In operational missions, CA units support the theater CINC by–

- Supporting US goals in a FID role. CA units provide advice and assistance in population and resource control (PRC) measures, civic action, and civil assistance.
- Supporting other SOF in a UW environment. CA units provide advice and assistance in PRC measures, organization of auxiliaries, civic action, and political warfare.
- Conducting civil administration missions. CA units–
  - Assist a host government to meet its people's needs and to maintain a stable and viable civil administration.
  - Support noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).
  - Establish a temporary civil administration to maintain law and order and to provide life-sustaining services until the host nation can resume normal operations. This must be done at the request of the host nation.
  - Establish a civil administration in occupied enemy territory. This will remain in effect until the local authorities are capable of administering a system that is supportive of US and allied objectives. Autonomy is restored to civil authorities as directed by the NCA.

In tactical missions, CA units support the tactical commander by–

- Identifying available local resources, facilities, and support.
- Coordinating US requirements for and assisting in obtaining local resources, facilities, and support.
- Minimizing civilian interference with US military operations.
- Assisting the commander in meeting legal and moral obligations to the local populace by temporarily providing support of goods and services through the host government agencies to the local population.
- Supplementing the intelligence effort by being a HUMINT collector.
- Acting as the staff focal point for cultural aspects that impact on military operations.

The mission of the AC battalion is to support non-mobilization contingency operations that are directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and to support Army and joint SOF.

The mission of the RC forces is to augment AC capabilities and to plan and conduct CA activities associated with the broad range of functional specialty skills identified in FM 41-10, Chapter 2.

CA support to the primary SOF missions includes minimizing civilian interference and controlling noncombatants during DA missions, civic action, civil defense, and other developmental and stability activities in support of FID and UW missions. CA support to collateral SOF missions includes humanitarian assistance and CMO in the JSOA.

## ORGANIZATION

The majority of CA units are in the US Army Reserve. These units are the major supporting elements for each of the warfighting unified commands. The US Army RC CA forces include 3 commands, 9 CA brigades or groups, and 25 CA companies. Unlike conventional forces, CA units are area oriented and must concentrate on a specific theater and its associated languages, cultures, and environments. There is only one CA battalion in the AC. This organization is discussed below.

### CA COMMAND (RC)

CA commands are assigned to a theater army. They—

- Plan, manage, and conduct CA operations. This is done in support of the theater army commander through the command of CA units and by conducting required staff support to other component services and the joint theater staff.
- Provide interface between national civil authorities and US military forces.
- Establish procedures for coordination of host-nation support to US requirements. Figure 8-1 shows a type of RC CA command.

### CA BRIGADE (RC)

CA brigades can be assigned to a theater army when designated as the senior CA unit in theater. They—

- Can also be assigned to a theater army area command (TAACOM) or a corps headquarters.
- Plan, manage, and conduct CA operations in support of the TAACOM or corps through the $C^2$ of attached CA units, and staff support to other component services and joint theater staff.
- Provide CA units to support CMO of TAACOM, area support group (ASG), corps G5, corps support command, and division and brigade G5. Figure 8-2 shows a type of RC CA brigade.

### CA BATTALION (GS) (AC)

CA battalions can be assigned to the theater army, SF group headquarters, headquarters CA command, headquarters CA brigade (when designated senior CA unit), JTF, or joint special operations task force (JSOTP) as required. They—

- Function as a $C^2$ element in multiple theaters for CA units assigned or attached to US joint, service, or functional component and combined commands for contingency and crisis.
- Can deploy rapidly into any theater to provide CA support to US joint service, or functional component and combined commanders.
- Plan and conduct CA operations in support of SOF in FID and UW environments, and in support of general purpose forces.
- Provide assistance to US military SOF FID missions coordinated as a part of a US security assistance program.
- Facilitate the relationships between the military forces, civil authorities, and people of the nations in which the military forces are in country to execute CA-type activities.
- Plan, train, and teach foreign nation military forces to execute CA-type activities supporting military civic action, population and resource control, civil defense, community relations, and other programs, as required.
- Conduct CA activities in DS of SOF in the conduct of UW missions; they also accompany SF teams.




**Figure 8-1. HHC CA command.**




**Figure 8-2. Type of HHC CA brigade.**

- Train, advise, and assist other agencies about the cultural environment and ways to conduct and support military civic action projects in which operations occur or are anticipated.

- Identify and assist in the acquisition of available local resources, facilities, and support to enhance the ability of the commander to accomplish the mission.

- Provide in-country support and assistance to the US country team and other US government agencies, as required or directed (for example, the United States Agency for International Development, United States Information Agency).

- Advise on the administration of refugee camps external but adjacent to the SF operational area in friendly nations.

- Support SOF in UW operations; advise and assist indigenous resistance forces, when directed, in developing political infrastructures to extend influence and legitimacy in contested areas.

- Provide technical advice and assistance to minimize local population interference with US military operations and conduct noncombatant evacuation operations to minimize adverse effects on mission accomplishment.

- Provide humanitarian and civic assistance under US and foreign national laws or under international agreements in coordination with the staff judge advocate (SJA) to allow the commander to fulfill legal and moral obligations to the local population.

- Supplement the intelligence cycle and psychological and informational operations activities at operational and tactical levels.

- Provide a regionally oriented language capability.

Figure 8-3 shows the organization of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne).

The AC battalion consists of an HHC and four regionally oriented companies. There is one company for each theater, with one company being responsible for two theaters.

CA unit intelligence activities address the full spectrum of cultural, social, political, and economic activity within the area of present or potential operations. It is only through a coordinated effort that CA and MI assets can provide all the information necessary for the commander to accomplish the CA mission.




**Figure 8-3. Organization of 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne).**

# ORGANIC INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AFFAIRS UNITS

Organic intelligence assets focus on collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence. This intelligence includes—

- All aspects of the civilian population.
- Social institutions.
- Government of an area.
- The full spectrum of economic activity within a present or potential operational area.

CA personnel engaged in CMO can obtain first-person information from many local sources. CA personnel must maintain their "military diplomat" status through passive elicitation activities. Active intelligence collection by CA personnel would severely hurt other CMO if discovered.

## COMMAND AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

The commander directs the IEW process through the SIO and the S3. The commander relies on the SIO to provide intelligence and combat information. Accurate, complete, and timely CA intelligence enables the commander and staff to estimate, in advance, what effect CMO may have on the mission or COAs. Ongoing intelligence support about popular attitudes toward civic action projects allows the commander to fine-tune projects to better meet area needs.

Intelligence on potential threat activities is critical. This includes possible terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda directed against planned or ongoing civic action projects. Such timely intelligence can allow for planning and implementing effective countermeasures.

## SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

The CA unit S2 is the SIO. The SIO and staff are the only MI assets organic to the CA unit. The SIO—

- Establishes liaison with host-nation military and government agencies.
- Coordinates with the chief of the security assistance organization and the area coordination center in each operational area to meet the commander's intelligence needs.
- Supervises organic and attached intelligence assets.
- Integrates CA intelligence efforts with other units and agencies.
- Assesses enemy CA and PSYOP capabilities, potential COAs, and their effect.
- Produces and disseminates CA intelligence and CA CMO estimates.

The SIO ensures area studies are available for each country and area where operations might be conducted. Area studies for locations where missions might be conducted and missions that support CONPLANs are given priority during the development process. The SIO uses IPB, with overlays, to reveal issues or items important to CA units. Some of these overlays are—

- Demographics showing dominant racial, religious, cultural, or political population densities. The SIO uses these overlays to template prevailing attitudes and loyalties in nonhomogenous populations.
- Public utilities showing the location and capability or capacity of all public utility buildings (such as power stations and substations, pumping stations, phone company switches, and waste handling facilities). These overlays, when used in conjunction with maneuver overlays, project the impact combat operations will have on the local population's ability to maintain basic living conditions.
- Health services support showing the location of private and public health service facilities (such as hospitals; pharmacies; and doctors, dentists, and veterinary offices). These overlays should reveal details such as capacity, age, capabilities, and equipment about each facility.
- Population displacement. These overlays include—

– Projected overlays showing the routes most likely to be used by a displacing population given a set of projected conditions (for example, disruption of the food supply or destruction of the town).

– Current situation overlays showing routes currently being used by displacing populations, including the refugee camps that have developed or are beginning to develop.

## NONORGANIC INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AFFAIRS

Since CA units have limited organic IEW support, nonorganic IEW support is required. Nonorganic support enables the SIO to develop accurate, complete, and timely intelligence to help the commander estimate the influence of CA factors on the mission or potential COAs. When deployed, active duty CA units normally request this support through the SOC J2 or TASOSC DOI. While in CONUS, CA units request support through USASOC.

### IEW SUPPORT FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

The SOC J2 primarily is concerned with in-theater IEW policy formulation, planning, and coordination. The SOC J2–

- Ensures that sufficient intelligence support is available for each mission tasked by the SOC.
- Relies on the theater service IEW organizations to collect, produce, and disseminate intelligence to meet CA requirements.
- Tasks subordinate SOF units to collect and report information in support of CA intelligence requirements.

The SOC J6 coordinates to obtain secure SCI voice and data communications between the headquarters of the SOC, its component commands, and the TASOSC.

The TASOSC DIO provides all-source IEW support to all in-theater ARSOF. Complying with guidance from the SOC J2, the DIO validates, consolidates, and prioritizes standing and routine IR and RIIs. He then forwards them to the TASOSC ISE collocated at the theater Army MI brigade's EACIC.

Under the staff supervision of the TASOSC DOI, the ISE–

- Responds to RIIs by integrating them into the EACIC requirements list.
- Monitors RII status until the appropriate collection assets respond.
- Maintains an intelligence data base to support ARSOF requirements.

OPORDs, OPLANs, campaign plans, and supporting CA and intelligence annexes contain specific CA intelligence requirements. Most of these requirements are validated and incorporated into CA and IEW collection plans. (See FM 34-1, Appendix H; and FM 34-2, Appendix A.)

In order to meet some of these requirements, SIOs may need to reinforce or refocus available IEW assets. Often, the CA or IEW SIO needs to enter the IEW system to access information or intelligence from other CS units; intelligence agencies; or sources at lower, adjacent, and higher echelons or national CA level.

This intelligence support helps the commander and staff determine the–

- Conditions existing within an operational area.
- Techniques and the degree of control to use on the local populace.
- Identities and backgrounds of key personalities, groups, or regions.
- Resources available from US forces host-nation resources.
- Measures required to reestablish or develop viable political, economic, and sociological conditions.

CA units use the information and intelligence gathered from all the intelligence disciplines and from the EW and CI functional areas to meet IEW needs. The scope and nature of the mission determines the type of IEW sup-

port required. Examples of CA needs which may require nonorganic support include, but are not limited to, intelligence or information about the –

- Topography, hydrography, climate, weather, and terrain (including land formation, drainage, vegetation, and soils).
- Attitude of the population including ideological, religious, and cultural aspects.
- Sociological factors including the real power structure in the area.
- Educational philosophy, standards, and facilities; important cultural activities; and repositories.
- Population census, location, ethnic composition, dietary habits, and health factors.
- Political system, governmental structure, personalities, laws, and political heritage.
- Communications, transportation, utilities, power, and natural resources.
- Labor potential, including availability by type and skill; practices; and organizations.
- Effects of war damage.
- Resistance movements.
- Organization and operation of forces in the area and the extent and degree of voluntary local support.
- Structure, orientation, capabilities, and reliability of indigenous public safety and law enforcement organizations.
- Foodstuffs, tobacco products, or alcoholic beverages peculiar to the area.
- Documentary items including passports, visas, vehicle operator licenses, and birth and marriage records.
- Hostile civilian activities including espionage, sabotage, and other factors of subversion and disaffection.
- Economic system and state of development including principal industrial, scientific, and technical capabilities; commercial processes; banking structure; monetary system; price and commodity controls; and extent and nature of agricultural production.
- State of technological advancement.
- Existing conditions and programs relating all CA functional specialities.
- Demographics showing dominant racial, religious, cultural, or political population densities. The SIO uses these overlays to template prevailing attitudes and loyalties in nonhomogenous populations.
- Public utilities showing the location and capability or capacity of all public utility buildings (such as power stations and substations, pumping stations, phone company switches, and waste handling facilities). These overlays, when used in conjunction with maneuver overlays, project the impact combat operations will have on the local population's ability to maintain basic living conditions.
- Health services support showing the location of private and public health service facilities (such as hospitals; pharmacies; and doctors, dentists, and veterinary offices). These overlays should reveal details such as capacity, age, capabilities, and equipment about each facility.
- Population displacement. These overlays include –
  - Projected overlays showing the routes most likely to be used by a displacing population given a set of projected conditions (for example, disruption of the food supply or destruction of the town).
  - Current situation overlays showing routes currently being used by displacing populations, including the refugee camps that have developed or are beginning to develop.

## INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES SUPPORTING CA OPERATIONS

There are primarily five intelligence disciplines which significantly support CA operations.

### HUMINT Support

HUMINT is collected using a variety of methods. HUMINT collectors—

- Interrogate EPWs and debrief or interview civilian internees, detainees, and refugees.
- Debrief returned captured US personnel, escapees, and evaders.
- Exploit CED and CEM.
- Perform controlled collection.
- Conduct LRSO, patrols, and OPs.
- Conduct liaison with local military or paramilitary forces and the local populace; and obtain reports from friendly troops.

CA units use HUMINT to help determine the extent of war damage in threat-controlled areas. HUMINT can also help to locate key technical personnel who can be of use in repairing or operating key infrastructure once friendly forces arrive.

Interrogation support for CA operations is available from the supported command's MI brigade or tactical exploitation battalion. Otherwise, interrogators are collocated at EPW collection points and holding facilities at echelons, division, and above. Interrogation information then is incorporated into the all-source product. When CA units need information for mission planning that only interrogators might provide, they must coordinate their requirements with the command that has interrogators.

### SIGINT Support

SIGINT is developed from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of information derived from intercepted electromagnetic emissions. SIGINT subdivisions include COMINT, ELINT, and FISINT. By integrating SIGINT with other resources, accurate targeting and threat data can be obtained. CA units can use SIGINT to pinpoint telecommunications and mass media facilities in target areas. Key facilities damaged during hostilities or natural disasters may have to be repaired and operated by US CA elements.

### IMINT Support

CA units use IMINT in varied ways. IMINT helps locate and determine the operational status of key civil infrastructure in denied areas where US forces may be deployed. This includes identifying and evaluating operational capabilities of transportation networks, factories, and other public structures or systems.

IMINT tasking is done through either FRAGO or intelligence annexes to the OPORD, SOP, or RII. Formats to request support from national systems are in the J-TENS Manual, Sections 3, 4, and 5; and FM 34-2, Appendix C. IMINT systems controlled by a higher headquarters, other services, or national agencies respond to approved RII through appropriate channels.

The channels used depend on the requesting unit and the requirement, the agency receiving the request, and command procedures. Corps and division assets can provide IMINT when the target area falls within the range of their organic systems. Other services and national assets also can be tasked to provide dedicated IMINT support to SOF operations.

### TECHINT Support

TECHINT consists of S&TI and battlefield TECHINT. TECHINT provides CA personnel with intelligence about foreign technological developments and the performance and operational capabilities of foreign materiel. Battlefield TECHINT, a subdivision of TECHINT, provides the tactical commander with countermeasures to neutralize and defeat enemy systems and materiel. CA units use TECHINT to identify key technical characteristics and specifications of threat construction equipment, industrial facilities, and utilities (for example, electric and gas) in target areas.

### CI Support

CI detects, evaluates, counteracts, or prevents foreign intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, and terrorism. It determines security vulnerabilities and recommends countermeasures. CI operations support OPSEC, deception, and force protection.

In CONUS, the security division, USASOC, conducts liaison with US and foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies as appropriate. This liaison is an important element of CI support to CA units. CI supports OPSEC by providing MDCI information and products, such as the MDCI appendix, to CA OPLANs and OPORDs. Additional CI support is obtained from the CONUS CI group as required. Upon deployment, CI support is obtained from the appropriate theater MI brigade. For additional information on CI and HUMINT, see FM 34-60 and FM 34-60A.

### OTHER NONORGANIC SUPPORT

Other nonorganic support includes weather and MC&G products. Weather is often the driving force behind CA missions. Severe weather such as hurricanes, tornados, and floods often require the deployment of US forces to assist in disaster relief efforts. Severe weather during combat and noncombat missions may require the diversion of resources to relief operations.

Regardless of the primary mission, CA units must have advanced knowledge of seasonal and nonseasonal weather patterns. Direct weather support should include, but not be limited to—

- Weather advisories and warnings.
- Long-range weather forecasts.
- Precipitation patterns.
- Wind patterns.
- Tidal data.

## CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO THE INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEM

Although CA personnel are in an ideal position to collect a variety of intelligence and information, it is not their primary mission. Their job is to establish a close working relationship with the local populace in day-to-day operations. Thus, this places CA personnel in a favorable position to—

- Collect intelligence information.
- Assist intelligence personnel in civilian-related activities.
- Identify local civilians with special skills or backgrounds that may aid the intelligence community.

Since CA personnel work closely with the host-nation populace, they can assist CI personnel by—

- Screening civilian officials.
- Identifying hostile agents among dislocated and local civilians.
- Locating and apprehending war criminals and enemy military personnel posing as civilians.
- Detecting and preventing sabotage.

# CHAPTER 9

# SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES TARGETING PROCESS

This chapter describes the SOF targeting process and mission planning. The targeting process includes developing a data base and planning and constructing the SOMPF.

This chapter is a guide for SOF targeting. Although the procedures and end products generally apply for all ARSOF, theaters may apply different methods across the operational continuum. However, if modifications are made, they must not be so different that they degrade SOF theater or service interoperability.

SOF commanders conduct both deliberate and adaptive targeting missions. They receive their missions through the joint strategic planning process, which is explained in JCS Publication 3-05.5 and FM 100-25, Chapter 6.

Although both SOF and conventional mission planning require all-source intelligence, SOF targeting and mission planning depends more upon highly detailed and broadly focused intelligence than conventional planning.

Developing these plans requires coordination among several staff elements at various levels, particularly in the intelligence and operations directorates or departments. This coordination must extend from the SOF in the field to theater and national levels.

## JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TARGETING PROCESS

Theater campaign planning drives the joint SO targeting process. In turn, the SO targeting process drives SO mission planning. The CINC establishes a Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) to direct the theater targeting process. This includes SO targeting as well. Figure 9-1 shows this process. The JTCB –

- Consists of members of the CINC staff and representatives of each subordinate command.
- Ensures all theater-level deep surveillance and attack resources are effectively employed.
- Establishes SO targeting objectives and priorities based on the CINC's SO targeting guidance and concept of SOF employment.
- Receives, consolidates, reconciles, and establishes priorities for SO target nominations from subordinate force commanders, and, if necessary, from supported allied force commanders.
- Tasks the SOC to assess, plan, and conduct the mission.
- Determines support requirements and tasks the appropriate agencies to support the mission.
- Tasks the service intelligence production agencies (IPAs), through their respective components, to support the targeting process.

## MISSION TASKING PACKAGE

When the JTCB nominates a target, a target system, or an objective area to be attacked by an SOF unit, the JTCB forwards the nomination in a mission tasking package (MTP) to the SOC target panel. The MTP includes target identity, location, and desired results. (See Appendix C.)

Upon receipt of the MTP, the SOC target panel designates the appropriate SOF unit as the mission planning agent (MPA) for the nominated mission. For ARSOF, the MPA is normally the SFG or the senior ranger force headquarters.

The SOC target panel forwards the MTP and available intelligence to the MPA to perform a feasibility assessment (FA). Although off-the-shelf operational and intelligence data is the norm, limited outside tasking may be levied to answer certain basic PIR, or in a joint environment, essential elements of information. At a minimum, the MPA needs –

- Area study data.
- DIA intelligence analysis.
- Maps:
  - 1:250,000 of the area where the target is located.
  - 1:50,000 scale covering a 20-nautical mile (NM) radius of the target.
  - City maps, special MC&G products, sketches, and special maps.
- Imagery:
  - Imagery annotated with only a north arrow and coordinate reference point at 1:50,000 ratio, covering a 20-NM radius around the target area.
  - Imagery annotated with only a north arrow and coordinate reference point, at 1:10,000 ratio, covering the target itself.
  - Automated tactical target graphic (ATTG) of the target.
- Current OB and installation data and overlays covering the target, operational area, or AI. This includes–
  - Ground order of battle (GOB).
  - Air order of battle (AOB).
  - Electronic order of battle (EOB).
  - Naval order of battle (NOB).
  - Missile order of battle (MOB).
  - Railway networks.
  - Airfields.
  - Port facilities.
  - Telecommunications facilities.

## FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT

When the MPA commander receives the MTP and the available intelligence, he convenes a target assessment group (TAG) to assess the SOC mission statement and mission concept. The intelligence representative in the TAG must–

- Play a key role in determining the feasibility of the nominated target.
- Analyze all available information concerning the threat, the target, and target characteristics.
- Integrate this intelligence with operations data on friendly force posture, capabilities, weapons effects, weather effects, objectives, rules of engagement, and doctrine.

The commander uses two analytical tools during the FA and throughout the entire SO targeting and mission planning process to assess mission validity and requirements. They are–

- The IPB process.
- Criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER).

The IPB process assists the commander in his battle focus. It enables him to see and understand the battlefield sufficiently to make sound tactical decisions. Chapter 10 discusses IPB for SOF in detail.

The S2 uses CARVER in target analysis. The product of this analysis aids the commander to determine if the unit can service the target. Appendix D discusses CARVER in detail.

After careful analysis, the MPA formalizes and completes the assessment in the FA format and forwards it through the SOC target panel to the SOC commander. (See Appendix C for the SOF FA format.) The SOC commander concurs or nonconcurs with the FA and forwards it to the JTCB for approval.

If the target is valid and feasible, the JTCB adds the target to the approved target list and assigns it a priority.




**Figure 9-1. Joint SO targeting process.**

The JTCB then directs the SOC to prepare a SOMPF for the target. Figure 9-2 shows the SOMPF basic structure and responsible organization.

## TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE

At the same time the JTCB tasks the SOC to prepare a SOMPF, the JTCB also tasks the appropriate service IPA to produce a TIP that supports the SOMPF. The TIP contains details on the target, operational area, and other aspects of the mission. (Appendix C contains TIP formats.)

All-source intelligence that is timely, detailed, and tailored is vital to the SO targeting and mission planning process. The US intelligence community includes many agencies that support various echelons of the command structure. These agencies differ in purpose and to the degree they support tactical mission requirements of individual operational elements.

Just as intelligence requirements for different conventional forces may vary, so do some of the intelligence requirements for ARSOF. However, the majority of ARSOF intelligence requirements are similar to those of conventional forces, although the degree of detail is frequently greater.

Much of the intelligence required for ARSOF mission planning is already available within the US intelligence community. However, many "target specific" items will require more collection, research, analysis, and textual elaboration than normally afforded to conventional mission planning. If target specific intelligence is not available, analogies or estimates drawn from similar targets in the same regions should be provided.

When an ARSOF element completes an FA and forwards it for target validation, a crucial part of this assessment is the intelligence requirements section. This section modifies and amplifies the information required to plan a mission. This becomes the RII addressed in the TIP. The TIP supports the entire mission planning process based on the analysis provided.

A key to effective SO intelligence support is for ARSOF to fully exploit the intelligence system. To do this, ARSOF operators must work with the intelligence agencies to sensitize the intelligence community to ARSOF requirements. This should include prioritized requirements and explanations for detailed PIR. The SOC ensures the MPA prioritizes these requirements during the deliberate and adaptive targeting processes.

The mechanism (both procedural and technological) of providing suitable SO intelligence support must be flexible to effectively satisfy the adaptive (combat and crisis) and deliberate (peacetime and route) mission planning processes. This mechanism is the I&W system.

Adaptive targeting provides the most rigorous and critical conditions under which to conduct effective SO intelligence support; so the overall system must be able to meet urgent, short-fused requirements. Adaptive targeting procedures should be used to energize periodic readiness exercises and to facilitate effective transition to actual combat and crisis support. The system's capability to effectively support ARSOF across the operational continuum is enhanced by realistic tasking during peacetime.

Primary sources used to satisfy SO intelligence requirements are the respective theater service intelligence production agencies, normally the TASOSC ISE. Only the joint force commander (JFC) and theater CINCs can ensure SO intelligence support requirements are recognized, understood, validated, integrated, and satisfied.

ARSOF requirements must be integrated with overall theater objectives. This arrangement works if SO intelligence requirements are defined and the intelligence community is allowed sufficient time to respond. The peacetime intelligence support mechanism must provide support at an accelerated pace during crisis or war.

ARSOF needs immediate access to these intelligence sources to plan and execute missions. Reliable, secure communications between the theater intelligence organizations and the SOC or JSOTF must be established and maintained throughout any crisis or conflict.

Secure communications must extend to other service SOF components (Naval Special Operations Forces [NAVSOF] and Air Force Special Operations Forces [AFSOF]); and provide for secure voice, data transfer, and imagery transfer between SOF components and the SOC or JSOTF.

This communications system must support SOF intelligence requirements as well as the needs of other intelligence users.

**SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSION PLANNING FOLDER (SOMPF)**

| BASIC STRUCTURE | RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION |
|---|---|
| **MISSION TASKING PACKAGE** | **SOC** |
| TRANSMITTAL DOCUMENTS | ALL PARTICIPANTS (assembled by the SOC) |
| TARGET IDENTIFICATION DATA | SOC |
| CINC MISSION GUIDANCE | CINC (forwarded by the SOC) |
| RECORD of CHANGES | SOC |
| RECORD of DISTRIBUTION | SOC |
| **TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE** | **THEATER SERVICE INTELLIGENCE** |
| TARGET AREA INFORMATION | Appropriate Theater Service Intelligence Production Agency (IPA) |
| DETAILED TARGET DESCRIPTION | Appropriate Theater Service IPA |
| MAPS, CHARTS, and TARGET MATERIALS | Appropriate Theater Service IPA |
| **PLAN OF EXECUTION** | **MISSION PLANNING AGENT** |
| COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE | Mission Planning Agent |
| SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT PLAN | Mission Planning Agent |
| MISSION SUPPORT PLANS | Supporting Agencies |

**Figure 9-2. SOMPF structure and responsible organization.**

This intelligence ADP and communications system also must be structured to support ARSOF missions conducted in advance of tactical theater communications systems deployment.

Timely, effective communication from the SOC or JSOTF through the JFC or CINC to the national intelligence system is critical to ARSOF success. Maximum use of ADP products and SR reporting is important. This includes ADP message processing, disseminating, and analyzing.

The MPA needs the TIP before the plan of execution (POE) can be completed. However, the POE development can be initiated at the same time as the TIP is being prepared.

### PLAN OF EXECUTION

The MPA is the coordinating authority for a mission. The SOC commander directs the MPA to prepare a POE. The SOC commander directs other SOF units to prepare mission support plans, as appropriate. Appendix C contains the SOF POE format. Joint planning sessions between the MPA and supporting SOF units are essential to produce quality plans.

The scope of the supported MPA commander's coordinating authority over supporting SOF units is prescribed in the SOC directive. Unless otherwise specified by the SOC directive, the supported MPA commander has the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. (See JCS Publication 0-2.)

Based on the complexity of the planning, SOF commanders assign actual mission planning responsibility to the lowest possible level. As the POE planners refine the mission concept (MICON), they develop a list of specific operational, IEW, and support requirements.

The MPA staff forwards requirements beyond its organic capabilities to the TASOSC. At the same time, it also forwards these requirements to appropriate supporting SOF units for them to include in their mission support plans.

The POE planners regularly brief the MPA commander to ensure the planning effort adheres to the commander's intent. POE development concludes with a formal decision brief to the MPA commander. Then, the POE is finished and forwarded to the SOC target panel. Figure 9-3 shows the POE development flow.

The MPA's SIO continues to play a key role throughout the entire SOF mission planning and targeting process. The SIO must continue to perform IPB and target analysis during POE development. By reducing the operational uncertainties and analyzing the target, the SIO can focus the collection effort where it is most effective. This allows him to identify the existing intelligence gaps to the SOC or JSOTF so these RII can be forwarded to the TASOSC ISE. The TASOSC ISE attempts to answer these RII in the TIP.

### MISSION SUPPORT PLANS

In coordination with the MPA, the TASOSC and supporting SOF units prepare their mission support plans. These plans must identify how the supporting unit intends to meet the requirements identified by the POE planners. Depending on the nature of the mission, mission support plans and their annexes include but are not limited to–

- Infiltration, resupply, and exfiltration.
- Signal, intelligence, and other CS.
- OPSEC and deception.
- Basing and other CSS.

### ASSEMBLY OF THE SOMPF

Upon receipt of the POE and mission support plans, the SOC target panel assembles the SOMPF and forwards it to the SOC commander for review and approval. Once the SOC commander approves the SOMPF, he may direct the MPA to conduct a POE capability demonstration. This demonstration should simulate the approved POE closely, subject to OPSEC and other limitations. Following the demonstration, the MPA corrects identified shortfalls in the POE. The MPA must maintain at least one copy of each approved SOMPF.

### ADAPTIVE TARGETING

The peacetime deliberate targeting process must be modified to perform adaptive targeting during crisis or war. The key to adaptive targeting is concurrent activity. When the MTP is received, the MPA treats it like an alert order under the joint operations planning system (JOPS) crisis action procedures. The MPA commander issues a warning order to the appropriate subunit and begins POE preparation as soon as the FA is complete. See JCS Publication 5-02.4 for JOPS crisis action procedures.


SOC
Identify and prioritize targets.
Develop initial mission statement and MICON.
Assign mission to SF group and provide conceptual MTP.
Select operational areas.
Identify sensitivity and oversight requirements.
MISSION PLANNING AGENT
Acknowledge receipt.
Inventory MTP.
Convene TAG.
TARGET ASSESSMENT GROUP S2/S3 PLANS OFFICER
Conduct initial assessment of MTP.
Develop COA.
DIRLAUTH
SOF CDR
TASOC ISE
COA briefed by plans officer.
SOF STAFF
Staff estimate completed for each COA.
SOF CDR
Staff estimate presented to CDR.
Forward feasibility assessment to SOC for approval.
Receive refined MTP.
Refine mission statement and MICON as required.
BN CDR
Develop detailed list of SOR.
Determine intelligence requirements and submit through group S2 to SOC J2.
Prepare initial POE.
Assign mission to SFOB.
Secure approval for POE.
Forward completed POE to SOC for final approval.
Periodic MICON briefs to ensure planning on track.
LOWEST LEVEL POSSIBLE
Develop and finalize POE.
SOF CDR
MICON briefed to CDR: approve and forward or return for revision.

**Figure 9-3. POE development flow.**

# CHAPTER 10

# INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

This chapter describes how the ARSOF SIO uses the standard IPB process to support ARSOF operations. It outlines the TTP for conducting IPB for SF, rangers, SOA, PSYOP, and CA units. See FM 34-130, Chapter 4, for more information on the IPB process and examples of standard templates that can be adapted to meet ARSOF requirements.

## INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD PROCESS

ARSOF SIOs use the IPB process to support commanders and their staffs in the decision-making process. The commander directs the IPB effort through his critical IR. All staff elements are active participants in the IPB process. IPB results in a graphic and written intelligence estimate that evaluates and portrays probable threat, friendly, and nonbelligerent third-party capabilities, and their respective vulnerabilities and probable COA. To be of value, IPB products must assist with situation and target development; they must aid the analytical process so that the intentions and activities of the population and threat forces can be predicted.

Although IPB is currently a time-consuming and labor-intensive manual process, it is becoming increasingly automated. However, SIOs still should prepare IPB products well ahead of operations and keep them current through updates. Once operations begin and new data become available, IPB products are dynamic; they change as the situation changes in the objective area. The SIO uses IPB to determine –

- Where to look.
- When to look.
- What to look for.
- What to look with.
- What to expect to see.

In turn, the SIO can recommend where and when to conduct operations, what they will operate against, and what results to expect, including possible reactions of third parties.

IPB is a cyclical process of intelligence analysis and evaluation that focuses on the assigned operational area and the forces that are expected to be operating in that area. IPB is the systematic and continuous process of integrating and analyzing data on the populace (threat, friendly, and nonbelligerent third-party), weather and climate, and terrain in a specific geographic area and operational environment.

To be effective, IPB must be a coordinated effort between the commander, his staff, and outside agencies, from the lowest operational elements through the theater command. The SIO compiles, analyzes, and disseminates the gathered data. Figure 10-1 shows the IPB process.

Although commanders have a different focus at each echelon, their IPB must be mutually supporting. The intelligence analysts at each echelon must understand this scaled IPB hierarchy. Once the intelligence cycle is underway and IPB begins, the SIO will use the results of the IPB to guide the commander toward the next phase of the operation to support mission objectives.

### GRAPHICS

For the SIO, graphics play a key role in quantifying the results of the IPB process. Although ARSOF intelligence requirements are generally more detailed than those of conventional military units, ARSOF IPB graphics must be readable and usable by supported and supporting forces.

### TEMPLATING

The last two steps in the IPB process – threat evaluation and threat integration – involve using templates. Templates are graphic illustrations of threat – and sometimes friendly – force structure deployments and capabilities. Figure 10-2 describes the four standard templates, their purpose, and the IPB step in which they are prepared. ARSOF applications and variations of these templates are discussed in detail in the threat evaluation and threat integration sections of this chapter.




**Figure 10-1. IPB process.**

| TEMPLATE | DESCRIPTION | PURPOSE | WHEN PREPARED |
|---|---|---|---|
| Doctinal | Enemy doctrinal deployment for various types of operations without constraints imposed by the weather and terrain. Composition, formations, frontages, depths, equipment numbers and ratios, and HVTs are types of information displayed. | Provides the basis for integrating enemy doctrine with terrain and weather data. | Threat Evaluation |
| Situation | Depicts how the enemy might deploy and operate within the constraints imposed by the weather and terrain. | Used to identify critical enemy activities and locations. Provides a basis for situation and target development and HVT analysis. | Threat Integration |
| Event | Depicts locations where critical events and activities are expected to occur and where critical targets will appear. | Used to predict time-related events within critical areas. Provides a basis for collection operations, predicting enemy intentions, and locating and tracking HVT. | Threat Integration |
| Decision Support | Depicts decision points and target areas of interest keyed to significant events and activities. The intelligence estimate is in graphic form. | Used to provide a guide as to when tactical decisions are required relative to battlefield event. | Threat Integration |

**Figure 10-2. IPB templates.**

## THE BULLSEYE CONCEPT

The bullseye concept at Figure 10-3 shows the focus of ARSOF commanders by echelon. The outermost ring consists of the country and regional analysis of geographic areas of responsibility assigned to the SF group, ranger regiment, SOA regiment, POG, and CA battalion.

This general analysis and its associated intelligence production efforts are accomplished at echelons above group or regiment, and are provided to the subordinate elements. The analysis does not focus on any specified area within the total region or country.

The middle ring represents the mission area analysis conducted at battalion or task force level. This level focuses on the JSOA assigned to the battalion or task force within a region or country. Products associated with this level represent the area specific intelligence necessary to support the operational elements in their specific missions.

The innermost circle covers the specific operational or target areas; it consists of a mission-specific analysis, which requires the development of a TIP.




**Figure 10-3. The "bullseye" concept of ARSOF intelligence support.**

Theater army intelligence assets develop the TIP and other supporting intelligence products for ARSOF operational elements. The TIP focuses directly on the operational elements' target site or area. The TIP contains answers to specific operational intelligence requirements.

In SF, ODAs also contribute to the development of this inner circle of intelligence by applying CARVER target analysis during isolation. (See Appendix C.)

## INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD IN SUPPORT OF ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

IPB is not a set of rigid rules, but a tool for developing graphic and written solutions through intuitive thinking. The essential difference between IPB for conventional forces and IPB for SOF is the degree of detail required. The commander focuses the IPB effort. SIOs conduct IPB throughout the operational continuum in detail. Also, SF IPB requires complete population analysis to support FID and UW missions. Figure 10-4 shows the five IPB steps and the equivalents for ARSOF, which are discussed later in this chapter.

At SF group level, the IPB effort includes the group S2, the intelligence analysts of the group MI detachment's ASPS, and the USAF weather team. The center of mass of the IPB effort will shift to SF battalion level and lower in FID, UW, or when SF battalions or companies are operating with relative independence or autonomy from the group.

For the ranger regiment, the commander focuses the IPB effort. The center of mass of this IPB effort shifts to the ranger battalion S2 when ranger battalions are committed to battle separately, even though regimental SIO support will continue throughout the operation.

At the SOA regiment, the nucleus of the IPB effort is the SOA task force S2. The SIO for the joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) is the nucleus of the PSYOP IPB process. The JPOTF SIO is usually the S2 of a regionally oriented PSYOP battalion. The SIO and staff perform detailed IPB of the AO.

S2s and NCOs in the PDCs and other independently operating detachments (for example, forward support detachments) perform abbreviated IPB of their specific AO, and do detailed analysis of targets developed through this IPB. The PDCs also provide the SIO with information for the SIO data base and IPB. At the CA battalion, the nucleus of the IPB effort is the CA battalion S2.

### BATTLEFIELD AREA EVALUATION

IPB begins with a battlefield area evaluation (BAE). This is an assessment of the battle area that considers the overall nature of the friendly and enemy forces and the operational environment. It normally covers the AO and AI. In this step, the SIO determines and answers requirements for weather, climate, and terrain (including hydrological, topographical, and population). To support SR missions, the SF SIO develops information on nonbelligerent third-party forces.

For other missions, the SIO conducts limited population and cultural evaluation, micro-infrastructure evaluation, and installation evaluation. The types of overlays and categories of subjects plotted vary according to actual mission requirements. Using a graphic keying system and color scheme on large-scale maps greatly facilitates data analysis when transparent overlays and integrating associated matrixes and other products are used.

#### Area of Operations

The AO is the area assigned the commander by a higher commander. The commander has authority and responsibility for conducting operations in this AO. It is usually the area where the actual struggle will occur, defined as a boundary or geographical feature, and usually includes routes of access and egress. This does not mean, however, that home base and routes of access and egress are given the same degree of attention as the area where the ARSOF unit executes its mission.

The SF AO extends from home base to the operational bases, to the JSOA, to the TAI or target, and back again. For FID and UW, the SF primary AO normally includes a designated JSOA or subdivision that may cover hundreds of square miles, or even an area larger than one country. The SF AO for SR and DA normally is quite smaller. Usually it comprises—

| IPB | SPECIAL FORCES | RANGERS | SOA | PSYOP | CIVIL AFFAIRS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BATTLEFIELD AREA EVALUATION (BAE) | OPERATIONAL AREA EVALUATION (OAE) | TARGET AREA EVALUATION (TAE) | BAE | OAE | OAE |
| TERRAIN ANALYSIS | TERRAIN and MICRO-TERRAIN ANALYSIS (SR/DA)<br><br>GEOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS (FID/UW)<br>TERRAIN ANALYSIS<br>MICRO-TERRAIN ANALYSIS<br>POPULATION ANALYSIS | MICRO-TERRAIN ANALYSIS | TERRAIN ANALYSIS | TERRAIN ANALYSIS<br><br>POPULATION ANALYSIS | TERRAIN ANALYSIS<br><br>POPULATION ANALYSIS |
| WEATHER ANALYSIS | WEATHER ANALYSIS (DA/SR)<br><br>CLIMATOLOGY ANALYSIS (FID/UW) | WEATHER ANALYSIS | WEATHER ANALYSIS | CLIMATOLOGY ANALYSIS | CLIMATOLOGY ANALYSIS |
| THREAT EVALUATION | CORRELATION of FORCE EVALUATION | THREAT EVALUATION | THREAT EVALUATION | THREAT EVALUATION | THREAT EVALUATION |
| THREAT INTEGRATION | DATA BASE INTEGRATION | THREAT INTEGRATION | THREAT INTEGRATION | DATA BASE INTEGRATION | DATA BASE INTEGRATION |

**Figure 10-4. IPB equivalents for ARSOF.**

- A TAI for SR.
- A "bullseye" from 10 to 20 NM from the target for DA (with greatest emphasis 5 to 10 kilometers from the target).
- The infiltration and exfiltration corridors to and from the target or TAI.

The ranger AO is the same as the SF DA AO (including routes to and from home station), except that the target normally covers a much larger area than for SF DA missions. For example, a ranger battalion may target an entire airfield, whereas an SF team may target airframes and crew billets.

The SOA AO extends from the initial staging base (ISB) to the forward staging base (FSB) to the SR TAI or DA target and back again. The PSYOP AO is tied to its targeted populations, and may comprise a country, a part of a country, or an international region. The CA AO normally is that part of a country in which CA operations are actually taking place.

### Area of Interest

The commander selects the AI based on the staff estimate of the situation. It covers future threats to the command and supports future operations. The AI includes E&E corridors, and serves as a guide for supporting intelligence requirements.

The SF AI for FID and UW normally includes countries or areas that actually or potentially provide military, political, economic, psychological, and social aid to threat forces.

The SF AI for SR normally covers areas which pose military, political, psychological, and social threats to the mission.

The SF AI for ranger DA missions normally covers those areas outside the target bullseye and access and egress routes from which tactical military threats to the mission can emanate. The SOA AI –

- Encompasses threat airfields, refueling and rearming points, surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, and air defense early warning radar and ground-controlled intercept (GCI) sites.
- Extends upward to the maximum altitudes of friendly and threat air defense systems.

The PSYOP AI comprises areas from which operational and strategic threats to mission accomplishment can emanate. The CA AI normally includes areas from which threats to mission accomplishment can emanate.

**BAE for Special Forces.** SF concerns include and go beyond the tactical battlefield. This is particularly true in FID and UW. Thus, the SF SIO begins the IPB effort with an operational area evaluation (OAE), which covers the SF AO and AI. During this function, the SF SIO begins to collect data to fill basic intelligence requirements in the following areas:

- Political.
- Military.
- Economic.
- Social.
- Climatology.
- Geographic.
- Psychological.
- Cultural.
- Friendly forces.
- Hostile forces.
- Nonbelligerent third-party forces.

It is here that key data is developed and tailored to the specific operational area and mission. It is also during this procedural step that the SIO fine-tunes the limits of the AOs and AIs, including those in the electromagnetic and psychological spectrums. SF OAEs for SR and DA missions focus on the location of the target and defenses or obstacles and specific orders and requirements (SOR).

The SF SIO conducts micro-infrastructure evaluations using 1:12,500 scale or larger maps, blueprints, floor plans, or photographs. Natural terrain is examined down to individual square meters of ground. OAE for FID and UW missions is more complex than for SR and DA. During the OAE for a FID mission in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment, the SIO should raise and answer the following PIR:

- What is the insurgent political or military structure and key personalities and leaders?
- Where can we expect to find threat and nonbilligerant third parties applying the elements of power (military, informational, economic, and political)?
- Where can we expect to not find the insurgents applying the elements of power?
- What forces within society can be expected to apply the elements of power independently of the insurgents or government; and where, when, and how will they apply these elements?

**BAE for Rangers.** Rangers begin the BAE with a specific target area evaluation (TAE). It is focused on answering the following types of questions:

- What are the threats on or near the objective?
- What are the size and dimensions of the target?
- How does the target correspond to other selected targets in terms of criticality and importance?
- What is the importance of this target to the threat or host country?
- Is the environment permissive, semipermissive, or nonpermissive?

- What is the physical layout and functional organization of the target?
- What is the construction of key components of the target, including dimensions, materials, and entry points?
- What are the primary and alternate energy supplies for the target?
- What and where are the fuel supply and storage facilities on the target?
- What are the lighting and detection systems on the target?
- What is the reaction time, size, and location of threat reinforcements?

**BAE for SOA.** During the BAE function, SOA SIOs evaluate threat ground, air, and naval forces which are expected to operate within the battlefield area (including routes to and from a target or TAI). They are evaluated to determine their capabilities in relation to the weather, terrain, and friendly mission. Particular attention is paid to air bases (including ships carrying aircraft), refueling points, LZs, DZs, and air defense weapons, radars, and other sensors operating within the battlefield area.

**BAE for PSYOP.** PSYOP units, like SF, begin IPB with an OAE. It is initially comprised of the basic and special PSYOP studies and assessments of the AO. These studies and assessments are produced by the PSYOP units and are listed in the DIA RIP. These studies are augmented with additional intelligence data in preparation for the PSYOP mission. PSYOP analysts doing OAE also focus on, but do not limit themselves to, identifying–

- Ethnic, racial, social, economic, religious, and linguistic groups of the area, their locations, and their densities.
- Key leaders and communicators in the area, both formal (such as politicians and government officials) and informal (such as businessmen and clergy).
- Cohesive and divisive issues within a community (for example, what makes them a community, what would split the community, and attitudes toward the US).
- Literacy rates and levels of education.
- Types and proportions of media consumed by the community.
- Any concentrations of third-country nationals in the AO, and their purposes and functions.

During the OAE, the PSYOP SIO prepares a matrix identifying groups, their leaders, preferred media, and key issues that need to be developed. This supplements population overlays. Based on the population makeup of the AO, the SIO–

- Determines what groups to focus on.
- Locates mass media facilities in the AO that aid in the dissemination of PSYOP products and identifies their operational characteristics.
- Evaluates studios and transmitters for AM and FM radio and television and their operational characteristics (wattage, frequency, programming).
- Evaluates heavy and light printing facilities, including locations, types, and capacities of equipment that can supplement the capabilities of PSYOP units.
- Evaluates accessibility of such facilities to PSYOP forces (for example, who controls them and whether they will cooperate with the US).

**BAE for CA.** Like other ARSOF units, CA units begin IPB with OAE. CA OAE in FID consists of–

- An evaluation of host-nation civic action programs.
- Population and resource control.
- Civilian labor.
- Materiel procurement.

The CA SIO also evaluates future sites and programs for civic action undertaken in the AO by the host nation unilaterally or with US support. In making this evaluation, the SIO often relies primarily on local and regional HUMINT assets of the host nation and the supported command to get an accurate feel for the insurgency or lawlessness and other major aspects of the operational environment.

CA OAE in UW evaluates hostile government CA operations for strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities that can be exploited by US-supported insurgents. This evaluation forms the basis for alternative programs conducted by the insurgents.

The CA OAE support of DA focuses on identifying the location, number, and disposition of civilians in and around the target for CA operators and supported SOF and conventional forces. The OAE also identifies potential sites for noncombatant assembly areas. These areas provide a place where civilians who have information of potential intelligence value can be protected and debriefed.

The primary role of CA when supporting DA missions is to minimize civilian casualties and interference. The CA SIO identifies procedures to safeguard PWs and noncombatants, and cultural factors which should be considered by tactical unit commanders. For example, CA OAE should identify churches used as a primary gathering site for religious functions as well as social events.

In NEO, CA OAE identifies the location and number of US and third-country nationals to be evacuated. This is done on the basis of the State Department's F-77 report, contained in the embassy Contingency Support Package (CSP). The CSP also includes imagery of all planned and potential AAs and evacuation points for official and US personnel. In disaster relief operations, CA OAE identifies the type and geographical limits of the disaster. When dealing with DCs, the CA OAE establishes the location, number, and status of all DCs in the AO. The OAE also includes identifying–

- Displaced civil measures to apply.
- Where the DCs are living.
- How they are getting their food.
- Sanitary conditions and afflicting diseases.

## TERRAIN ANALYSIS

The second step in IPB is terrain analysis. Terrain analysis is performed to reduce the uncertainties and effects of natural and synthetic terrain, and to assess the effects of the population on military operations.

As part of IPB, all ARSOF units employ the factors of OCOKA. However, ARSOF units often must have more details on the total environment than OCOKA can provide because they operate in environments and perform diverse missions.

ARSOF missions may require the SIO to perform what is called geographic analysis; this consists of terrain analysis and population analysis. Geographic analysis and component parts are discussed later in this chapter.

### Key Terrain

Mission requirements and the commander's intent determine ARSOF selection criteria for key terrain. Key terrain is an area or locality in which the seizure or control will afford a marked advantage to threat or friendly units. Key terrain applies during DA missions. However, it is not so cut and dried in FID or UW.

In FID, for example, key terrain may include a hilltop overlooking a host-nation military installation. The seizure or control of that hilltop is key to the security of the installation. However, the local population living along the approaches to the hilltop are key to an insurgent force trying to reach the hilltop to reconnoiter or attack the installation.

While the local population is not terrain, their presence is key to the insurgent force which counts on direct or tacit civilian support for free movement. Take away that civilian support, and insurgent movement towards the key terrain becomes more difficult.

Physically seizing and controlling these people by voluntary or forced relocation can solve the immediate problem, but may ultimately create new ones. However, "seizing their hearts and minds" through PSYOP and CA operations will deny the insurgents free access to the hilltop. An alert and cooperative population is an excellent early warning device against insurgent movement. Obviously, people are not key terrain; but their presence on a terrain feature can make that location key terrain to threat or friendly forces.

The SIO must use caution when recommending key terrain. For example, the control of coca crop areas may deny its use to the drug cartels, but will alienate local farmers from the government.

### Terrain Overlays

Normally, ARSOF use the five basic terrain overlays that are developed from geographic and terrain analysis. These terrain overlays are prepared in the terrain

analysis step but are used and updated throughout the IPB process.

**Population Status Overlay.** Figure 10-5 reflects the results of the population analysis subset of geographic analysis. It depicts the population – an often critical factor in ARSOF operations – especially in FID and UW environments. While population is not specifically a terrain feature, the presence of people and their associated activities in a given geographic area often determine the importance of that terrain to friendly and threat operations.

The population can provide support and security to friendly and threat forces. For example, the failure of the November 1989 insurgent offensive in San Salvador, El Salvador, was largely a result of the insurgents' inability to mobilize the urban masses against the government. This inability resulted in a tactical and operational military failure and severely undermined the credibility of the insurgents' claim to be representing the will of the people.

Figure 10-5 also shows the sectors of the population that are pro-government, neutral, and pro-insurgent. A generic graphic may also show education, religion, ethnic, or economic aspects of the population.

A more refined graphic in an urban environment would show the homes and work places of key friendly or threat military or civilian personnel and their relatives. In this instance, large-scale maps and imagery are used to accurately plot the information by marking rooftops of buildings. This refined graphic should be cross-referenced to OB files, such as personality files and faction or organization files. This graphic –

- Assists the commander to see the AO or target area and to develop his mission plans.
- Enables the commander to determine the prospects for attacking or securing a key node in a built-up area and then factors in the possibility of collateral damage to the population and to property. (This tool is valuable in counter-drugs operations.)

**Concealment and Cover Overlay.** Figure 10-6 shows the availability, density, type, and location of concealment and cover to friendly and threat elements. It should depict concealment and cover from the ground as well as from the air.

In areas with a significant threat of aerial attack or observation, overhead concealment and cover may be important for threat selection of base camps, mission support sites, drug laboratories, and the like.

Surface configuration primarily determines cover, including natural and synthetic features (such as mines, bunkers, tunnels, and fighting positions). Vegetation is the primary feature that provides concealment. Some vegetation may provide concealment from both aerial and ground observation, while other types will provide concealment from only the air or ground. Canopy closure data is critical for the determination of areas that offer concealment from aerial observation, particularly in tropical rain forests.

This information is incorporated into the concealment and cover overlay for rural and other forested areas. In built-up areas, synthetic structures are also assessed for the concealment and cover they offer.

When used with the population status overlay, the concealment and cover overlay can be used to determine dwelling and work places, safe houses, routes of movement, meeting places and others. For FID, UW, DA, CT, and SR missions, this can also narrow the area of search for key personnel and other $C^2$ elements.

**Logistics Sustainability Overlay.** Figure 10-7 shows the location of items essential to friendly and threat operations. Detecting and locating supply lines and bases are critical to finding and defeating hostile activities. Attention is given to basic food, water, medicine, and material supply. In rural areas, this overlay shows potable water supplies, farms, orchards, growing seasons, and the like. In built-up areas, this overlay shows supermarkets, food warehouses, pharmacies, hospitals, clinics, and the residences of doctors and other key medical personnel.

In counter-drug operations, this overlay identifies the locations of supply outlets offering precursor chemicals. In FID and UW environments, this overlay is used to locate businesses offering PVC tubing used to produce indigenous mines and booby traps, and retail or wholesale outlets that sell printing materials necessary to produce PSYOP products. Key to preparing this overlay is knowledge of threat and friendly forces, their logistical




**Figure 10-5. Example of a population status overlay.**




**Figure 10-6. Example of a concealment and cover overlay.**




**Figure 10-7. Example of a logistics sustainability overlay.**

requirements, and the availability and location of materiel and personnel to meet these requirements.

**Trap or Key Facilities Overlay.** Figure 10-8 graphically portrays the location of possible threat targets within the AO. In FID environments, this overlay shows—

- Banks.
- Bridges.
- Electric power installations.
- Bulk petroleum facilities.
- Friendly military and government facilities.
- Residencies and work places of key personnel. This overlay requires particular refinement for threat DA and SR missions against large facilities and infrastructure systems (such as air bases, rail yards, and bulk electric power supply grids).

This graphic overlay is used to determine the points most susceptible to attack based on threat capabilities and intentions. For example, the threat to a large air base may focus on air frames, crew billets, and POL storage; instead of runways, aprons, and the control tower.

The trap overlay is significant to the friendly commander's defense planning because it shows him where to concentrate his defenses and, conversely, where his defenses can be more diffused. The trap overlay utilizes CI personnel to focus on indicators of threat preparation for attack, such as the discovery of an indigenous worker pacing off the distances between perimeter fences and critical nodes. The trap overlay is also useful in disaster relief and counter lawlessness operations by identifying likely locations for rioting, pilfering, or looting.

**Lines of Communications Overlay.** Figure 10-9 highlights transportation systems and nodes within the AO (such as railways, roads, trails, navigable waterways, and airfields). In urban environments, mass public transit routes and schedules, as well as underground sewage, drainage and utility tunnels, ditches, and culverts are shown. Where applicable, this overlay also shows seasonal variations.

Care is taken to compare recent aerial imagery and map products to ensure new LOC are added to the final product. If operating in tropical rain forests and conducting a FID mission, freshly cut trails may not be observable from the air and may require specific map tracking debriefs of SR teams and other patrols.

The extent and regularity that a trail is repaired or improved can indicate the pattern and type of threat activity, and may in itself indicate preparations for large-scale movement or attack. In many situations, LOC products are readily available from the host nation or other local sources.

### Terrain Analysis for Special Forces

The terrain analysis step for SF is called geographic analysis in FID and UW, and microterrain analysis for SR and DA. Because of its universal applicability, population analysis is discussed later. In SF geographic analysis, the SIO—

- Considers subcategories of terrain, microterrain, and population.
- Analyzes the political, military, economic, social, psychological, and cultural factors of the AO and AI under the category of population.
- Determines how they separately and collectively affect friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent third-party capabilities, vulnerabilities, and COAs.

SF SR and DA microterrain analysis cover all mission-essential aspects of the terrain. Each individual mission will dictate the level of focus and the specific factors the SIO will consider. This requires the use of 1:12,500 scale maps when these maps are available. Factors to include:

- OCOKA factors in a radius (to be determined by the mission and operational considerations) of the target or TAI, such as threat air, ground, and water AAs and infiltration corridors; vegetation, foot trails, mountain passes, small wadis, steep slopes, thickets, and elevations in excess of 50 meters in height and potential OPs, LPs, and cache sites.
- All significant synthetic features in the AO. (Examples would be military garrisons, installations, airfields, and seaports; rail facilities, bridges, and tunnels; petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) complexes; electric power and telecommunications facilities; villages, nomadic camp sites, and artesian wells; shacks and towers; surveillance cameras and other early warning devices; churches, mosques,




**Figure 10-8. Example of a key facilities and target overlay.**




**Figure 10-9. Example of a LOC overlay.**

cemeteries, and monuments; utility poles and gas stations.)

- LOCs in the AO that could support friendly or hostile forces.
- Air corridors for extraction, reinforcement, or fire support aircraft.
- Potential LZs, DZs, and beach landing sites (BLSs) for extraction or for additional SF deployments or reinforcement.
- Food and water sources suitable for human consumption in the AO (including capacities by season).
- Cross-country mobility (in overlay form) for friendly and hostile dismounted personnel and wheeled and tracked vehicles.
- Elevation contours (in overlay form) of the AO, integrated with digitized computer terrain graphics for a ground perspective of the AO.

### Terrain Analysis for Rangers

Ranger SIOs conduct microterrain analysis and consider the same basic factors as SF microterrain analysis within a larger target area. This includes specific air corridors for ranger airborne and air assault operations.

### Terrain Analysis for SOA

SOA SIOs conduct in-depth studies of each optional flight route during the terrain analysis step of IPB. This study is imagery intensive because target areas are often inaccessible by ground or are behind enemy lines. SOA operate primarily at night and under limited visibility. Therefore, identifying and measuring terrain features are often critical to the success of the SOA mission.

Imagery with highly detailed mensuration is used for detailed pre-flight planning. For SOA's flying long infiltration and exfiltration routes, critical terrain consists of identifiable reference points that aid in navigation, as well as terrain features that can mask friendly aircraft from detection and hostile fire.

SOA terrain overlays depict all the obstacles to flight, reference points, check points, masked areas, and danger zones. These factors are used to determine the best flight routes to the target. The SIO uses the combined obstacle overlay to determine flight routes for infiltration and exfiltration. This overlay is the basis for input to the SOA requirements section of the TIP.

When preparing to support DA and SR ground missions, SOA terrain analysis must equal or surpass the detail of the ground force terrain analysis. Due to the low altitudes that SOA aircraft fly, features that are obstacles to ground forces may also be obstacles to SOA.

For example, SOA terrain analysis requires the SIO to measure buildings, poles, trees, wires, streets, open fields, and anything else that could be in an LZ, pickup zone (PZ), or obstacle to flight during insertions and extractions. Following are some considerations.

- Slope is an obstacle to fast rope assault operations.
- Open fields and rooftops provide viable insertion and extraction points for ARSOF personnel.
- Streets in urban areas or trails in wooded areas can be used for ultra low-level flight to hide the aircraft from detection and fire.

### Terrain Analysis for PSYOP

CA SIOs conduct PSYOP terrain analysis focusing on how geography affects the population of the AO, and the dissemination of PSYOP products. This step includes preparing a line-of-sight (LOS) overlay for radio and television stations derived from an obstacle overlay that shows elevations and other LOS information. For PSYOP, terrain analysis will, for example, focus on determining the respective ranges and audibility of signals from the most significant broadcast stations identified during OAE.

### Terrain Analysis for CA

CA SIOs conduct terrain analysis in support of DA missions to aid the commander in accomplishing his mission while minimizing civilian interference and reducing collateral damage.

In FID and UW environments, the CA SIO conducts geographic analysis to identify critical government and insurgent food, water and resupply routes, and potential locations of insurgent base areas. In FID and UW, the SIO primarily determines how terrain affects the ability of the supported group to conduct civic action and civil

defense. For example, extremely rugged or thickly vegetated areas may be unacceptable for some civic action projects because they are inaccessible to the necessary personnel and equipment needed to run such projects.

### Population Analysis

As stated earlier, population analysis is a subset of geographic analysis. It has applications for all ARSOF units, including ranger and SOA units. Rangers and SOA require an understanding of population issues when battlefield developments force them to operate in isolation for extended periods. An understanding of the population is crucial to successful E&E from threat forces if stranded in threat or denied territory.

Population is a major consideration to ARSOF in FID and UW environments, as well as in SR and some DA missions. Consequently, their SIOs must undertake a distinct population analysis of the AO in support of these missions. During this step, the SIO identifies, evaluates, and prepares overlays and other products, as appropriate, for –

- Social organizations.
- Economic organizations.
- Political organizations.
- History of the society.
- Nature of the threat.
- Nature of the government response.
- Effects on nonbelligerents.
- COA of the threat, government, and nonbelligerents.

Because of the shared interest in population analysis, ARSOF SIOs operating in the same AO must coordinate their efforts during this step.

## FACTOR ANALYSIS

Although not a part of IPB, factor analysis is a concurrent process with IPB.

The SIO performs a factor analysis to determine which activities and programs accommodate the common goals of the politically and socially active groups. The SIO determines which groups and composite groups are supporting, or are inclined to support, the government; to support the threat; or to remain neutral.

### Social Organizations

In evaluating social organizations, the SIO looks at –

- Density and distribution of population by groups, balance between urban and rural groups, sparsely populated areas, and concentrations of primary racial, linguistic, or cultural groups.

- Race, religion, national origin, tribe, economic class, political party and affiliation, ideology, education level, union memberships, management class, occupation, and age of the populace.

- Overlaps among classes and splits within them. For example, do union members belong to one or a few religious or racial groups? Are there ideological divisions within a profession?

- Composite groups based on their political behavior and the component and composite strength of each. For example, who are actively or passively supporting the government or the insurgents, and who are neutral?

- Active or potential issues motivating the political, economic, social, or military behavior of each subgroup and group; and population growth or decline, age distribution, and changes in location by groups. For example, economic benefits, social prestige, political participation, and perception of relative deprivation.

### Economic Organizations

The SIO identifies economic programs within our values and resources to generate favorable support, stabilize neutral groups, or neutralize threat groups. In evaluating economic organizations, the SIO looks at –

- Major ideologies. An example is the principal economic ideology of the society with local innovations or adaptation in the operational area.

- Economic infrastructure. Examples of indicators are fuel and mineral resource locations, bulk electric power production and distribution, transport facilities, and communications networks.

- National economic performance. Examples of indicators are gross national product, gross domestic

product, foreign trade balance, per capita income, inflation rate, and annual growth rate.

- National production performance. Examples of indicators are public and private ownership patterns; and the concentration, dispersal, and distribution of wealth in agriculture, manufacturing, forestry, information, professional services, transportation, mining, and the like.

- Public health. Some indictors are birth and death rates, diet and nutrition, water supply, sanitation and health care availability, and endemic diseases.

- Foreign trade patterns. Some examples are domestic and foreign indebtedness (public and private) and resource dependencies; analysis of economic benefit, how wealth is distributed, what is the level of poverty, and where does it occur.

- National education programs. Some factors to determine if the educational policies of the country meet national needs are how accessible it is to groups and individuals; grouping by scientific technical, professional, liberal arts, and crafts training; and skill surpluses and shortages.

- National employment patterns. Indicators of employment are unemployment, underemployment, and exclusion of groups; and horizontal and vertical career mobility.

- National revenues. Indicators are taxing authorities, rates, and how rates are determined.

- Population dispersal patterns. Indicators are population shifts and their causes and effects (for example, rural to urban, agriculture to manufacturing, and manufacturing to service).

### Political Organizations

In evaluating political organizations, the SIO looks at—

- The formal political structure of the government and the sources of its power. For example, the SIO must determine whether a country has a pluralist democracy based on the consensus of the voters or a strong-man rule supported by the military.
- The informal political structure of the government, and its comparison with the formal structure. The SIO must determine the true functional system by comparing it. For example, is the government nominally a democracy but really a political dictatorship?

- The legal and illegal political parties and their programs, strengths, and prospects for success. The SIO also studies the prospects for partnerships and coalitions between the parties.

- The nonparty political organizations, motivating issues, strengths, and parties or programs they support, to include political action groups.

- The nonpolitical interest groups and the correlations of their interests with political parties or nonparty organizations. These can include churches, cultural and professional organizations, and unions.

- The mechanism for government succession, the integrity of the process, roles of the populace and oligarchy, regularity of elections, systematic exclusion of identifiable groups, voting blocks, and patron-client determinants of voting.

- The independence, subordination, and effectiveness of the judiciary. To determine this, the SIO answers the following questions: Does the judiciary have the power of legislative and executive review? Does the judiciary support constitutionally guaranteed rights and international concepts of human rights?

- The independence or control of the press and other mass media, and the alternatives for the dissemination of information and opinion.

- The centralization or diffusion of essential decision making and patterns of inclusion or inclusion of specific individuals or groups in the process.

- The administrative competence of the bureaucracy. To determine this, the SIO answers the following question: Are they altruistic public servants or self-serving crooks? Can individuals and groups make their voices heard within the bureaucracy?

### History of the Society

The SIO correlates political, economic, and social groups and identifies political programs which will neutralize opposing groups and provide a plurality

favorable to friendly groups. In evaluating the history of the society, the SIO specifically looks at –

- The origin of the incumbent government and its leadership. To determine this, the SIO answers the following questions: Was the government elected? Does it have a long history? Have there been multiple peaceful successions of government?
- The history of political violence. The SIO analyzes the political history of the country and asks: Is violence a common means for the resolution of political problems? Is there precedent for revolution, coup d'etat, assassination, or terrorism? Does the country have a history of consensus building? Does the present threat have causes and aspirations in common with historic political violence?

**Nature of the Threat**

The SIO determines the legitimacy of the government; acceptance of violent and nonviolent remedies to political problems by the populace; the type and level of violence required by friendly and threat forces; and the groups or subgroups that can be expected to support or oppose the use of violence.

In evaluating the nature of the threat, the SIO looks at –

- External support to the threat, including direct military intervention by third-party nations.
- The desired end state of the threat, the clarity of its formulation, the openness of its articulation, the commonality of points of view among the elements of the threat, and the differences between this end view and the end view of the government.
- The groups and subgroups supporting the general objectives of the threat.
- The cleavages, minority views, and discord within the threat.
- The groups that might have been deceived or duped by the threat about the desired end-state of the threat.
- The organizational structures and patterns used by the threat, any variations and combinations to these structures or patterns, and any shifts and trends.
- The stage and phase of the threat and how far and long it has progressed and regressed over time.
- The unity and disagreement with front groups, leadership, tactics, primary targets, doctrine, OB, training, morale, discipline, and materiel resources.
- External support.
- Whether rigid commitment to a method or ideological tenet, or other factor, constitutes an exploitable vulnerability and weakness on which the government can build strength.

**Nature of the Government Response**

In evaluating the nature of the government response, the SIO looks at –

- General planning or lack of planning for countering the threat, comprehensiveness of planning, and correctness of definitions and conclusions.
- Organization and methods for strategic and operational planning and execution of plans, strengths, weaknesses, resource requirements and constraints, and reality of priorities.
- Population and resources utilization, and the effects on each group.
- Organization, equipment, and tactical doctrine for security forces. How does the government protect its economic and political infrastructure?
- Areas where the government has maintained the initiative.
- Population and resource control measures.
- Economic development programs.

### Effects on Nonbelligerents

The SIO correlates government and threat strengths and weaknesses and identifies necessary changes in friendly security force programs, plans, organization, and doctrine. The SIO determines the strengths and weaknesses of the nonbelligerents, the depth of their commitment to remain neutral, and the requirements to make them remain neutral or to support friendly or threat programs or forces.

Also important is how civilian communities react to the US forces operating in their area. The SIO needs to know whether the civilian community views the US as a friendly and benign force there to aid the country and people; or, if they see the US as an overbearing superpower trying to exert its control over the oppressed. The SIO needs to determine if the civilian population is likely to assist US or friendly forces in escaping and evading capture by threat forces.

In evaluating the effects on nonbelligerents, the SIO looks at—

- Mechanisms for monitoring nonbelligerent attitudes and responses.
- Common objectives of groups neither supporting nor opposing the threat.
- Effects of government military, political, economic, and social operations and programs on the populace. Does the government often kill civilians in its counter-threat operations? Are benefits of government aid programs evenly distributed?
- Weather the populace is inclined to provide the threat and the government with intelligence.

### COA of the Threat, Government, and Nonbelligerents

In evaluating the COA for threat forces, government, and nonbelligerents, the SIO considers the above factors and determines likely COAs and the effects of each. For example, to keep the threat from killing teachers and substituting ideologically based educational programs in village schools, the government—

- May provide its teachers with bodyguards.
- May form small, armed, and highly mobile squads to minimize the effects of threat destruction of power line support towers. The squads must be capable of reaching, repairing, or replacing damaged towers in less time than it takes the threat to plan and execute attacks on these targets.

## WEATHER ANALYSIS

The third IPB step is weather analysis. Normally, ARSOF SIOs preparing for DA and SR missions receive the results of weather analysis and climatological data from the SO SWO. However, the distance to the objective and the duration of a mission may require climatological data and light data from several time zones and weather seasons.

SF, PSYOP, and CA in FID and UW environments, and SOA on extended operations, however, have concerns that go beyond weather and extend to climate. In these situations, the SIO performs a climatology analysis. He looks at the climate, weather, and light conditions in the AO, over time, to determine their effects on friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent third-party operations.

The SIO—

- Considers climate types by area and season, and their effects on military, political, social, and economic activities.
- Develops historic weather data and weather effects overlays during this step.
- Gives special considerations to light data and its effect on friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent third-party operations and activities; this is because weather and light conditions can influence the number of civilians who will be in or around a DA target, SR TAI, or other ARSOF AI. The effects of weather and climate are integrated with terrain analysis.

SF, rangers, SOA, and threat forces often choose darkness and adverse weather conditions for DA and SR operations. Weather strongly influences—

- Infiltration and extraction.
- Foot movement.
- Night observation devices (NODs).
- Laser target designation (LTD) operations.
- SR surveillance ranges.

- Weapons effectiveness.
- Deployments or reaction times.

For rangers, weather analysis concentrates on the effects of weather on—

- Airborne and air assault operations.
- Troop morale.
- Weapons effectiveness.
- Rotary-wing lift capabilities.
- Ground movement of light infantry.
- Observation limitations.
- Fields of fire.

Light and lunar data are pertinent to ranger operations. Lunar data influences the efficiency of night vision goggles (NVGs).

### Weather Analysis for SOA

For SOA, weather analysis must be detailed. Generic weather summaries for a country are not sufficient for SOA elements. Weather patterns for each geographical region must be obtained and compared to the terrain data to develop the best flight routes. Weather data which may have negligible impact on conventional Army aviation assets may be critical for night infiltration operations in denied areas.

Within the target area, last minute weather conditions may be a critical element of the target analysis. Soil composition combined with weather can severely affect operations.

- Moon illumination and angle are important for flight operations with NVGs.
- Visibility, wind speed, and wind direction can significantly affect light helicopter operations.
- Conditions of sand or snow in a moderate wind; loose rock and gravel in a high wind; and sudden brown-out or white-out can render SOA operations ineffective.
- Sea and water conditions are also important to know for survivability and for combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations when SOA work over water.

The SOA SIO and his analyst use much of the same data as SF and ranger SIOs. Ground and air ARSOF sometimes operate together; therefore, to achieve rapid, thorough, and accurate analysis for all mission participants, coordination—and even consolidation—of intelligence during terrain analysis and other stages of IPB are critical.

### Weather Analysis for PSYOP and CA

Weather and climate can play an important role in the development of a PSYOP plan or CA mission. In FID and UW missions, particularly, weather and climate affect CA projects, PSYOP media, and dissemination operations. For example, wind direction and speed at 500 feet above ground level (AGL) increments are required for leaflet operations; recruitment of locals in subzero weather is extremely difficult; periods of drought may force farmers to become bandits or insurgents; and flooding can interfere with food and medicine distribution.

## THREAT EVALUATION

The fourth IPB step is threat evaluation. Threat evaluation is a detailed study of threat forces, their composition and organization, tactical doctrine, weapons and equipment, and supporting systems. Threat evaluation determines threat capabilities and limitations and how the threat would fight if not constrained by weather and terrain.

### Threat Evaluation for SF

Because SF often operate in fluid environments where opposing sides may not be well-defined or may change, the SIO focuses on correlating the interaction of friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent third-party forces in the AO. Figure 10-10 shows the correlation of forces in FID and UW. The SF SIO—

- Identifies the threat, friendly, and nonbelligerent third-party forces and develops a detailed OB data base.
- Determines their strengths and weaknesses in relation to each other.

Unlike non-ARSOF SIOs, who look two echelons up and one down, the SF SIO must look at all echelons of forces that can affect the mission, regardless of echelon.




**Figure 10-10. Correlation of forces in FID and UW.**

In SF DA and SR operations, predictive templates are produced during the threat evaluation step. Predictive templates portray known and suspected threat activity on or near a target or TAI. They can be general sketches, photographs, or imagery products. These templates are in addition to the doctrinal overlays and other traditional products. The SIO pays special attention to—

- Security and reaction force capabilities, weapons, fortifications and barriers, morale, uniforms, and communications.
- Threat indirect fire weapons coverage.
- Point and area air defense.
- NBC and other special weapons or hazards that may be present or used on the target or in the TAI.
- Threat, friendly, or nonbelligerent third-party forces status; out to 25 kilometers from the target or TAI.

In FID and UW operations, SF SIOs pay particular attention to military and paramilitary police forces on the government side, and the regular and irregular forces and infrastructure (auxiliary and underground) on the threat side. SF correlation of force evaluation in these environments includes analysis of the following factors for friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent forces:

- Key personalities.
- Composition.
- Strength.
- Logistics.
- Training (individual, unit, and special).

- Electronics technical data.
- Disposition (location).
- Tactics and methods.
- Operational effectiveness.

- Other situation-specific data such as–
  - History and lineage of threat organization and factions.
  - Cultural peculiarities.
  - Dialects.
  - Religious peculiarities.
  - Ethnic.
  - Drug use.

The SF SIO–

- Determines how the friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent forces can use geography, offensive actions, security, surprise, and cross-country mobility to allow the S3 to develop locally superior applications of the elements of power.

- Identifies strengths and weaknesses of friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent forces.

- Determines the political, social, economic, and psychological effects of each side's COA, tactics, and countertactics.

- Analyzes the COA and makes recommendations to the S3 to optimize the application of the elements of combat power by the friendly side.

### Threat Evaluation for Rangers

For rangers, the amount of detail studied during threat evaluation is generally greater and is focused on a much smaller AO. HVTs are identified during this step. HVTs are based on the commander's guidance, specific target area evaluation, and knowledge of threat capabilities en route and at the target location. In conducting threat evaluation, data on the threat's composition, disposition, organization, and tactics are gathered and evaluated. In addition, rangers determine and evaluate–

- Foreign forces on the target; this includes all OB (air, ground, electronic, naval) and $C^3I$ systems.

- Communications, ESM, ECM, and imitative communications deception operations.

- Data on threat security and reaction forces capable of reinforcing the objective.

- Local militia present and their status.

- Uniforms, equipment, and weapons (and associated capabilities) used by threat forces.

- Target fortifications, barriers, and point air defenses.

- Morale and likely reactions of target defenders.

- Reactions and status of the onsite work force.

- Threats from indirect fire, air, and NBC to rangers on target.

- Locations of arms rooms and caches.

- Data on the local populace (for example, their language, whether they are armed and support the government, and their feelings toward the US).

- Other historical background data.

### Threat Evaluation for SOA

For SOA threat evaluation is often difficult and complex because of the environment in which SOA aircraft work. Many of the systems presenting a threat to SOA do not affect conventional commanders. Since the mission for SOA in DA and SR missions is undetected infiltration and exfiltration, the primary threat is anything that can detect and report aircraft movements.

Civilian and commercial systems may be as dangerous to SOA as threat soldiers and military systems. Detection and early warning from civil air traffic control radars, navigational radar on fishing vessels, or others are as harmful as early warning by a military air defense radar.

Unique vulnerabilities of SOA aircraft must also be considered. A rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) is more dangerous to a low-flying helicopter than an SA-7 or SA-14. The SOA SIO must assess potential threats that range beyond standard OB files on the objective country and neighboring countries.

During threat evaluation, the SOA SIO also examines communication links. A threat that can detect the mission aircraft but cannot report its presence in a timely manner is not a major concern to the SOA element. On the other hand, a lone rifleman with a radio or a telephone can ruin an SOA mission. Terrain masking is a critical factor in determining the threat's detection and reporting capabilities.

Threat evaluation of the SOA target site itself is also complex and goes beyond the usual OB available or target area. SOA elements need to know nearly as much as the ARSOF DA ground element about security forces. They also need information on aerial patrol reaction forces, lighting at the target, and so on. When SOA and other ARSOF work together, close coordination—or even consolidating their threat evaluations—is necessary.

### Threat Evaluation for PSYOP

For PSYOP, threat evaluation serves two purposes. First, it gives the JPOTF commander an understanding of the existing and potential opposing products in the AO. It is a safe assumption that US PSYOP will be countered by the threat. Opposing PSYOP may be "products of the deed," like civic actions. This opposing product may come from governments, political parties, labor unions, or religious groups. US PSYOP forces in the AO must anticipate and be able to counter or prevent threat products directed at US and allied forces and the local populace.

Second, the supported unit commander depends upon the JPOTF commander for advice on any PSYOP consequences of US operations, and for recommended alternative measures within each COA.

To conduct threat evaluation, the SIO and staff must determine the capabilities of hostile organizations to conduct product operations and to counteract US and allied PSYOP. The demographics of any threat military and paramilitary forces should be evaluated at this step; if they were not considered during OAE. These organizations may be within the AO or AI, and even in another country. Specific capabilities to be evaluated include the ability to—

- Conduct offensive product operations targeting US, allied forces, or the local populace.
- "Inoculate" its personnel against US PSYOP efforts (defensive counter-products).
- Counteract US PSYOP efforts by exploiting weaknesses in US PSYOP campaigns (offensive counter-products).
- Conduct active measures or "dirty tricks" campaigns.
- Conduct ECM against US or allied PSYOP broadcasts.

### Threat Evaluation for CA

During threat evaluation, the CA SIO must determine the noncombatants during military operations. This is especially critical where the opponent is not a standing military force or if the force is not equipped with standard uniforms and weapons, like guerrillas or terrorists. These military forces can often blend into or intermingle with the civilian community. Threat evaluation for CA units identifies threat OB and the modus operandi of these threat forces.

Threat forces use social, religious, and other types of forums to employ the elements of power and methods of countering them.

### Doctrinal Templating

Where possible, the ARSOF SIO uses doctrinal templates to graphically show the results of threat evaluation. These templates depict the force structure, deployment, or capabilities of hostile, friendly, and nonbelligerent third-party doctrinal deployment.

This is shown for various types of operations without the constraints imposed by climatological conditions and geography. It is used as a comparative data base to integrate what is known about threat, friendly, and nonbelligerent third-party forces. Military operating systems, like artillery, air defense, or engineers, may also be templated.

### Pattern Analysis

In the absence of identifiable doctrine, pattern or trend analysis is used. Insurgent or terrorist threat operations, for example, can be shown at the operational level by flow charts showing the essential steps, with time windows of typical operations, like assassinations.

At the tactical level, diagrams can show how the threat forces have executed type operations in the past, such as abductions from vehicles. In the latter war-of-movement stage of insurgency, types of data displayed are—

- Composition.
- Formations.
- Frontages.
- Depths.
- Equipment numbers and ratios.
- HVTs (subclassified as movers, emitters, shooters, and sitters).

**Other Threat Evaluation Templates**

ARSOF SIOs may employ a combination of standard and nonstandard doctrinal templates.

For COIN operations, a recommended technique for templating the reactions of threat forces is to use the reactive doctrinal template (RDT). The RDT is simply a series of concentric circles keyed to time-distance assumptions. Figure 10-11 shows an example of an RDT.

The RDT is a variant of the doctrinal template. It depicts how insurgent groups usually react to friendly activity in their area. Like the standard doctrinal template,




**Figure 10-11. Example doctrinal foot movement in jungle template, 1:50,000 scale.**

the RDT does not take terrain and other external factors into consideration.

## THREAT INTEGRATION

The final step in IPB is threat integration. SF, PSYOP, and CA SIOs refer to this step as data base integration. However, because of the relatively narrow range of factors considered by ranger and SOA, this function remains threat integration in ranger and SOA IPB. This is the final stage in the development of a TIP. In turn, the TIP supports development of the POE for the ARSOF element. At this step, all of the factor analysis performed in the preceding steps are integrated that presents the total picture to the SIO, commander, and staff. Templates play a key role in presenting this picture to the commander.

### Situation Template

The SIO uses situation templates to show how threat, friendly, and nonbelligerent third-party forces might operate and communicate within the constraints imposed by specific meteorological conditions and geography.

The situation template is basically a doctrinal template with geographical and meteorological constraints applied. It is used to identify critical threat, friendly, and nonbelligerent activities and locations, and provides a basis for situation and target development and HVT analysis.

A situation template is a snapshot of what a particular force might do at a certain time and place. In FID, this template might be substituted for a target analysis overlay that displays–

- All the potential targets (people and places) within the AO.
- Insurgent ambush points on friendly avenues of approach.
- Possible locations for sighting indirect fire and antiaircraft weapons.
- Infiltration corridors.
- Post-attack escape routes.

Situation templates are very important for ranger operations, but in contrast are only important for SOA where the SOA element is called on to perform sustainment operations. When the target analysis overlay is used with pattern analysis, additional NAIs can be pinpointed.

### Event Template

Event templates show locations where critical events and activities are expected to occur and where critical targets and opportunities will appear. The SIO uses the event template to predict time-related events within critical areas. It provides a basis for collection operations; predicting threat, friendly, and nonbelligerent third-party intentions; and locating and tracking HVTs.

This type of template assists the SIO in–

- Wargaming each threat, friendly, and third-party COA.
- Depicting NAIs and the relationship of events.
- Providing a means for analyzing the sequence of activities and events that should occur for each COA and how they relate to one another. The SF SIO in FID, for example, attempts to identify the significant actions the insurgents may take (for example, to engage in nationwide economic sabotage, assassinate mayors in contested regions, and negotiate with the government). As the force is visualized, critical areas become apparent. Within these areas, significant events and activities will occur and targets and opportunities will appear.

Figure 10-12 shows insurgent planning for an operation. These NAIs are points or areas where human activity or lack of activity will confirm or deny a particular COA. Events within NAIs can be analyzed for indicators that the SIO can direct intelligence and target acquisition resources against. NAIs and SIR are incorporated into the collection plan.

The SF SIO may have to correlate types of events with historical or insurgent commemorative dates. In this case, the SF SIO first–

- Identifies an historical or commemorative day or timeframe when the insurgents are likely to conduct an operation.
- Identifies the types of training, logistics, intelligence, and tactics the insurgents would likely employ in the operation.




**Figure 10-12. Insurgent incident steps, drawn as an equivalent event template.**

For example, a possible insurgent COA may be to seize a small district capital on a significant national holiday and hold it for at least 24 hours with the hope of triggering an insurrection among the inhabitants.

Insurgent planning for such an operation would require detailed HUMINT, deception, psychological preparation of the populace, and pre-attack target surveillance. Selected key nodes would have to be identified and targeted by specialized assault teams in the opening stage of the assault. Examples would be police stations and the military garrison headquarters, government radio and television station, telephone exchange, power plant, and fuel depot.

The insurgents would need a battalion-sized assault force supported by indirect fire and antiaircraft weapons, and the employment of product teams, population screening, and control measures for the actual operation.

Therefore, the insurgents must designate AAs and routes to the objective. All of these insurgent activities can be observed by establishing NAIs and TAIs. It takes detailed knowledge of the threat in a particular area for this template to be useful. Tactics, organization, and political or military objectives can change periodically and from area to area.

### Decision Support Template

The SIO uses the decision support template (DST) to show decision points that are keyed to significant events and activities. The DST is the intelligence estimate in graphic form. It does not dictate decisions to the friendly commander, but identifies critical events and human activities relative to time and location that may require tactical or operational decisions by the commander. It is, at best, the SIO's in-progress review for intelligence, and is determined as part of a decision briefing provided to the commander by his entire staff.

DSTs identify where and when targets can be attacked or other opportunities exploited to support the commander's concept for executing the mission. The DST for SF, ranger, and SOA DA missions shows critical nodes, HPTs, and target components within the objective. The DST for SF in FID, for example, shows areas of likely insurgent or government activity or influence, potential future insurgent targets and objectives, and TAIs.

A TAI is an area or point along an infiltration route or mobility corridor (MC), where successful interdiction will cause hostile forces to either abandon a particular COA or require the use of unusual activity and support to continue. Examples of TAIs include—

- Key bridges.
- Road junctions.
- Chokepoints.
- DZs and LZs.
- Known fording sites.
- AAs.

Figure 10-13 shows a TAI within an NAI. TAIs which are essential to the uninterrupted progress of threat forces may become HVTs. The identifying TAI is a joint effort between the intelligence and operations staffs. In FID, population groups can be TAIs for targeting by PSYOP, CMO, and other nonlethal means.

Decision points (DPs) are geographical and chronological points where and when the commander must make decisions in order to seize or retain the initiative. DPs can be NAIs or TAIs. Their selection is primarily an operations officer function.

Decisions must be made early enough to ensure that they can be implemented in time to achieve the desired effects.

Decisions cannot be made until there are indications that particular events will occur and their locations can be determined with a high degree of confidence. DPs are determined by comparing times required to implement decisions, doctrinal movement rates (adjusted to compensate for the effects of meteorological conditions, geography, and human action on mobility), and distances. For example, if it requires 2 hours to implement a friendly decision, the decision must be made while the threat force is at least 2 hours from the TAI where the event is expected to occur.

Time phase lines (TPLs) are based on doctrine, pattern, and trend analysis. TPLs help to determine where the threat, friendly, or nonbelligerent third-party force will be and what it will look like. A TPL is drawn across an AA or MC to show potential threat advance at doctrinal or historical rates, as modified by geography and meteorological conditions. TPLs project where a




**Figure 10-13. TAI within an NAI.**

particular force is expected to be at any given time. TPLs do not show the effects of friendly action, except when light or heavy opposition is built into doctrinal or historical rates of advance.

### Other Threat Integration Templates

ARSOF SIOs may produce a combination of standard and nonstandard templates during the threat integration step. These include but are not limited to–

- Reactive situational templates (RSTs).
- Reaction event templates (RETs).
- COIN DSTs.
- NEO event templates.
- Disaster relief templates.

**Reactive Situational Template.** In COIN missions, the RDT, which is a variant of the doc-trinal template, becomes the RST when it is applied to the actual terrain in the operational environment. The RST shown at Figure 10-14 uses TPLs to project where the insurgents are likely to be in reaction to friendly actions.

**Reaction Event Template.** The RST becomes the RET when the SIO adds NAIs and TAIs to it. Figure 10-15 shows an example of an RET.




**Figure 10-14. Reactive situational template for COIN operations.**




**Figure 10-15. Reactive event template for COIN operations.**

**COIN DST.** The COIN DST is the RET with TAIs and DPs added. DPs, in the context of FID or COIN, would indicate when reaction and blocking forces would be inserted into the TAI. For UW, RETs with TAIs and DPs constitute the DST. In this case, TAIs would be areas for harassment and delay (for example, with direct and indirect weapons fire); DPs would indicate the timing of key decisions (for example, abandonment of an insurgent base). Figure 10-16 shows a reactive DST for COIN.

**NEO Event Template.** The event template for NEO portrays—

- Any events that pertain to the safety of US citizens in the country.
- Movements of threat forces.
- The status of all other forces involved in the operation, including nonbelligerent third parties.

This template should show the location, number, and status of all potential COAs, NAIs, TAIs, and DPs. NAIs will be potential assembly areas for evacuation to take place, potential chokepoints for roads, and possible locations for critical installations.

**Disaster Relief Template.** Overlays for disaster relief show the locations of critical facilities and of key personalities within the national and local governments. Key personalities are people who can be mobilized to reestablish law and order, get government functioning again, and stabilize the situation.

Graphic overlays for DC operations include information on the location of existing and potential DC camps, LOC, and destinations. Critical installations and facilities also are templated and analyzed for potential use.

### Threat Integration for SF

In UW or FID environments, the SIO applies threat, friendly, and nonbelligerent third-party data to the constraints imposed by the weather and terrain. This is to determine how the friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent forces might actually operate in the AO. This lets the intelligence analyst identify significant military, political, psychological, economic, and social events in the AO and to predict probable COAs.

During this function, the SIO develops the event, situation, and DSTs, as well as other products to clarify the situation in the operational area for the commander and staff. These products become the basis for tactical intelligence operations and associated command decisions.

In DA and SR missions, SF requires templates with TPLs that depict the probable approach of threat forces from their known location to the target area, and in pursuit of the operational element. The SIO develops and adds NAIs along likely AAs to indicate threat reactions. From the event template, the SIO develops the DST by adding TAIs, where a threat reaction force can be delayed; and by adding DPs where the SF operational element must decide on a COA (for example, withdrawal).

### Threat Integration for Rangers

For rangers, threat integration is based on known and suspected threat locations at a specific installation or piece of terrain. It takes the known information of the installation and the surrounding area and attempts to show where threat forces could be located.

The SIO develops a situational template from predictive templating to help the commander visualize suspected threat intentions. This could include suspected OB or AAs for reaction forces. He then draws the situational template over the predictive template in a different color to contrast known and potential threat locations and intentions, especially for air and ground reaction forces within the target areas. The ranger TAI normally does not extend beyond 10 kilometers from the target, because of the rangers' limited fire support assets.

The next step for the ranger SIO conducting threat integration is event templating. During terrain analysis, the SIO uses the LOC overlay with the cross-country movement overlay to assist the analyst in determining NAIs that are crucial to accomplishing the ranger mission. During the analysts' briefing, the commander will determine where to deploy reconnaissance assets based upon the threat and terrain and their influence on the target. Not all NAIs will have rangers observing for threat activity.

Ranger battalions have a 12-person reconnaissance detachment. The only intelligence collection asset assigned to the ranger regiment is the regimental reconnaissance detachment which can be deployed 48 hours prior to the main assault force. AC-130 gunships




**Figure 10-16. Reactive decision support template for COIN.**

providing fire support can also provide visual reconnaissance on and near the target area. Through direct communications between the reconnaissance detachments and the AC-130, threat reaction forces can be monitored and engaged. By observing pertinent NAIs, rangers are able to detect and respond to enemy reaction forces.

For rangers, the last step in threat integration is the DST. The DST concentrates on the most critical targets and answers the following type PIR:

- What are the critical nodes or HPTs within the objective?
- Is the CP more critical than the ammunition supply point?

The ranger SIO develops TAIs in conjunction or in proximity to NAIs on the event template. As reaction force installations are identified, key routes or AAs become evident from microterrain analysis products. Based on these products, the SIO identifies TAIs that will affect the reaction, organization, or movement of threat ground forces. Observing these TAIs allows rangers to monitor or confirm target destruction by aerial fire support assets.

Since ranger reconnaissance and fire support assets are not deployed more than 10 kilometers from the target, the friendly reaction events from the threat to the objective occur in a matter of minutes.

The ranger AI is so small that engagement of TAIs by ranger fire support occurs as soon as the information is passed through intelligence and operations channels if the gunners have not already engaged the target. Hourly tracking of a threat force moving to reinforce an attacked ranger target does not occur at the ranger regiment level. This is because the ranger force will not be on the target long enough to be engaged by larger threat follow-on forces. On some targets, there is no threat reaction force, and TAIs are engaged solely on the target itself.

### Threat Integration for SOA

During threat integration SOA SIOs must also integrate their pertinent threat data into situational and event templates which affect their choice of flight routes and modes of infiltration or exfiltration.

For SOA, this is the final step in the development of their target folder. The threat as it relates to flight route options is the final factor in deciding which option provides the best route. Threat integration helps determine the best approach and final assault paths into the target area. It provides the necessary visual products for the integration of coordinated assault fires if needed. Situation templates become important for SOA only if the element is called upon to perform sustainment operations.

Threat data is integrated with the target terrain data, which includes information on where every building and telephone pole is located and measured. This final product –

- Depicts the best insertion or extraction points.
- Identifies targets for destruction by support attack helicopter fire.
- Helps reconcile multiple flight routes in very limited air space.

Finally, threat integration results in the DST for SOA when in the form of –

- Air defense zone coverage overlays.
- Threat aircraft reaction times.
- Combat radii overlays.
- Terrain masking overlays.

The DST shows the best flight route and COA on the target under varying conditions. This final DST depicts terrain, obstacles to flight, routes, LZs, PZs, alternate PZs, OB, targets or TAIs, and often operational time lines. In a sustained DA or SR mission, NAIs are used in conjunction with TAIs when SOA aircraft are tasked for interdiction missions.

### Threat Integration for PSYOP

For PSYOP, threat integration is known as data base integration. PSYOP threat interaction relies heavily on templating, although the situation template is not normally used. The PSYOP SIO uses the event template and event analysis matrix to –

- Identify trends or patterns of activities that can be exploited by either US or threat forces.

- Identify ongoing product campaigns harmful to friendly forces and threat situations, and highlight those events that are important to PSYOP.

The DST is seldom done entirely as an overlay. In some instances, a map is not used at all. Normally, NAIs and TAIs are terrain-oriented. However, for PSYOP, NAIs and TAIs are people-oriented.

For PSYOP –

- NAIs are people or groups of people (audiences) that could affect the outcome of friendly operations. PSYOP intelligence collection efforts are targeted against these NAIs. NAIs can be converted to TAIs as the situation changes.

- TAIs are the NAIs the PSYOP SIO and PSYOP S3 recommend to the commander as targets for a PSYOP campaign. The PDC conducts a detailed analysis of these TAIs to develop PSYOP campaigns. TAIs may be categorized as HVTs or HPTs.

When PSYOP SIOs conduct data base integration, the event template reflects friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent third-party situations and highlights events that are important to PSYOP. TPLs and DPs may be days, weeks, or months before the beginning of the supported operation or PSYOP campaign. These are best represented as timelines on a calendar, with milestones.

Only in the later stages of a PSYOP campaign in support of active combat operations are TPLs tied to terrain or the movement of forces on the ground. In this case, DPs and TPLs are used to synchronize PSYOP campaign implementation within the supported operation.

### Threat Integration for CA

For CA operations, threat integration is called data base integration. The products of data base integration are several graphic overlays that the CA SIO uses when briefing the commander on the situation and potential COA. NAIs and TAIs for CA operations focus on people and facilities rather than on terrain or units.

The DST consists of areas where civic action projects or civil defense training are most valuable and necessary. TPLs are not used in the traditional sense, if at all, for CA in UW. A DP for when and where a CA mission should be conducted is stated in terms of months or years rather than in terms of hours or minutes.

Graphic overlays that aid the CA commander during decision making for a DA operation are related to locations and numbers of civilians in and around the objective. They show the locations of critical facilities and installations such as hospitals, water sources, power sources, sanitation facilities, railroads, airports, and government buildings that must be protected and avoided during the attack. CA units do not normally conduct operations in support of SR.

In data base integration in support of FID missions, event templates and insurgent leader profiles and matrixes are valuable. A well-organized insurgency operates with some sort of doctrine and methodology. Although there may be readily apparent doctrine, the plotting of events may yield consistent patterns.

The CA SIO must also consider the actions of the host-nation government and host-nation military in countering the insurgency. US military operations should be consistent with the efforts of the host nation and represent a unified effort spearheaded by the host nation, not by the US. The DST includes NAIs that are possible locations of insurgent bases, as well as potential sites for future civic action activities. TAIs must be examined from a reactive standpoint. The site of a CA program could become the target for the threat. DPs and TPLs are in terms of when and where to concentrate CA activities and when and where not to conduct them.

UW does not normally lend itself to doctrinal templating, so doctrinal and situation templates are usually not used in CA UW intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The event template is used and must be kept accurate and current. Through careful analysis of the event template, patterns and trends of the threat emerge.

## DISSEMINATING AND USING

The ARSOF SIO produces a variety of templates, overlays, association and event matrixes, and flow charts, as appropriate, to support and illustrate METT-T. As these products are completed, the SIO provides them to the commander and S3 for approval and guidance. After the commander approves them, the S3 integrates IPB with other staff products and applies them to mission planning and execution.

As a follow-up, the SIO must–

- Ensure that the right products are promptly provided to the right consumers, and are adequate for and properly used by them.
- Advise and coach nonintelligence MOS personnel in appropriate use of products.
- Use his IPB products to identify gaps in the intelligence data base and redirect his collection effort.

# APPENDIX A

# SAMPLE COLLECTION PLAN FORMATS AND INSTRUCTIONS

Although there is no prescribed collection plan format, the two formats in this appendix are recommended because—

- They can be easily modified to support mission or unit requirements.
- They are easily tailored to reflect the collection assets available throughout an operation, battle, or mission.

## LINEAR BATTLEFIELD COLLECTION PLAN

The first format is designed to support most conventional (linear) battlefield collection management requirements.

- Figure A-1 shows examples of standard collection plan SOF PIR and IR.
- Figure A-2 shows an example of this type of collection plan format with sample entries.
- Figure A-3 gives instructions on how to fill out the major parts of a standard collection plan format.

The standard collection plan format is a valuable aid during all phases of the collection management process. (See Chapter 3.) Written collection plans help the collection manager to focus efforts and to monitor requirements, like threat capabilities and vulnerabilities. The amount of detail needed, of course, depends on the particular requirement to be satisfied and the amount of overall collection effort required. FM 34-2, Chapter 4, contains additional information on the collection management process.

For some operations, a collection plan might be as simple as a list of available collection resources and brief notes or reminders about current intelligence requirements or specific information that must be collected. For other operations, more complex plans may be required. ARSOF operations often have several PIR and IR that require analysis and extensive collection effort over longer periods.

| | |
|---|---|
| PIR | • Where and in what strengths are threat forces? |
| | • Where and how is the threat applying the elements of power (military, informational, economic, and political)? |
| | • Where is the threat not applying the elements of power? |
| | • What will the population in the target area be (supportive, hostile, or neutral) toward ARSOF operations? |
| | • What is the threat's low-level air defense capability? |
| | • How is the HN CA program working? |
| | • What is the strength of popular support for and opposition of the threat ? |
| IR | • How, where, when, and by whom will the threat be resupplied and reinforced? |
| | • How will nonbelligerent third parties react toward ARSOF actions (when, where, and how)? |
| | • Where are threat MCs and ICs? |
| | • What are the friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent third-party organizations in the AO? |

**Figure A-1. Some examples of standard collection plan PIR and IR.**

CLASSIFICATION

**UNIT:** 1 Bn 9SFG(A) **COLLECTION PLAN** **PERIOD COVERED:** FROM D+1 TO D+5

| PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS | INDICATORS (ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS) |
|---|---|
| PIR<br>1. Where and in what strength are threat forces? | a. Areas of enemy activity.<br>b. Discovery of weapons and new trails within the AO.<br>c. Introduction of new tactics by insurgents. |

AVENUE OF APPROACH — COORDINATES FM TQ 5720 TO UQ 9273

MOBILITY CORRIDOR NO — FM TO

| NAMED AREA OF INTEREST | DISTANCE | TIME NET | TIME NLT | SPECIFIC INFORMATION OR REQUESTS | OBSERVED TIME | TASOSC ISE | SOC J2 | GP MI DET | 1 BN MI DET | ODA 834 | ODA 832 | ODA 831 | ODB 830 | 4th POG | 96th CA | HN Police | HN 1st BDE | HN 2d BDE | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NAI 2 | 50 km | NA | D+5 | Report increased border crossing VIC TQ6020, TQ3218 and TQ0613. | | x | x | ⊗ | ⊗ | x | ⊗ | ⊗ | x | x | ⊗ | ⊗ | | ⊗ | | |
| NAI 1 | 10 km | NA | D+5 | Report discovery of caches containing weapons. | | x | x | | | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ | x | ⊗ | ⊗ | x | ⊗ | ⊗ | | |
| NAI 1 | 10 km | NA | D+5 | Report insurgent changes in recruitment. | | x | x | x | x | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ | ⊗ | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

AVENUE OF APPROACH — COORDINATES FM TO

MOBILITY CORRIDOR NO — FM TQ 5901 TO TQ 8220

| NAMED AREA OF INTEREST | DISTANCE | TIME NET | TIME NLT | SPECIFIC ORDERS OR REQUEST | OBSERVED TIME |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NAI | | | | | |
| NAI | | | | | |
| NAI | | | | | |

AGENCIES TO BE EMPLOYED

| HOUR AND DESTINATION OF REPORTS | REMARKS |
|---|---|
| As obtained | As needed |

Briefly state specific information to be sought that will substantiate each indication.

Specific information needs become the basis for orders and requests to collect information.

(List all available units that can be employed in the collection of required information)

Place an "X" under each unit that can acquire the specific information sought. Circle the "X" under the unit actually selected that will be assigned collection action.

CLASSIFICATION

Figure A-2. Standard collection plan format with sample entries.

| PIR AND IR | INDICATORS | SIR | COLLECTION AGENCIES | PLACE AND TIME TO REPORT | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | INSTRUCTIONS | | | | |
| List PIR and IR. Leave sufficient space to list indicators for each PIR and in IR column 2. | List Indicators that will satisfy each PIR. | Then, if necessary list specific information required to satisfy the indicator. Key requirements to NAI on the event template if possible. These requirements form the basis for specific orders and requests. | Place an "X" under each agency that can collect the required information. Circle the "X" when an agency has been selected and tasked. | Place may be a headquarters or unit.<br><br>Time may be specific, periodic, or as obtained. | Include means of reporting; for example, via spot report format.<br><br>Include established communications; for example, multichannel, FM, RATT, or state "by SOP" if SOP criteria apllies for responding to collection requirements. |
| | EXAMPLE | | | | |
| Where and in what strengths are threat forces? | Discovery trails within the AO. | Report increased boarder crossing VIC 5D47-5042 to Seine River. | | | |

Figure A-3. Instructions for filling out the major parts of a standard collection plan format.

## NONLINEAR BATTLEFIELD COLLECTION PLAN

The second format is designed to support nonlinear battlefield collection management requirements. Figures A-4 and A-5 support the explanation of the nonlinear battlefield collection plan. Since ARSOF are routinely deployed in nonlinear environments, this format is particularly suited to meet their collection management requirements.

The ARSOF SIO uses nonlinear battlefield collection plans and worksheets to manage and answer the volume of diverse PIR and IR generated in a nonlinear environment. Although detailed, the format –

- Simplifies collection management tasks.
- Can be filled out on the computer or by hand.
- Facilitates identifying collecting and reporting tasks during all phases of the collection management process.
- Requires only four steps to complete:
  - List the PIR and IR. Then assign alphanumeric letters to PIR and IR.
  - Determine potential indicators and prioritize those that effectively answer the PIR and IR. Any indicator that does not answer the PIR and IR is deleted.
  - Analyze the indicators and target characteristics to determine SIR. Then prioritize the SIR and determine the appropriate collection agencies.
  - Give the various collection agencies a prioritized SIR tasking list that is easy to read and understand.

### LIST AND PRIORITIZE PIR AND IR

The first step is to list and prioritize the PIR and IR. As in all collection plans, the nonlinear battlefield collection plan format is designed to assist the SIO in answering the commander's PIR. However, these PIR and IR are not immediately added to the collection plan. Instead, they are posted next to the plan and given numerical or alphabetical designators. Figure A-5 shows examples of prioritized nonlinear battlefield PIR and IR.

The most important PIR is assigned the number 1; the next, number 2; and so on. IR are given alphabetical designators and prioritized the same way as PIR. This allows the collection manager to continually add, revise, and reprioritize PIR and IR. Use these numbers or letters in the PIR and IR number column on the collection plan to reference specific PIR or IR.

### DETERMINE INDICATORS

The second step is to determine what activities or characteristics of the operational area will answer the PIR and IR. This procedure is called determining indicators. This is the most important step in the collection management process.

An indicator is any positive or negative evidence of threat activity or any characteristic of the operational area that points toward threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, or intentions. The ability to read indicators (including deception indicators) contributes to the success of friendly operations. This is because an analysis of all available indicators is the basis for recommendations to the commander for specific COAs.

Potential indicators are written down and analyzed to determine if they can answer any of the established PIR and IR. All the indicators that answer one or several PIR or IR are prioritized. Any indicator that does not answer a PIR or IR is deleted.

The resulting list of indicators forms the basis for collection tasks. By knowing what indicators satisfy PIR and IR – and the most likely methods and places of finding them – the collection manager can determine the specific collection tasks and assign them to available resources. The collection manager needs a thorough knowledge of the threat, the characteristics of the operational area, and the general capabilities of collection assets before he can translate the commander's PIR and IR into indicators. This includes a detailed knowledge of –

- The threat organization, equipment, and doctrine.
- The biographical data on major personalities.
- The present and past performance of units and organizations.
- Terrain and weather activities.
- Patterns of current operations.

| NONLINEAR BATTLEFIELD COLLECTION PLAN | | | | | | AGENCIES and AGENCY COLLECTION PRIORITY | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SIR NO. | TIME | | SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS | PIR/IR NO. | SIR PRI | GP ml DET | SOT-A (1) | SOT-A (2) | SOT-A (3) | CI TM | B930 | A93L | A934 | 4th POG | 96th CA | SOC J2 |
| | | NAI | | | | ALL | TWO | FIVE | SIX | RED-A GREEN-A | ALL | RED | GREEN | ALL | ALL | ALL |
| 1 | INDEF | ALL | REPT: location, quantity and type of unexplained firing in the area | 1,5 | 20 | | 3 * 5 | 3 * 5 | 3 * 5 | | | | | | 9 * 1 | |
| 2 | INDEF | ALL | REPT: any presence of mines, booby traps and obstacles etc., in the area | 1,5 | 21 | | | | | | | 8 * 1 | 8 * 2 | 8 * 3 | 10 * 4 | |
| 3 | INDEF | ALL | REPT: locations of suspected non-government trg sites and the approx No. of personnel the site can support | 1,5 B,C | 15 | | | | | | | 6 * 3 | 6 * 4 | 6 * 5 | | 3 * 1 |

Figure A-4. Nonlinear battlefield collection worksheet.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| PIR | 1. | Where and in what strengths are the insurgent forces? |
| | 2. | Will insurgent forces attack US forces; if so; where, when and in what strength? |
| | 3. | Where can the insurgent forces conduct main force operations; if so, when and in what strength? |
| | 4. | Where, how, and in what strength are insurgent forces air defense capable? |
| | 5. | Where are the supply and training bases of insurgent forces? |
| IR | A. | How strong is popular support for the insurgents? |
| | B. | How, where, and by whom will the insurgent forces be resupplied. |
| | C. | Where are the infiltration and exfiltration routes? |
| | D. | What are the names and number of internal and external organizations supporting the insurgent forces? |
| | E. | When will third world countries react to US forces conducting military operations; if so, how? |

**Figure A-5. Examples of prioritized nonlinear battlefield collection PIR and IR.**

- Degree of popular support.

The collection manager must also understand the circumstances and support required for a particular indicator to occur. These include but are not limited to a detailed knowledge of the–

- Amount and availability of support required for a particular action or activity.
- Normal doctrinal activity or disposition.
- Activity required for a particular COA.
- Actions within threat capabilities and limitations.
- Characteristics of foreign commanders.
- Possible or practicable operations.
- Collection characteristics.
- Identification of target characteristics.

Established patterns can also be used to determine indicators. Often these existing patterns link a particular event or activity to probable COA. Sometimes, they can even be used to determine when and where that activity might occur. Patterns help to decide–

- Where to look.
- When to look.
- What to look for.

## INDICATOR WORKSHEET INSTRUCTIONS

Figure A-6 is a nonlinear battlefield indicator worksheet to help determine indicators. Instructions for using this worksheet follow:

- IND NO. This is used as a reference point. Each line is labeled in numerical order to orient personnel to indicators on the worksheet.
- INDICATOR. All potential indicators are written and analyzed to determine if they answer any PIR or IR.

- PIR/IR NO. The ASPS records the PIR and IR number or letter that can be answered by the corresponding indicator. For example, indicator 1 may provide information regarding PIR 1 and 5 and IR A, B, and C. The collection manager would insert the numbers 1 and 5 and the letters A, B, and C in the appropriate block. When indicators fail to support any PIR or IR, they are deleted and replaced by another potential indicator.

- INDICATOR PRIORITY. In this column each indicator is prioritized. The collection manager determines which indicator answers the most important PIR and IR and rates them accordingly. Examples:

| IND NO. | INDICATOR | PIR/IR NO | INDICATOR PRIORITY |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Locations of threat base camps | 1,5,A,B,C | 17 |
| 2 | Locations of threat cache sites | 1,2,5,B,C | 2 |
| 3 | Degree of insurgent popular support | 1,2,A,B,D,E | 3 |
| 4 | Establishment of new unexplained agricultural areas, or recently cleared fields | 1,3,5,B | 12 |
| 5 | Size and location of insurgent forces | 1,2,3,5,B | 1 |
| 6 | Unexplained weapons firing or explosions in the country side | 1,5 | 20 |
| 7 | Threat reconnaissance activity | 2,C | 27 |
| 8 | Attitude of local populace toward government and insurgent forces | 1,2,A,B | 5 |
| 9 | Threat propaganda efforts | 2,A,D,E | 26 |
| 10 | Disappearance of populace from previously populated areas | 1,2 | 9 |
| 11 | Avoidance of certain areas by the populace | 1,2 | 10 |
| 12 | Equipment found in insurgent cache sites | 1,3,4,5, A,B,C,D | 11 |
| 13 | Unexplained trails | 1,5,C | 19 |
| 14 | Insurgent use of air defense weapons or small arms at aircraft | 1,4 | 13 |
| 15 | Significant changes in insurgent tactics, techniques, or procedures | 2,3,A,D | 25 |
| 16 | Sabotage attempts against supply depots, ammo supply points, ammo facilities, and lines of communication | 1,2 | 8 |
| 17 | Significant movement of civilians and refugees | 1,A,C | 22 |
| 18 | Location and type of insurgent indirect fire | | |
| 19 | Names and number of internal organizations supporting insurgents | 1,5,A,B,D | 18 |
| 20 | Names and number of external organizations supporting insurgents | 1,5,A,B,D,E | 15 |
| 21 | Failure of police or information nets to report correctly | A,D | 32 |
| 22 | Attacks on communications sites | | |
| 23 | Damage to roads, airfields, and helipads in the operational area | 1,3 | 14 |

**Figure A-6. Nonlinear battlefield indicator worksheet.**

- Indicator 1 answers PIR 1 and 5 and IR A, B and C.
- Indicator 2 answers PIR 1, 2, and 5 and IR B and C.
- Indicator 3 answers PIR 1 and 2 and IR, A, B, D, and E.

Therefore, indicator 1 would be the 17th priority, number 2 the 2d, and number 3 the 3d priority.

### DETERMINE SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

In the third step, the ASPS analyzes the prioritized indicators and target characteristics to determine SIR. SIR are the basic questions that need to be answered to confirm or deny the existence of an indicator.

For example, the first PIR is where and in what strength there are insurgent forces. (See Figure A-5.) Some indicators that may assist in answering this requirement are—

- The location of enemy base camps.
- The establishment of new and unexplained agricultural areas or recently cleared fields.
- The size and location of insurgent forces.
- Any unexplained firing or explosions in the countryside.

All the above indicators can assist in answering the first PIR.

Then these indicators are analyzed to develop SIR. Some examples of SIR for indicator 1—Where are enemy base camps located—could be:

- Report the location, quantity, and type of unexplained firing in the area.
- Report any presence of mines, booby traps, and obstacles in the area.

The accurate determination of indicators and SIR is essential for effective collection management. Knowing where, when, and what to look for helps in selecting what to look with.

This process maximizes the use of limited collection assets against an array of collection targets. After indicators and SIR are prepared, the ASPS passes them to the CM&D section for collection action.

The collection manager prioritizes the SIR and tasks appropriate sources to answer them. The list of taskings for each source should also be prioritized. All of this can be completed in step 3.

The nonlinear battlefield collection plan format provides the collection manager with an effective format to organize and monitor this task.

### COLLECTION PLAN INSTRUCTIONS

Figure A-7 is a sample of a completed nonlinear battlefield collection plan format. Instructions for using this format follow:

- SIR NO. Use as a reference point. Label each line numerically to orientate personnel to SIR on the worksheet.
- TIME. List the start and stop times the corresponding SIR should confirm or deny a particular SIR. (These SIR may be extremely time sensitive, such as reporting a reaction force leaving its post to reinforce a SOF target; or the indicator may remain in effect throughout the entire operation, such as reporting the avoidance of a specified area by the local populace. In this case, list indefinite.)
- NAI. NAI can be shown vertically or horizontally on the chart. The NAI listed in the vertical NAI column indicates where the SIR should be observed. An NAI may pertain to one or more SIR or vice versa. List the NAIs that each particular source is responsible for in the horizontal NAI column. An ODA may be responsible for only one NAI, while a SOT-A may monitor several NAIs.
- SIR. In this column the CM&D section lists the SIR they believe will confirm or deny particular indicators and which help to answer one or more PIR and IR. It is not uncommon to develop several SIR from one indicator or for each SIR to provide information on several indicators and PIR and IR.
- PIR/IR NO. Here, members of the CM&D section record the PIR and IR numbers or letters that can be answered by the corresponding SIR.


LINEAR BATTLEFIELD COLLECTION PLAN UNIT: 1 BN 9SFG(A)
AGENCIES AND AGENCY COLLECTION PRIORITY
SIR NO.
TIME
NAI
SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
PIR/ IR NO
SIR PRI
GRP M DET
SOT-A (1)
SOT-A (2)
SOT-A (3)
CITM
B930
A931
A933
A934
4th POG
96th CA
TASO-SC ISE
SOC J2
HN police
HN 1st BDE
HN 2d BDE
Other HN Agencies
ALL
TWO
FIVE
SIX
RED-A Green-A
RED
BLACK
GREEN
BLACK GREEN
1 INDEF ALL Report location, quantity and type of unexplained firing in the area 20
2 INDEF ALL Report any presence of mines, booby traps and obstacles etc, in the area 1,5 21
3 INDEF ALL Report locations of suspected nongovernment training sites and the approx No. of personnel the site can support 1,5,B,C 15
4 INDEF ALL Report sighting of groups of strangers in and around the area 1,2,5,B,C 5
5 INDEF ALL Report areas showing significant signs of activity but few if any inhabitants 1,5 22
6 INDEF ALL Report the number, size, equipment, composition, route and time of suspected insurgents in the area 1,3,4[illegible] B,C 10
7 INDEF ALL Report insurgent recruitment tactics, techniques and procedures and their effectiveness 1,A,B,D 23
8 INDEF ALL Report information obtained from EPWs and civilians on insurgent locations, probable COAs, activities, strengths and cache sites 1,2,3,4,5, A,B,C,D 1
9 INDEF ALL Report the establishment of new and unexplained agricultural areas or recently cleared fields 1,3,5,B 11
10 INDEF ALL Report location and contents of confirmed or suspected cache sites 1,3,4,5, A,B,C,D 9
11 INDEF ALL Report signs of suspected digging or areas of dead or unusual foliage 1,5,B 18
12 INDEF ALL Report latenight or otherwise unusual moving of boxes/equipment into a residence or business 1,5,B 19
13 INDEF ALL Report large numbers of personnel visiting a particular residence 1,5,B,D 17
14 INDEF ALL Report connections with political parties, labor unions, schools, churches, etc. 5,A,B,C,D 26
15 INDEF ALL Report increased domestic/foreign media coverage of insurgent activities and insurgent sensitivities to public attitudes and reactions 1,5,A,D,E 14
16 INDEF ALL Report propaganda effort's (indicate, type, targets, location, time encountered, theme and effectiveness) 1,2,3,D,E 2
17 INDEF ALL Report the use of new words, phrases or symbols in the area 1,2,4,A,D 4
18 INDEF ALL Report sabotage attempts against supply depots, ASPs, commo facilities or LOCs 1,2 8
19 INDEF ALL Rpt location and contents of thefts that could support activities (bulk food, clothing boots, weapons and road taxes) 1,2,B 7
20 INDEF ALL Rpt significant movements of civilians & refugees, to include the avoidance of certain areas 1,2,5,A 6
21 INDEF ALL Report the use of air defense weapons or small arms fire at aircraft to include the type and locations of weapon 1,4,D 13
22 INDEF ALL Rpt damage to roads, airfields & other structures 1,3 12
23 INDEF ALL Report unexplained trails or increased activity on established roads, trails, rivers or streams 1,5,B,C 16
24 INDEF ALL Report unusual, public gatherings, strikes, riots or demonstrations A 28
25 INDEF ALL Rpt any significant changes in tactics, techniques, or procedures 2,3,A,D 24
26 INDEF ALL Report any confirmed or suspected recon activity 2,C 25
27 INDEF ALL Rpt lack of cooperation from local authorities A,D 27
28 INDEF ALL Rpt any radio traffic or EW activity [illegible] 3
HN AF

Figure A-7. Sample of a completed nonlinear battlefield collection plan format.

- SIR PRIORITY. In this column each SIR is prioritized. The collection manager determines which SIRs answer the most important PIR and IR and rates them accordingly.

- AGENCIES AND AGENCY COLLECTION PRIORITY. Listed across the top of this section are all organic and supporting collection agencies. In the block below them, their respective NAIs are listed.

Before a particular agency or unit is selected to collect on a SIR, the collection manager determines what assets are available and capable of collecting the information needed. This includes assets in organic, supporting, and higher collection agencies.

To do this, the collection manager needs to know the capabilities and availability of each available asset, such as—

- Frequency ranges for SOT-A team radios.
- Aircraft mission durations.
- Number of flights, mobility, linguistic capabilities.

This information is essential to determine which asset or agency is capable of collecting information to answer SIR. The DOD capabilities handbook has profiles of system capabilities. Host nation or HUMINT resources capabilities must be obtained from the parent organization. Figure A-8 shows a capability and requirement correlation chart.

After determining asset capability and availability, the collection manager places a mark (check or asterisk) in the small square in the lower left corner of the block that corresponds to the SIR that a particular agency or asset can answer. Next, he determines which agency or asset can best answer the SIR and prioritizes them. To do this, he considers the location, range, and threat to the collector, as well as other mission requirements. This step is shown on the worksheet by placing the appropriate number in the small square in the right corner of the block.

Example: (Refer to Figure A-7.) The CM&D section determines that the CI team, the CA unit, and host-nation police are capable of answering SIR #4—Report sightings of groups of strangers in and around the operational area.

- The collection manager places a mark (check or asterisk) in the square located in the lower left corner of the block that corresponds to that particular SIR and each of the three capable agencies.

- After further consideration he determines that the host-nation police can best answer the SIR, followed by the CA unit, then the CI team. He then puts the number 1 in the square located in the lower right corner of the block that corresponds to SIR #4 and the host-nation police, the number 2 in the CA unit block, and the number 3 in the CI team block.

## TASKING LIST

In the final step the CM&D section prepares a prioritized tasking list for each collection agency that is easy to understand. To do this, he reviews the SIR each agency is tasked to answer and then prioritizes them according to the SIR priority column.

Example: (Refer to Figure A-7).

- The SOT-A (1) is tasked with SIR #1, 6, and 28.
- IR #1 has an SIR priority of 20, SIR #6 a priority of 10, and SIR #28 a priority of 3.

This means the collection manager must provide the SOT-A (1) with a prioritized tasking list as follows:

1-Report time, frequency, and location of any insurgent radio traffic or EW activity (SIR #28).

2-The number, size, equipment, composition, route, and time of suspected insurgent patrols in the area (SIR #6).

3-The location, quantity, and type of unexplained firings in the area (SIR #1).

## OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The only exception to this procedure is when the collection manager tasks interrogators. Interrogators need verbatim PIR and IR. This is in addition to the indicators or SIR containing specific intelligence or combat information requirements.

Interrogators need this information because their primary source of information and intelligence comes from people who have different levels of understanding and background. This means interrogators must tailor their questions so that the subject can understand what is being asked. Often, interrogators must ask a subject several different questions, all seemingly unrelated to the other, before the subject understands and can answer the question.

Example: CM&D tasks interrogators to ". . . report instances of dead foliage." This SIR is specific. If the subject is not native to the area, he may not have noticed dead foliage. However, if the interrogator knows the larger PIR is to ". . . locate insurgent supply caches . . ." he can rephrase or ask different questions to secure this information. By knowing the larger question, the interrogator is able to quickly secure the information or intelligence the commander needs and spot report it back immediately.

# APPENDIX B

# AREA STUDY OUTLINE FORMAT

This appendix contains an outline format for an area study. The format, shown at Figure B-1, provides a systematic means for compiling and retaining essential information to support ARSOF operations. The basic outline is flexible to permit details of a given operational area. As time permits further study, the subjects should be subdivided and assigned to selected personnel to produce detailed analysis of specified AI.

CLASSIFICATION

COPY___OF___COPIES
UNIT
LOCATION
DATE

AREA STUDY OF JSOA_____

1. PURPOSE AND LIMITING FACTORS.

   a. Purpose. Delineate the area being studied.

   b. Mission. State the mission the area study supports.

   c. Limiting factors. Identify factors that limit the completeness or accuracy of the area study.

2. GEOGRAPHY, HYDROGRAPHY, AND CLIMATE. Divide the operational area into its various definable subdivisions and analyze each subdivision as follows:

   a. Areas and dimensions.

   b. Strategic locations.

      (1) Neighboring countries and boundaries.

      (2) Natural defenses, including frontiers.

      (3) Points of entry and strategic routes.

CLASSIFICATION

**Figure B-1. Outline for a general area study.**

CLASSIFICATION

c. Climate. Note variations from the norm and the months in which they occur. Note any extremes in climate that would affect operations.

(1) Temperature.

(2) Rainfall and snow.

(3) Wind and visibility.

(4) Light data. Include beginning morning nautical twilight (BMNT); ending evening nautical twilight (EENT); percent of illumination, sunrise, sunset, moonrise, and moonset.

(5) Seasonal effect of the weather on terrain and visibility.

d. Relief.

(1) General direction of mountain ranges or ridge lines and whether hills and ridges are dissected.

(2) General degree of slope.

(3) Characteristics of valleys and plains.

(4) Natural routes for and natural obstacles to cross-country movement.

(5) Location of area suitable for guerrilla bases, units, and other installations.

(6) Potential LZs and DZs, and other reception sites.

e. Land use. Note any peculiarities, especially in the following;

(1) Former heavily forested areas subjected to widespread cutting or dissected bypaths and roads. Also note the reverse, pastureland, or wasteland that has been reforested.

(2) Former wasteland or pastureland that has been resettled and cultivated and is now being farmed. Also note the reverse: Former rural countryside that has been depopulated and allowed to return to wasteland.

CLASSIFICATION

**Figure B-1. Outline for a general area study (continued).**

CLASSIFICATION

(3) Former swampland or marshland that has been drained; former desert or wasteland now irrigated and cultivated; and lakes created by dams.

f. Drainage (general pattern).

(1) Main rivers, direction of flow.

(2) Characteristics of rivers and streams (include widths, currents, banks, depths, kinds of bottoms, and obstacles).

(3) Seasonal variations, such as dry beds and flash floods.

(4) Large lakes or areas with many ponds or swamps (include potential LZs for amphibious aircraft).

g. Coast. Examine primarily for infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply points.

(1) Tides and waves, to include winds and current.

(2) Beach footing and covered exit routes.

(3) Quiet coves and shallow inlets or estuaries.

(4) Surf types and current types.

h. Geological basics. Identify types of soil and rock formations (include areas for potential LZs for light aircraft).

i. Forests and other vegetation.

(1) Natural or cultivated.

(2) Types, characteristics, and significant variations from the norm at different elevations.

(3) Concealment and cover. Include density and seasonal variations.

j. Water. Note ground, surface, seasonal, and potability.

CLASSIFICATION

**Figure B-1. Outline for a general area study (continued).**

CLASSIFICATION

k. Subsistence.

(1) Seasonal or year-round.

(2) Cultivated. Include vegetables, grains, fruits, and nuts.

(3) Natural. Include berries, fruits, nuts, and herbs.

(4) Wildlife. Include animals, fish, and fowl.

3. POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS. Identify friendly and foreign political powers and analyze their capabilities, intentions, and activities that influence mission execution.

a. Hostile power.

(1) Number and status of nonnational personnel.

(2) Influence, organization, and mechanisms of control.

b. National government (indigenous).

(1) Government, international political orientation, and degree of popular support.

(2) Identifiable segments of the population with varying attitudes and probable behavior toward the United States, its allies, and the hostile power.

(3) National historical background.

(4) Foreign dependence or alliances.

(5) National capital and significant political, military, and economic concentrations.

c. Political parties.

(1) Leadership and organizational structure.

(2) Nationalistic origin and foreign ties (if a single dominant party exists).

CLASSIFICATION

**Figure B-1. Outline for a general area study (continued).**

CLASSIFICATION

(3) Major legal parties with their policies and goals.

(4) Illegal or underground parties and their policies and goals.

(5) Violent opposition factions within major political organizations.

d. Control and restrictions.

(1) Documentation.

(2) Rationing.

(3) Travel and movement restrictions.

(4) Blackouts and curfews.

(5) Political restrictions.

(6) Religious restrictions.

4. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS. Identify those economic factors that influence mission execution.

a. Technological standards.

b. Natural resources and degree of self-sufficiency.

c. Financial structure and dependence on foreign aid.

d. Monetary system.

(1) Value of money, rate of inflation.

(2) Wage scales.

(3) Currency controls.

e. Black market activities. Note the extent and effect of those activities.

CLASSIFICATION

**Figure B-1. Outline for a general area study (continued).**

CLASSIFICATION

f. Agriculture and domestic food supply.

g. Industry and level of production.

h. Manufacture and demand for consumer goods.

i. Foreign and domestic trade and facilities.

j. Fuels and power.

k. Telecommunications and radio systems.

l. Transportation adequacy by United States Standards.

(1) Railroads.

(2) Highways.

(3) Waterways.

(4) Commercial air installations.

m. Industry, utilities, agriculture, and transportation. Note the control and operation of each.

5. CIVIL POPULACE. Pay particular attention to those inhabitants in the operational area who have peculiarities and who vary considerably from the normal national way of life.

a. Total and density.

b. Basic racial stock and physical characteristics.

(1) Types, features, dress, and habits.

(2) Significant variations from the norm.

c. Ethnic and/or religious groups. Analyze these groups to determine if they are of sufficient size, cohesion, and power to constitute a dissident minority of some consequence.

CLASSIFICATION

**Figure B-1. Outline for a general area study (continued).**

CLASSIFICATION

(1) Location or concentration.

(2) Basis for discontent and motivation for change.

(3) Opposition to the majority or the political regime.

(4) Any external or foreign ties of significance.

d. Attitudes. Determine the attitudes of the populace toward the existing regime or hostile power, the resistance movement, and the United States and its allies.

e. Division between urban, rural, or nomadic groups.

(1) Large cities and population centers.

(2) Rural settlement patterns.

(3) Areas and movement patterns of nomads.

f. Standard of living and cultural (educational) levels.

(1) Extremes away from the national average.

(2) Class structure. Identify degree of established social stratification and percentage of populace in each class.

g. Health and medical standards.

(1) General health and well-being.

(2) Common diseases.

(3) Standard of public health.

(4) Medical facilities and personnel.

(5) Potable water supply.

CLASSIFICATION

**Figure B-1. Outline for a general area study (continued).**

CLASSIFICATION

(6) Sufficiency of medical supplies and equipment.

h. Traditions and customs (particularly taboos). Note wherever traditions and customs are so strong and established that they may influence an individual's actions or attitude even during a war situation.

6. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES. Identify friendly and hostile conventional military forces (army, navy, and air force) and internal security forces (including border guards) that can influence mission execution. Analyze nonnational or hostile forces, as well as national (indigenous) forces, using the subdivisions shown below.

a. Morale, discipline, and political reliability.

b. Personnel Strength.

c. Organization and basic deployment.

d. Uniforms and unit designations.

e. Ordinary and special insignia.

f. Overall control mechanism.

g. Chain of command and communication.

h. Leadership. Note officer and NCO corps.

i. Nonnational surveillance and control over indigenous security forces.

j. Training and doctrine.

k. Tactics. Note seasonal and terrain variations.

l. Equipment, transportation, and degree of mobility.

m. Logistics.

n. Effectiveness. Note any unusual capabilities or weaknesses.

CLASSIFICATION

**Figure B-1. Outline for a general area study (continued).**

CLASSIFICATION

o. Vulnerabilities in the internal security system.

p. Past and current reprisal actions.

q. Use and effectiveness of informers.

r. Influence on and relations with the local populace.

s. Psychological vulnerabilities.

t. Recent and current unit activities.

u. COIN activities and capabilities. Pay particular attention to reconnaissance units, special troops (airborne, mountain, ranger), rotary-wing or vertical-lift aviation units, CI units, and units having a mass NBC delivery capability.

v. Guard posts and wartime security coverage. Note the location of all known guard posts or expected wartime security coverage for all types of installations. Pay particular attention to security coverage along the main LOC (railroads, highways, and telecommunications lines) and along electrical power and POL lines.

w. Forced labor and detention camps. Note exact location and description of the physical arrangement (particularly the security arrangements).

x. Populace and resources control measures. Note locations, types, and effectiveness of internal security controls. Include checkpoints, identification cards, passports, and travel permits.

7. RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION. Identify the organizational elements and key personalities of the resistance organization. Note each group's attitude toward the United States, the hostile power, various elements of the civilian populace, and friendly political groups.

a. Guerrillas.

(1) Disposition, strength, and composition.

(2) Organization, armament, and equipment.

(3) Status of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.

CLASSIFICATION

**Figure B-1. Outline for a general area study (continued).**

CLASSIFICATION

(4) Operations to date.

(5) Cooperation and coordination between various existing groups.

(6) Motivation of the various groups and their receptivity.

(7) Quality of senior and subordinate leadership.

(8) General health.

b. Auxiliaries and the underground.

(1) Disposition, strength, and degree of organization.

(2) General effectiveness and type of support.

(3) Responsiveness to guerrilla or resistance leaders.

c. Logistics capability.

(1) Availability of food stocks and water. Include any restrictions for reasons of health.

(2) Agricultural capability.

(3) Type and availability of transportation of all categories.

(4) Types and location of civilian services available for manufacture and repair of equipment and clothing.

(5) Medical facilities to include personnel, medical supplies, and equipment.

(6) Enemy supply sources accessible to the resistance.

8. TARGETS. (The objective in target selection is to inflict maximum damage on the foreign power with minimum expenditures of soldiers and materiel. Initially, a guerrilla force may have limited operational capabilities to interdict or destroy foreign targets.)

a. Study the target area.

CLASSIFICATION

**Figure B-1. Outline for a general area study (continued).**

CLASSIFICATION

b. Identify and analyze points of attack.

c. List targets in order of priority by system and in accordance with mission requirements.

d. As appropriate, address both fixed and mobile (generic) targets.

9. EFFECTS OF CHARACTERISTICS. State conclusions reached through analysis of the facts developed in the previous paragraphs.

a. Effects on hostile COA.

b. Effects on friendly COA.

CLASSIFICATION

**Figure B-1. Outline for a general area study (continued).**

# APPENDIX C

# SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSION PLANNING FOLDER

The SOMPF consists of three parts: MTP, TIP, and POE. ARSOF units prepare SOMPFs when tasked by the theater CINC. The theater SOC prepares the transmittal documents and assembles the MTPs. The CINC mission guidance is the heart of the MTP. The CINC will task the Army component intelligence support agency and other appropriate intelligence agencies to produce the TIP.

The ARSOF unit assigned the mission will conduct an FA. The FA will determine if the target is a valid ARSOF target. The FA is reviewed by the theater SOC and the theater targeting board. Following review and approval of the FA, the theater targeting board tasks the MPA (through the theater SOC) to develop a POE.

## MISSION TASKING PACKET

The MTP consists of tasking and transmittal documents, target identification data, and CINC mission guidance. Figure C-1 shows the format for the MTP.

### SOF FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT

The FA is a target feasibility analysis conducted by SOF commanders on nominated SOF targets. The FA is used by the MPA to analyze the viability of the target. The purpose of the FA is to address the following questions:

- Is this a valid ARSOF mission?
- Is it within the command's capability, unilaterally or as a joint operation, to accomplish the mission within an acceptable degree of risk?

Figure C-2 shows the format for a SOF FA. Detailed planning and the selection of a preferred COA is reserved for the development of a POE should the FA indicate that the mission is viable. All existing shortfalls that would preclude development of the FA must be identified immediately. At a minimum, imagery, area study, maps, and OB are required to produce the FA. The OB must be updated prior to deployment. The process outlined in this format may be compressed during adaptive targeting.

## TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKET

The TIP is tailored for the particular SOF mission. Figure C-3 shows the format for SOF DA or SR missions. Figure C-4 shows the format for SOF FID or UW missions.

## PLAN OF EXECUTION FORMAT

The POE is a detailed plan of how the assigned SOF will carry out the validated mission assigned to them. The POE, in conjunction with mission rehearsals, is the end result of the mission planning process. POEs are also developed by the unit responsible for infiltration or exfiltration to and from the target area. Figures C-5 and C-6 show the formats for SOF POE.

SECTION I--TASKING AND TRANSMITTAL DOCUMENTS.

a. Joint force special operations command commander (JFSOCC) tasking.

b. Subordinate tasking from JFSOCC.

c. Coordinating instructions (DIRLAUTH authorization).

SECTION II--TARGET IDENTIFICATION DATA.

a. Name.

b. Basic encyclopedia (BE) number.

c. Mission number (if applicable).

d. Mission tasks.

e. Functional classification code.

f. Country.

g. JSOA coordinates (latitude [LAT], longitude [LONG], and universal transverse mercator [UTM]).

h. Geographic coordinates (LAT, LONG, and UTM).

i. General description and target significance.

SECTION III--CINC MISSION GUIDANCE (combatant commander's mission statement and objectives).

a. Mission statement.

b. Specific objectives.

c. Commander's guidance.

d. $C^2$.

SECTION IV--RECORD OF CHANGES.

SECTION V--RECORD OF DISTRIBUTION.

**Figure C-1. Format for an SOF MTP.**

SECTION I--MISSION

a. Target identification data.

b. Mission statement and commander's guidance.

SECTION II--COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT.

a. Feasibility as a target.

b. Probability of mission success.

c Recommendation.

SECTION III--ASSUMPTIONS.

SECTION IV--FACTORS AFFECTING COA.

a. Characteristics of the JSOA.

(1) Weather.

(2) Terrain.

(3) Other pertinent factors.

b. Situation.

c. Enemy situation.

(1) Composition.

(2) Disposition.

(3) Strength.

(a) Committed forces.

(b) Location of reinforcements and estimated reaction times.

(c) NBC capabilities.

(4) Significant enemy activity, intelligence, and CI capabilities.

(5) Peculiarities and weaknesses.

**Figure C-2. Format for an SOF FA.**

(6) Vulnerability to deception.

(7) Enemy capabilities.

(a) Defensive.

(b) Offensive.

(c) Intelligence and CI.

(8) Reaction and reinforcement.

(9) Security on target.

SECTION V--COA.

a. Identify COA.

b. Analyze COA.

c. Compare COA.

(1) Advantages.

(2) Disadvantages.

(3) Risks.

d. Recommended COA.

SECTION VI--INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS.

SECTION VII--SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS.

a. Personnel.

b. Logistics (including CSS).

c. Other.

SECTION VIII--INDIGENOUS SUPPORT.

**Figure C-2. Format for an SOF FA (continued).**

SECTION I--TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION.

a. Target identification data.

(1) BE #.

(2) Category.

(3) Geographic coordinates.

(4) UTM coordinates.

(5) Map sheet numbers.

b. Description and significance.

c. Detailed target description.

d. Target vulnerability assessment.

SECTION II--NATURAL ENVIRONMENT.

a. Geographic data (including terrain and hazards to movement).

b. Meteorological data (climatological overview, tables, including illumination data).

c. Hydrographic data (coastal and otherwise).

d. Target vulnerability assessment.

SECTION III--THREAT.

a. Ground forces (including border guards).

b. Paramilitary and indigenous forces (including intelligence, security, and police services).

c. Naval forces (including Coast Guard and Maritime Border Guard).

d. Air Forces.

e. Air Defense Forces (including radars, passive detectors, $C^3$).

**Figure C-3. TIP format for SOF DA or SR missions.**

f. EOB.

g. Space-based assets.

h. Other.

SECTION IV--DEMOGRAPHICS AND CULTURAL FEATURES.

a. Area population characteristics.

b. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition.

c. Social conditions.

d. Religious factors.

e. Political characteristics.

f. Economic conditions.

g. Miscellaneous (for example, currency, holidays, dress, customs).

SECTION V--LOC AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS.

a. Airfields.

b. Railways.

c. Roadways.

d. Waterways.

e. Ports.

f. POL.

g. Power grid.

h. Telecommunications.

i. Media (for example, print, radio, television).

**Figure C-3. TIP format for SOF DA or SR missions (continued).**

SECTION VI--INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION. Potential LZs, DZs, BLSs, and helicopter LZs.

SECTION VII--SURVIVAL, EVASION, RESISTANCE, ESCAPE, RECOVERY (SERER) AND SURVIVAL DATA.

a. Selected areas for evasion (SAFE) areas.

(1) Population.

(2) Characteristics and culture.

(3) Location.

(4) Approaches.

(5) Contact and recovery points.

(6) Security hazards.

(7) Concealment and cover.

b. Survival data.

(1) Food.

(2) Water.

(3) Shelter.

(4) Medical.

(a) Diseases.

(b) Plants and animals of medical importance.

SECTION VIII--UNIQUE INTELLIGENCE (mission specific requirements not covered above).

SECTION IX--INTELLIGENCE SHORTFALLS.

**Figure C-3. TIP format for SOF DA or SR missions (continued).**

APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY.

APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY.

APPENDIX C: IMAGERY.

APPENDIX D: MAPS AND CHARTS.

APPENDIX E: SCI (if applicable).

**Figure C-3. TIP format for SOF DA or SR missions (continued).**

SECTION I--OBJECTIVE AREA IDENTIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION.

a. Objective area (OA) identification data.

b. Description and significance.

SECTION II--NATURAL ENVIRONMENT.

a. Geographic data (including terrain, hazards to movement).

b. Meteorological data (climatological overview, tables, including illumination data).

c. Hydrographic data (for example, coastal, waterways, lakes).

d. Water sources (color-coded overlay).

SECTION III--THREAT.

a. Objective country (EOB).

(1) Summary (strategy, force disposition, threat to US personnel).

(2) Ground forces.

(3) Paramilitary, indigenous forces, internal security, and police.

(4) Naval forces (including Coast Guard and Maritime Border Guard).

(5) Air forces.

(6) Air defense forces (including aircraft, radars, passive detectors).

(7) EOB.

(8) Threat forces communication.

(9) EW.

(10) $C^3CM$.

(11) Weapons systems.

**Figure C-4. TIP format for SOF FID or UW missions.**

(12) Intelligence collection capability (air, sea, land and space-based).

(13) Uniform and equipment markings.

(14) NBC capability.

(15) NBC protection and decontamination.

(16) Special operations.

(17) PSYOP.

(18) Civil disturbance and riot control training.

(19) Government resistance potential.

(21) Support of regional insurgencies.

(22) Support of terrorists and guerrillas.

b. Opposition and resistance forces.

(1) Groups and forces.

(2) Military capabilities.

(3) Groups and forces communications.

(4) United States use of groups and forces.

(5) Threat to United States personnel and advisors.

(6) I&W.

SECTION IV--DEMOGRAPHICS, CULTURAL, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL FEATURES.

EEI MUST BE ANSWERED FOR BOTH OBJECTIVE COUNTRY AND OPPOSITION AND RESISTANCE FORCES. (EEI and OIR are joint terms. United States Army uses PIR and IR.)

a. Area population characteristics.

b. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition.

**Figure C-4. TIP format for SOF FID or UW missions (continued).**

c. Social conditions.

d. Religious factors.

e. Political characteristics.

f. Available labor force.

g. Customs (social, weapons, religion, cultural mores).

h. Medical capabilities.

i. Health and sanitation conditions.

j. Economic conditions.

k. Currency, holidays, dress.

SECTION V--LOC, INFORMATION, SYSTEMS, LOGISTICS.

a. Airfields.

b. Railways.

c. Roadways.

d. Waterways.

e. Ports.

f. POL.

g. Power grid.

h. Telecommunications.

i. Media (print, radio, television).

j. Exploitable civilian transportation.

k. Primary modes of transportation.

l. US provided materials and services.

**Figure C-4. TIP format for SOF FID or UW missions (continued).**

m. Stockpiles.

n. War-sustaining industries.

o. War-sustaining resupply.

SECTION VI--INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION. Potential LZs, DZs, BLSs, and helicopter LZs.

SECTION VII-FID AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

(EEI MUST BE ANSWERED FOR BOTH OBJECTIVE COUNTRY AND OPPOSITION AND RESISTANCE FORCES.)

a. Military assistance provided.

b. Foreign personnel (noncombatants).

c. Foreign military material.

d. Deployments of foreign personnel and equipment.

e. Foreign contractors services and construction.

f. US support.

SECTION VIII--UNIQUE INTELLIGENCE (mission-specific requirements not covered above).

SECTION IX--INTELLIGENCE SHORTFALLS.

APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY.

APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY.

APPENDIX C: IMAGERY.

APPENDIX D: MAPS AND CHARTS.

APPENDIX E: SCI (if applicable).

**Figure C-4. TIP format for SOF FID or UW missions (continued).**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Place

Headquarters

Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.

1. References:

(a) Maps and charts.

(b) Other pertinent documents.

SECTION I--MISSION.

SECTION II--THE SITUATION AND COAs.

a. Considerations affecting the possible COAs.

1. Characteristics of the JSOA.

(a) Military geography.

(1) Topography.

(2) Hydrography.

(3) Climate, weather, illumination data, etc.

(b) Transportation.

(c) Telecommunications.

(d) Politics.

(e) Economics.

(f) Sociology.

(g) Science and technology.

**Figure C-5. Format for an SOF POE.**

2. Relative combat power.

(a) Enemy.

(1) Strength.

(2) Composition.

(3) Location and disposition.

(4) Reinforcements.

(5) Logistics.

(6) Time and space factors.

(7) Combat efficiency.

(b) Friendly.

(1) Strength.

(2) Composition.

(3) Location and disposition.

(4) Reinforcements.

(5) Friendly force assistance.

(6) Logistics (including CSS).

(7) Time and space factors.

(8) Combat efficiency.

3. Assumptions.

b. Analysis of enemy capabilities.

c. Comparison of friendly COAs.

**Figure C-5. Format for an SOF POE (continued).**

(1) Statement of COAs.

(2) Comparison of COAs.

d. Decision (recommended COA)--mission profile.

(1) Method and location of infiltration.

(2) Movement to target area.

(3) Action at objective.

(4) Movement to and method of exfiltration.

SECTION III--SUPPORTING PLANS.

a. Overall schedule.

(1) Preparation.

(2) Rehearsal.

(3) Rendezvous.

(4) Transit.

(5) Execution.

(6) Recovery.

b. Logistics (including CSS).

c. Communications-electronics (C-E) procedures and equipment needs.

d. Deception.

e. Indigenous force support.

f. Time and distance charts.

g. Deployment.

**Figure C-5. Format for an SOF POE (continued).**

h. Weaponeering.

i. Target recuperability.

j. Resupply.

k. Exfiltration.

l. SERER.

m. Command relationships.

SECTION IV--LIMITING FACTORS.

a. Intelligence.

b. Weather.

c. Equipment.

d. Tactics.

e. Logistics (including CSS).

f. Personnel.

g. Training.

h. Supporting forces.

i. $C^3$.

j. Law of war, rules of engagement, US law and legal issues.

k. Other factors.

(Signed)

ANNEXES: (As required: by letter and title)

DISTRIBUTION: (According to policies and procedures of the issuing headquarters).

**Figure C-5. Format for an SOF POE (continued).**

SECTION I--MISSION.

a. Target identification data.

b. Mission statement.

SECTION II--MISSION SUMMARY.

a. Mission tasking.

b. Objective area.

c. General concept.

d. Summary of limiting factors.

e. Probability of mission success.

SECTION III--ASSUMPTIONS.

SECTION IV--THREAT ASSESSMENT.

SECTION V--NAVIGATION AND OVERALL MISSION PORTRAYAL.

a. Launch bases.

b. Intermediate staging bases.

NOTE: This will represent the entire infiltration or exfiltration route from launch to recovery on a suitable scale chart annotating all information deemed necessary by the planning cell for portrayal of the mission. This should include, but is not limited to, the following:

c. LZs, DZs, and BLSs.

d. Recovery bases.

e. Abort or emergency divert bases.

f. Air refueling tracks forward arming and refueling point (FARP) (aircraft and boats).

NOTE: Includes fixed, rotary-winged aircraft, surface ships, and submarines.)

**Figure C-6. Format for SOF POE--infiltration and exfiltration.**

g. Routes.

1. Ingress.

2. Egress.

3. Orbiting and holding.

4. Safe passage procedures.

5. Strip charts, navigation logs, global positioning satellite receivers, and other aids (as required).

SECTION VI--SUPPORTING PLANS.

a. Overall schedule of events.

b. Prelaunch requirements:

1. Updates to OBs.

2. EEIs.

3. Problem areas and key factors.

c. Infiltration or exfiltration platform factors and logistical considerations.

d. $C^3$.

1. Security preparations.

2. Departure procedures (overt or deception procedures).

3. Communication equipment requirements.

a. Infiltration or exfiltration platforms.

b. SOCC.

4. Specialized operational procedures and techniques.

5. Radio silence areas.

6. GO or NO-GO point.

**Figure C-6. Format for a SOF POE--infiltration and exfiltration (continued).**

7. Publish signal operation instructions (SOI).

8. Deception.

e. Emergency procedures.

1. Engine out capability.

2. Weather.

3. Faulty intelligence.

4. Infiltration or exfiltration platforms abort procedures.

a. Late departure procedures.

b. Maintenance problems.

c. Battle damage.

d. Platform destruction.

e. Bump plan.

5. Drop or other fuel-related malfunctions.

6. Lost communications procedures.

7. Mission abort procedures.

f. Evasion plan of action.

1. Crew responsibilities.

2. Immediate actions upon sinking, ditching, or bailout.

3. Evasion movement.

4. SAFE area intelligence descriptions (SAID).

5. SAFE.

**Figure C-6. Format for a SOF POE--infiltration and exfiltration (continued).**

6. Evasion team communications.

7. Search and rescue (SAR) contact procedures.

SECTION VII--LIMITING FACTORS.

a. Intelligence.

b. Weather.

c. Equipment.

d. Munitions.

e. Tactics.

f. Logistics (including CSS).

g. Personnel.

h. Training.

i. Supporting forces.

j. Rules of engagement and legal issues.

SECTION VIII--SOA, SURFACE SHIP AND SUBMARINE REQUIREMENTS FROM ARSOF AND NAVSOF TO CONDUCT INITIAL ASSESSMENT.

a. Target coordinates.

b. Maximum and minimum distances the LZs or DZs can be from the target.

c. Timeframe in OPLAN or CONPLAN scenario (for example, Pre-D-Day or D + XX).

d. Desired launch and recovery bases.

e. Type of delivery and recovery required (for example, jump, land, fast rope, seal delivery vehicle [SDV] or zodiac) and platform preferred.

f. Number of personnel to be transferred and approximate weight per person.

**Figure C-6. Format for a SOF POE--infiltration and exfiltration (continued).**

g. Approximate size and weight of additional equipment.

h. Assumptions made during customer's FA and POE.

i. Desired time over target.

j. Resupply and/or exfiltration requirements.

NOTE: Some of the information may not be readily available. Information onhand will normally suffice to conduct the POE. However, all efforts should be made to obtain the above information and incorporate it into the POE.

**Figure C-6. Format for a SOF POE--infiltration and exfiltration (continued).**

# APPENDIX D

# TARGET ANALYSIS PROCESS

This appendix explains CARVER, which is an SOF term. CARVER is used by ARSOF SIOs and operational personnel throughout the ARSOF targeting and mission planning process to assess mission, validity, and requirements. It is also used in technical appreciation and target analysis. This appendix provides a step-by-step example of how to use CARVER.

## CRITICALITY, ACCESSIBILITY, RECUPERABILITY, VULNERABILITY, EFFECT, AND RECOGNIZABILITY FACTORS

The CARVER selection factors assist in selecting the best targets or components to attack. As the factors are considered, they are given a numerical value. This value represents the desirability of attacking the target. The values are then placed in a decision matrix. After CARVER values for each target or component are assigned, the sum of the values indicate the highest value target or component to be attacked within the limits of the statement of requirements and commander's intent.

### CRITICALITY

Criticality means target value. This is the primary consideration in targeting. A target is critical when its destruction or damage has a significant impact on military, political, or economic operations.

Targets within a system must be considered in relation to other elements of the target system. The value of a target will change as the situation develops, requiring the use of the time-sensitive methods which respond to changing situations. For example, when one has few locomotives, railroad bridges may be less critical as targets; however, safeguarding bridges may be critical to maneuvering conventional forces which require use of such bridges. Criticality depends on several factors:

- Time: How rapidly will the impact of the target attack affect operations?
- Quality: What percentage of output, production, or service will be curtailed by target damage?
- Surrogates: What will be the effect on the output, production, and service?
- Relativity: How many targets are there? What are their positions? How is their relative value determined? What will be effected in the system or complex "stream"?

Table D-1 shows how criticality values are assigned on CARVER matrixes.

**Table D-1. Assigning criticality values.**

| CRITERIA | SCALE |
|---|---|
| Immediate halt in output, production, or service; target cannot function without it | 9-10 |
| Halt within 1 day, or 66% curtailment in output, production, or service | 7-8 |
| Halt within 1 week, or 33% curtailment in output, production, or service | 5-6 |
| Halt within 10 days, or 10% curtailment in output, production, or service | 3-4 |
| No significant effect on output, production, or service | 1-2 |

### ACCESSIBILITY

A target is accessible when an operational element can reach the target with sufficient personnel and equipment to accomplish its mission. A target can be accessible even if it requires the assistance of knowledgeable insiders. This assessment entails identifying and studying critical paths that the operational element must take to achieve its objectives, and measuring those things that aid or impede access. SOF must not only be able to reach the target but must also remain there for an extended period. The four basic steps identifying accessiblity are—

- Infiltration from the staging base to the target area.

- Movement from the point of entry to the target or objective.
- Movement to the target's critical element.
- Exfiltration.

Factors considered when evaluating accessibility include but are not limited to–

- Active and passive early warning systems.
- Swimmer detection devices.
- Air defense capabilities within the target area.
- Road and rail transportation systems.
- Type of terrain and its use.
- Concealment and cover.
- Population density.
- Other natural or synthetic obstacles and barriers.
- Current and climatic weather conditions.

The analysis along each critical path to the target should measure the time it would take for the action element to bypass, neutralize, or penetrate barriers and obstacles along the way. Accessibility is measured in terms of relative ease or difficulty of movement for the operational element and the likelihood of detection. The use of standoff weapons should always be considered in such evaluations. Table D-2 shows how accessibility values are assigned on CARVER matrixes.

**Table D-2. Assigning accessibility values.**

| CRITERIA | SCALE |
|---|---|
| Easily accessible, standoff weapons can be employed | 9-10 |
| Inside a perimeter fence but outdoors | 7-8 |
| Inside a building but on ground floor | 5-6 |
| Inside a building but on second floor or in basement; climbing or lowering required | 3-4 |
| Not accessible or inaccessible without extreme difficulty | 1-2 |

## RECUPERABILITY

A target's recuperability is measured in time; that is, how long will it take to replace, repair, or bypass the destruction of or damage to the target? Recuperability varies with the sources and type of targeted components and the availability of spare parts availability. Factors which should be considered when assessing recuperability include, but are not limited to, the availability of–

- Onhand equipment such as railroad cranes, dry docks, and cannibalization.
- Restoration and substitution through redundancies.
- Onhand spares.
- Equivalent OB equipment sets that back up critical equipment or components, and the effects of economic embargoes and labor unrest.

Table D-3 shows how recuperability values are assigned on CARVER matrixes.

**Table D-3. Assigning recuperability values.**

| CRITERIA | SCALE |
|---|---|
| Replacement, repair, or substitution requires 1 month or more | 9-10 |
| Replacement, repair, or substitution requires 1 week to 1 month | 7-8 |
| Replacement, repair, or substitution requires 72 hours to 1 week | 5-6 |
| Replacement, repair, or substitution requires 24 to 72 hours | 3-4 |
| Same day replacement, repair, or substitution | 1-2 |

## VULNERABILITY

A target is vulnerable if the operational element has the means and expertise to successfully attack the target. When determining the vulnerability of a target, the scale of the critical component needs to be compared with the capability of the attacking element to destroy or damage it. In general, the attacking element may tend to–

- Choose special components.
- Do permanent damage.
- Prevent or inhibit cannibalization.
- Maximize effects through the use of onsite materials.
- Cause the target to self-destruct.

Specifically, vulnerability depends on–

- The nature and construction of the target.
- The amount of damage required.
- The assets available; for example, personnel, expertise, motivation, weapons, explosives, and equipment.

Table D-4 shows how vulnerability values are assigned on CARVER matrixes.

**Table D-4. Assigning vulnerability values.**

| CRITERIA | SCALE |
|---|---|
| Vulnerable to long-range laser target designation, small arms fire, or charges of 5 pounds or less | 9-10 |
| Vulnerable to light antiarmor weapons fire or charges of 5 to 10 pounds | 7-8 |
| Vulnerable to medium antiarmor weapons fire, bulk charges of 10 to 30 pounds, or very careful placement of smaller charges | 5-6 |
| Vulnerable to heavy antiarmor fire, bulk charges of 30 to 50 pounds, or requires special weapons | 3-4 |
| Invulnerable to all but the most extreme targeting measures | 1-2 |

## EFFECT

The effect of a target attack is a measure of possible military, political, economic, psychological, and sociological impacts at the target and beyond. This is closely related to the measure of target criticality. The type and magnitude of given effects desired will help planners select targets and target components for attack. Effect in this context addresses all significant effects, whether desired or not, that may result once the selected target component is attacked. Traditionally, this element has addressed the effect on the local population, but now there are broader considerations. Effect is frequently neutral at the tactical (ODA) level.

For example, the primary effect of the destruction of two adjacent long-range radar sites in an early warning system may be to open a hole in the system that is of sufficient size and duration to permit the attacker to launch a successful air or missile nuclear strike against the defender. Effects can also include–

- The triggering of countermeasures.
- Support or negation of PSYOP themes.
- Unemployment.
- Reprisals against the civilian populace.
- Collateral damage to other targets.

Possible effects can be speculative and should be labelled as such. Effects of the same attack may be quite different at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. For example, the destruction of a substation may not affect local power supply but cuts off all power to an adjacent region. Table D-5 shows how effect values are assigned on CARVER matrixes.

**Table D-5. Assigning effect values.**

| CRITERIA | SCALE |
|---|---|
| Overwhelmingly positive effects; no significant negative effects | 9-10 |
| Moderately positive effects; few significant negative effects | 7-8 |
| No significant effects; neutral | 5-6 |
| Moderately negative effects; few significant positive effects | 3-4 |
| Overwhelmingly negative effects; no significant positive effects | 1-2 |

## RECOGNIZABILITY

A target's recognizability is the degree to which it can be recognized by an operational element and/or intelligence collection and reconnaissance assets under varying conditions. Weather has an obvious and significant impact on visibility. Rain, snow, and ground fog may obscure observation. Road segments with sparse vegetation and adjacent high ground provide excellent conditions for good observation. Distance, light, and season must also be considered.

Other factors which influence recognizability include the size and complexity of the target, the existence of distinctive target signatures, the presence of masking or camouflage, and the technical sophistication and training

of the attackers. Table D-6 shows how recognizability values are assigned on CARVER matrixes.

**Table D-6. Assigning recognizability values.**

| CRITERIA | SCALE |
|---|---|
| The target is clearly recognizable under all conditions and from a distance; it requires little or no training for recognition | 9-10 |
| The target is easily recognizable at small-arms range and requires a small amount of training for recognition | 7-8 |
| The target is difficult to recognize at night or in bad weather, or might be confused with other targets or target components; it requires some training for recognition | 5-6 |
| The target is difficult to recognize at night or in bad weather, even within small-arms range; it is easily confused with other targets or components, it requires extensive training for recognition | 3-4 |
| The target cannot be recognized under any conditions, except by experts | 1-2 |

## CARVER MATRIX

These CARVER factors and their assigned values are used to construct a CARVER matrix. This is a tool for rating the desirability of potential targets and wisely allocating attack resources.

To construct the matrix, list the potential targets in the left column. For strategic level analysis, list the enemy's systems or subsystems (electric power supply, rail system). For tactical level analysis, list the complexes or components of the subsystems or complexes selected for attack by your higher headquarters. (Figure D-1 shows a sample matrix for a bulk electric power supply facility.)

As each potential target is evaluated for each CARVER factor, enter the appropriate value into the matrix. Once all the potential targets have been evaluated, add the values for each potential target. The sums represent the relative desirability of each potential target; this constitutes a prioritized list of targets. Attack those targets with the highest totals first.

If additional men and/or munitions are available, allocate these resources to the remaining potential targets in descending numerical order. This allocation scheme will maximize the use of limited resources. The SIO can use the CARVER matrix to present operation planners with a variety of attack options. With the matrix he can discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each COA against the target. Having arrived at conclusions through the rigorous evaluation process, the SIO can comfortably defend his choices.

## SITE RECONNAISSANCE

During target systems analysis, it is advantageous (in a permissive environment) to have a reconnaissance element perform a site survey. This reconnaissance can take place at the specific target site or at a similar site in a more accessible location.

Preparation for reconnaissance and analysis of an industrial establishment or other technically sophisticated complex is one of the more difficult missions for the ARSOF SIO. Reconnaissance could be done in support of DA missions or to assist a host nation to defend a potential target in a FID environment. Target analysis is a cooperative effort between the operational element and intelligence personnel. This analysis seeks to answer PIR, IR, and SIR in the categories of CARVER.

Target analysis is the responsibility of the SIO, but a reconnaissance team can often be used to answer SIR that cannot be satisfied by any other means. Preparation for a site reconnaissance requires review and understanding of the following process. Site reconnaissance—

- Can be overt, covert, or clandestine.
- Can be conducted as part of a larger area assessment or a distinct mission activity.

| BULK ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| POTENTIAL TARGETS | C | A | R | V | E | R | TOTAL |
| FUEL TANKS | 8 | 9 | 3 | 8 | 5 | 6 | 41 |
| FUEL PUMPS | 8 | 6 | 2 | 10 | 5 | 3 | 34 |
| BOILERS | 6 | 2 | 10 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 31 |
| TURBINES | 8 | 6 | 10 | 7 | 5 | 9 | 45 |
| GENERATORS | 4 | 6 | 10 | 7 | 5 | 9 | 41 |
| CONDENSERS | 8 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 34 |
| FEED PUMPS | 3 | 8 | 5 | 8 | 5 | 6 | 33 |
| CIR. WATER PUMPS | 3 | 8 | 5 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 33 |
| GENERATOR STEP UP TRANSFORMER | 10 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 5 | 9 | 53 |

**Figure D-1. Completed CARVER matrix.**

- Can take place across the operational continuum.
- Is often more than a traditional reconnaissance and less than a full-scale analysis. Comprised of four cyclic steps.

### SIO AND RECONNAISSANCE TEAM REVIEW

The first step is a joint SIO and reconnaissance team review of the commander's guidance and stated requirements. This sets out what is to be accomplished regarding the target. In a FID environment, this includes an evaluation of the threat to the target.

### GATHER, ORGANIZE, AND EVALUATE INFORMATION

The second step is to gather, organize, and evaluate available information about the target; and to identify gaps in the data. Maps, photographs, flow charts, blueprints, diagrams, and other data are provided by the SIO and are examined, as appropriate, in light of the mission and the PIR and IR.

An initial CARVER report and targeting folder that highlights gaps in the data may be prepared at this step. The folder is used to develop a detailed collection and reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.

### SURVEY THE TARGET

The third step is a survey of the target by the reconnaissance team. The team—

- Gathers information validating data gathered and conclusions drawn up to this step.
- Satisfies intelligence and information requirements.
- Gives the supported targeting analyst and/or operational element a "feel" for the target.

If the survey is overt and with the cooperation of personnel working at the site, the operational element follows these basic rules:

- Look for those things that would be important if the site had to be attacked in the future. Note layout, construction, location, and composition of key components, security, and communications.
- Dress neatly but not conspicuously.
- Find out what the key components of the site are likely to be by pre-visit research; check this against what you see or are told on the site. Note manufacturers and model numbers of key components. Find out which, if any, of these components are made by cast methods or are otherwise difficult to replace. Determine who the key personnel at the site are and what they do.
- Be conscious of where you are on site at all times in relation to key components; notice what type of machinery or equipment is in your immediate vicinity.
- Discern how the site is similar to other sites in its class. Note any significant differences.
- Take brief but good notes.
- Be polite and attentive when someone from the site is speaking. Direct questions, one at a time, to your host. Do not badger guides with persistent questions about subjects they are unsure about or do not want to discuss.
- Avoid making comments about perceived lax security.
- Do not wander away from the tour group or into restricted areas: such conduct will offend your host.
- Do not smoke where there is even a remote fire hazard or without the permission of your host.
- Ask for informational handouts, such as illustrated public relations literature, that provide technical information about the site. Be especially alert for flowcharts and layout diagrams.
- Do not volunteer any more information about yourself or your purpose than is necessary to accomplish your mission.
- Avoid immature discussions concerning sabotage or destruction of components onsite. Hosts are often concerned about security and, fearing widespread dissemination of their vulnerabilities, may prevent them from offering useful information or hosting return visits in the future.
- Get permission before taking any photographs.

### COMPLETE THE RECONNAISSANCE REPORT

The fourth step is to complete the reconnaissance report and transmit it to the SIO. The following are minimum recommended data requirements for a reconnaissance report prepared by a reconnaissance team:

- R&S plan employed.
- Site, system, or complex layout diagram with north arrow and scale.
- During the CARVER assessment, the operational element normally focuses on accessibility, vulnerability, and recognizability.
- Map coverage of 1:250,000, 1:50,000, and 1:25,000 extending out from the target and including significant installations and activities noted by the team that are inside the AO and AI.
- High-angle overhead, oblique overhead, and ground photography of the target with annotations of installations, activities, and differences observed by the operational element.
- Site communications and electronics data can be gathered by an attached SOT-A.
- Locations of the nearest fixed-wing capable airstrip and fixed-wing capable instrumented airstrip; ground distances from each of the above airstrips to the target; and the nearest DZs, LZs, and BLSs.
- Summary of local human and material resources available to support special operations.
- List of sources used.

## SITE RECONNAISSANCE TRAINING

Since target analysis is the responsibility of the SIO, the SIO trains reconnaissance teams or surrogates in technical appreciation and CARVER analysis. When training, consider the following:

- Know the characteristics and lowest common denominators of the type target being surveyed. This is a strong base for assessing vulnerabilities.
- It is best to get verification from at least two different sources for every critical fact.
- It is important to know the separate capabilities of the attacking and defending forces.
- When doing a map or sketch reconnaissance of the target and its environment, it is helpful to inventory the area in a clockwise fashion, starting at the farthest point considered and moving in circles of decreasing size to the center of the target.
- Although persons working or living near the target can provide important information, one should be wary of the advice of local "experts." Often they have little or no training or experience in target evaluation, and may know less than they think they do.
- Assessments should focus on the CARVER elements separately, and as they interrelate.
- When conducting assessments, three heads (and three sets of eyes) are better than one or two. A second opinion is helpful, but a third will provide greater insight and prevent potential deadlock.
- It is helpful to do separate analyses of like sites, and then to compare the results.
- Where security considerations permit, CARVER reports should be signed and dated to fix responsibility, facilitate scheduled updating, and identify future reconnaissance team and analyst training requirements.
- The farther one is from the risks of an operation, the more feasible the operation appears and the more academic the intelligence requirements seem. It is important to integrate both planning staff and operators in the analysis process.

# GLOSSARY

| | |
|---|---|
| abn | airborne |
| AA | avenue of approach |
| AC | Active Component |
| ACofS | Assistant Chief of Staff |
| ACP | Army country profile |
| ADA | air defense artillery |
| ADP | automatic data processing |
| AFSOC | Air Force Special Operations Command |
| AFSOF | Air Force Special Operations Forces |
| AGL | above ground level |
| AI | area of interest |
| AIA | Army Intelligence Agency |
| AID | Agency for International Development |
| AMPS | amplification requests |
| AO | area of operations |
| AOB | air order of battle |
| ARNGUS | Army National Guard United States |
| ARSOC | Army Special Operations Command |
| ARSOF | Army Special Operations Forces |
| ASD (SO/LIC) | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict |
| ASE | aircraft survivability equipment |
| ASG | area support group |
| ASIC | all-source intelligence center |
| ASPS | all-source production section |
| AST | area specialist team |
| ATTG | automated tactical target graphic |
| AV | audiovisual |
| AVN | aviation |
| BAE | battlefield area evaluation |
| BDA | battle damage assessment |
| bde | brigade |
| BE | basic encyclopedia |
| BLS | beach landing site |
| BMNT | beginning morning nautical twilight |
| bn | battalion |
| BPS | basic PSYOP studies |
| $C^2$ | command and control |
| $C^3$ | command, control, and communications |
| $C^3CM$ | command, control, and communications countermeasures |
| $C^3I$ | command, control, communications, and intelligence requirements management |
| CA | civil affairs |
| CAA | command arrangement agreements |
| CARVER | criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability |
| CCIR | commander's critical information requirements |
| cdr | commander |
| C-E | communications and electronics |
| CG | commanding general |
| CI | counterintelligence |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CINC | commander-in-chief |
| CINCSOC | Command-in-Chief, Special Operations Command |
| CIR | continuing intelligence requirements |
| CI/SEC | counterintelligence/security |
| CM&D | collection management and dissemination |
| CMA | collection management authority |
| cmd | command |
| CMEC | Captured Materiel Exploitation Center |
| CMO | civil-military operations |
| co | company |
| COA | course of action |
| COCOM | combatant command |
| COIN | counterinsurgency |
| col | collection |
| col rqmts | collate requirements |
| COMINT | communications intelligence |
| comm | communications |
| COMMZ | communication zone |

| | |
|---|---|
| CONPLAN | contingency plan |
| CONUS | continental United States |
| CONUSA | continental United States Army |
| CS | combat support |
| CSAR | combat search and rescue |
| CSG | cryptologic support group |
| CSP | contingency support package |
| CSS | combat service support |
| CT | counterterrorism |
| cur intl | current intelligence |
| DA | direct action |
| DC | displaced civilian |
| DCA | Defense Communications Agency |
| DCS | Defense Communications System |
| DCSINT | Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence |
| DCSOPS | Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations |
| det | detachment |
| det rqmts | determine requirements |
| DF | direction finding |
| DIA | Defense Intelligence Agency |
| DIRLAUTH | direct liaison authority |
| dissem | dissemination |
| DMA | Defense Mapping Agency |
| DNA | Defense Nuclear Agency |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| DOI | Director of Intelligence |
| DP | decision point |
| DS | direct support |
| DST | decision support template |
| DZ | drop zone |
| E&E | evasion and escape |
| EAC | echelon above corps |
| EACIC | echelon above corps intelligence center |
| ECCM | electronic counter-countermeasures |
| ECM | electronic countermeasures |
| econ | economy |
| EEFI | essential elements of friendly information |
| EEI | essential elements of information |
| EENT | ending evening nautical twilight |
| ELINT | electronics intelligence |
| EOB | electronic order of battle |
| EPW | enemy prisoner of war |
| ESM | electronic support measures |
| est | estimate |
| eval | evaluate |
| EW | electronic warfare |
| EWR | early warning radar |
| FA | feasibility assessment |
| FALOP | forward area limited observing program |
| FARP | forward arming and refueling point |
| FID | foreign internal defense |
| FISINT | foreign instrumentation signals intelligence |
| FIST | fire support team |
| FOB | forward operating base |
| FSO | fire support officer |
| FRAGO | fragmentary order |
| FSB | forward staging base |
| FSCOORD | fire support coordination |
| fwd | forward |
| $G^1$ | Assistant Chief of Staff (Personnel) |
| $G^2$ | Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence) |
| $G^3$ | Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations and Plans) |
| $G^4$ | Assistant Chief of Staff (Logistics) |
| GCI | ground controlled intercept |
| GDIP | general defense intelligence program |
| gen rqmts | generate requirements |
| GOB | ground order of battle |
| govt | government |
| GP (R) | group (reserve) |
| GRP | group |
| GS | general support |
| GSR | ground surveillance radar |
| GW | guerrilla warfare |
| HF | high frequency |
| HHC | headquarters and headquarters company |
| HHD | headquarters and headquarters detachment |

| | |
|---|---|
| HN | host nation |
| hq | headquarters |
| hr | hour |
| HUMINT | human intelligence |
| HVT | high-value target |
| I&W | indications and warning |
| IC | infiltration corridor |
| IEW | intelligence and electronic warfare |
| II | imagery interpretation |
| IIR | intelligence information report |
| IMINT | imagery intelligence |
| INSCOM | United States Army Intelligence and Security Command |
| INTSUM | intelligence summary |
| IPA | intelligence production agency |
| IPB | intelligence preparation of the battlefield |
| IPR | intelligence production requirement |
| IR | information requirements |
| IROL | imagery reconnaissance objectives list |
| ISA | International Standardization Agreements |
| ISB | initial staging base |
| ISE | intelligence support element |
| ISOFAC | isolation facility |
| IST | intelligence support team |
| J-TENS | Joint Tactical Exploitation of National Systems |
| J2 | Directorate of Intelligence |
| J6 | Communications-Electronics Directorate |
| JCS | Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| JFC | joint force commander |
| JFSOCC | Joint Force Special Operations Command commander |
| JIC | joint intelligence center |
| JIF | joint interrogation facility |
| JOPS | joint operations planning system |
| JPOTF | joint psychological operations task force |
| JRFL | Joint Restricted Frequency List |
| JRTC | Joint Readiness Training Center |
| JSCP | Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan |
| JSOA | joint special operations area |
| JSOC | Joint Special Operations Command |
| JSOTF | joint special operations task force |
| JSTPS | joint strategic target planning staff |
| JTCB | Joint Target Coordination Board |
| JTF | joint task force |
| lat | latitude |
| LIC | low-intensity conflict |
| LLSO | low-level source operation |
| LNE | liaison national element |
| LNO | liaison officer |
| LOC | lines of communication |
| long | longitude |
| LOS | line-of-sight |
| LRS | longrange surveillance |
| LTD | laser target designation |
| LZ | landing zone |
| MACOM | Major Army Command |
| MASINT | measurement and signature intelligence |
| MC | mobility corridor |
| MC&G | mapping, charting, and geodesy |
| MDCI | multidisciplined counterintelligence |
| METT-T | mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available |
| MI | military intelligence |
| MICON | mission concept |
| MIJI | meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference |
| MISTE | Military Intelligence Specialty Training Element |
| MOB | missile order of battle |
| MOS | military occupational specialty |
| MPA | mission planning agent |
| MSC | major subordinate command |
| MSI | multispectral imagery |
| msn | mission |
| MSU | major subordinate unit |
| MTMC | Military Traffic Management Command |
| MTP | mission tasking package |
| NAI | named area of interest |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NAVSOC | Naval Special Operations Command |
| NAVSOF | Naval Special Operations Forces |

| | |
|---|---|
| NAVSPECWARCOM | Naval Special Warfare Command |
| NBC | nuclear, biological, and chemical |
| NCA | National Command Authority |
| NEO | noncombatant evacuation operations |
| NM | nautical mile |
| NOB | naval order of battle |
| NOD | night observation device |
| NRFI | nonrecurring finished intelligence |
| NRT | near-real-time |
| NSA | National Security Agency |
| NTC | national training center |
| NVG | night vision goggles |
| OA | objective area |
| OAE | operational area evaluation |
| OB | order of battle |
| OCOKA | observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach |
| OCONUS | outside continental United States |
| ODA | operational detachment-A |
| ODB | operational detachment-B |
| ODCSINT | Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence |
| OIR | other intelligence request |
| OP | observation post |
| OPCEN | operations center |
| OPCON | operational control |
| OPLAN | operations plan |
| OPSEC | operations security |
| OSD | Office of the Secretary of Defense |
| PCOMS | privacy communications system |
| PDC | product development center |
| PIR | priority intelligence requirements |
| POE | plan of execution |
| POG | psychological operations group |
| POL | petroleum, oils, and lubricants |
| PRC | population and resource control |
| pri rqmts | prioritize requirements |
| PSYOP | psychological operations |
| PW | prisoner of war |
| PZ | pickup zone |
| QSTAG | Quadripartite Standardization Agreement |
| R&A | research and analysis |
| R&S | reconnaissance and surveillance |
| RC | reserve component |
| RDT | reactive doctrinal template |
| rec | received |
| recon | reconnaissance |
| REDTRAIN | readiness training |
| rgt | regiment |
| RET | reactive event template |
| rgr | ranger |
| RII | request for intelligence information |
| RIP | Register of Intelligence Publications |
| RPG | rocket-propelled grenade |
| RST | reactive situational template |
| RZ | reconnaissance zone |
| S2 | Intelligence Officer |
| S3 | Operations and Training officer |
| S5 | Civil Affairs Officer (US Army) |
| SAFE | selected areas for evasion |
| SAID | SAFE area intelligence descriptions |
| SAM | surface-to-air missile |
| san | sanitize |
| SAP | special access program |
| SAR | search and rescue |
| SCI | sensitive compartmented information |
| SCIF | sensitive compartmented information facility |
| SDV | seal delivery vehicle |
| SECDEF | Secretary of Defense |
| SERE | survival, evasion, resistance, and escape |
| SF | Special Forces |
| SFG | special forces group |
| SFG(A) | special forces group (airborne) |
| SFOB | special forces operations base |
| SIGCEN | signal center |
| SIGINT | signals intelligence |
| SII | statement of intelligence interest |
| SIO | senior intelligence officer |
| SIR | specific information requirements |
| SJA | staff judge advocate |
| SO | special operations |

| | |
|---|---|
| SOA | Special Operations Aviation |
| SOC | special operations command |
| SOCC | special operations command element |
| SOCCENT | Special Operations Command, Central |
| SOCEUR | Special Operations Command, Europe |
| SOCLANT | Special Operations Command, Atlantic |
| SOCPAC | Special Operations Command, Pacific |
| SOCSOUTH | Special Operations Command, South |
| SOF | special operations forces |
| SOFA | status of forces agreement |
| SOI | signal operation instructions |
| SOMPF | special operations mission planning folder |
| SOP | standing operating procedure |
| SOR | specific orders and requirements |
| SOSAR | special operations search and rescue |
| SOT-A | support operations team-A |
| SOT-B | support operations team-B |
| SPECAT | special category |
| spt | support |
| SPTCEN | support center |
| SR | special reconnaissance |
| SSO | special security office |
| SSR | special security representative |
| STANAG | Standardization Agreements |
| SWO | staff weather officer |
| TAACOM | theater army area command |
| tac | tactical |
| TAE | target area evaluation |
| TAG | target assessment group |
| TAI | target area of interest |
| TASOSC | Theater Army Special Operations Support Command |
| TCAE | technical control and analysis element |
| TECHINT | technical intelligence |
| TEMPEST | compromising emanations |
| TENCAP | Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities |
| tgt | target |
| tgt intel | target intelligence |
| thrt asmt | threat assessment |
| TIP | target intelligence package |
| tm | team |
| TOC | tactical operations center |
| TOE | tables of organization and equipment |
| TPL | time phase line |
| TTP | tactics, techniques, and procedures |
| U&S | unified and specified |
| US | United States |
| USA | US Army |
| USACA | US Army Civil Affairs |
| USACAPOC | US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command |
| USADAO | United States Defense Attache Office |
| USAF | United States Air Force |
| USAFE | United States Air Forces in Europe |
| USAFLANT | United States Air Force, Atlantic |
| USAFSO | United States Air Force special operations |
| USAJFKSWCS | United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center |
| USAR | US Army Reserve |
| USARCENT | United States Army, Central |
| USAREUR | United States Army, Europe |
| USARLANT | United States Army, Atlantic |
| USARSO | United States Army, South |
| USASFC | United States Army Special Forces Command |
| USASOC | United States Army Special Operations Command |
| USCENTAF | United States Central Air Force |
| USCINCSOC | Commander-in-Chief, United States Special Operations Command |
| USIA | United States information Agency |
| USLANTFLT | United States Atlantic Fleet |
| USMC | United States Marine Corps |
| USN | United States Navy |
| USNAVCENT | United States Navy, Central |
| USNAVEUR | United States Navy, Europe |
| USNAVSO | United States Navy, South |
| USPACAF | United States Pacific Air Forces |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| USSOCOM | United States Special Operations Command | val rqmts | validate requirements |
| USSPACECOM | United States Space Command | WO | Washington office |
| UTM | universal transverse mercator | WWIMS | Worldwide Warning and Indication Monitoring System |
| UW | unconventional warfare | | |

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